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Abstract 
This dissertation is a collection of essays that investigate the intersection of 
managerial behaviors, corporate governance quality, and financial outcomes.  
Chapter 1 explores the relationship between chief executive compensation, financial 
performance, and corporate governance quality for large U.S. nonprofits – an 
organizational form that does not have owners.  Strong corporate governance helps 
to establish reasonable levels of managerial pay and perquisite consumption, and to 
mitigate excessively high levels of executive compensation that tend to accompany 
poor organizational performance.  These findings demonstrate the positive impact of 
good governance on managerial behaviors and corporate outcomes in a setting where 
monitoring mechanisms are inherently weak.  Chapter 2 examines whether nonprofit 
hospitals use earnings management to enhance their charitable image.  Nonprofit 
hospitals whose earnings deviate from a low profit benchmark shift costs from non-
patient-centered to patient-centered activities to project the appearance that they are 
better fulfilling a charitable mission and patient-centered focus.  This effect is 
magnified for hospitals with greater normative pressures, lower regulatory oversight, 
and greater reliance on external financing through donations.  These findings 
highlight the importance of looking beyond bottom-line net income when assessing 
the quality of accounting earnings.  Chapter 3 investigates the impact of corporate 
political connections on firm value and financial policies in the context of a 
landmark Supreme Court ruling, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
(“Citizens United”).  Historically politically connected firms realized an abnormal 
xiv 
 
price drop of −0.475% on the date the Citizens United decision was announced, and 
a cumulative abnormal loss of −1.219% five days after the announcement date.  In 
contrast, historically non-politically connected firms enjoyed positive returns on 
announcement date on the order of 0.240%.  Additionally, the corporate cash 
holdings of historically politically connected firms increase in response to the 
Citizens United decision, particularly when corporate governance is weak.  These 
findings support a link between agency costs and political connections. 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Executive Compensation, Organizational Performance, and 
Governance Quality in the Absence of Owners 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Stark differences in the organizational forms of nonprofit and for-profit 
entities have elicited an assortment of concerns about the role and responsibilities of 
nonprofit managers.  Specifically, nonprofit organizations lack many of the external 
monitoring mechanisms native to for-profit entities, thereby allotting nonprofit 
managers discretion about whether and how to prioritize their organization’s goals 
and objectives or, alternatively, their own personal interests.  However, despite the 
prominence of the nonprofit sector in the U.S. economy – specifically, encompassing 
5.5% of U.S. GDP and 9% of the nation’s labor force (in 2010)1 – many of these 
concerns remain unaddressed by both researchers and regulators.  Indeed, of 
particular importance is the nonprofit organization’s absence of shareholders and the 
implications such lack of oversight has on the motives and actions of nonprofit 
managers.  Given that the managers of nonprofits are not held accountable to (and 
are not themselves) owners of the organization, nonprofit entities are exposed to 
agency conflicts that are arguably more prevalent and of greater severity than those 
facing for-profit organizations.
2
  These concerns draw special attention to nonprofit 
                                                 
1
 See Roeger, Blackwood, and Pettijohn (2013). 
2
 Clearly, the term “agency conflicts” in the nonprofit context does not carry the same meaning as in 
for-profits because nonprofits do not have residual claimants – just a nebulous set of “stakeholders.”  
I use the term “agency conflicts” here in the broader sense of managers pursuing personal goals 
instead of those of the organization.  
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governance quality since implementing strong governance mechanisms should help 
to ward off undesirable consequences that are likely to accompany agency conflicts, 
such as high levels of executive pay and/or poor organizational performance.  This 
paper presents evidence targeted at answering four main research questions:  (1) 
What factors determine CEO-to-employee relative pay and, separately, executive 
perquisites at nonprofits?, (2) What factors explain organizational performance?, (3) 
What is the relationship (if any) between CEO-to-employee relative pay and 
organizational performance?, and (4) What role does governance quality play with 
respect to the relations described in (1), (2), and (3)? 
I investigate the intersection between CEO-to-employee relative pay, 
organizational performance, and governance quality in the context of a large and 
diverse sample of nonprofit organizations over the period 2008-2010, utilizing 
nonprofit financial and governance data drawn from the significantly redesigned 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from 
Income Tax, which large nonprofits are required to file beginning in tax year 2008.  
By most accounts, the most notable additions to the new form were questions related 
to governance practices.  The new section, entitled “Governance, Management, and 
Disclosure”, was touted as the revamped form’s “crown jewel” by Steven T. Miller, 
former Commissioner of the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division (Miller 
2008).  These new data allow for a comprehensive analysis of nonprofit governance 
quality that was previously impossible to conduct.  I investigate how nonprofit 
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relative pay and measures of nonprofit performance relate to a nonprofit governance 
quality index that I construct from this relatively new dataset. 
Also of interest in the present study is the relation between nonprofit CEO-to-
employee relative pay and nonprofit performance.
3
  A talented and very hard-
working CEO who operates in the best interests of the nonprofit may be rewarded for 
achieving optimal organizational performance (Pay-for-Performance Hypothesis).  
Controlling for other factors, this hypothesis implies a positive relation between 
CEO compensation and measures of nonprofit performance.  In contrast, abnormally 
high CEO compensation may arise if governance mechanisms are inadequate such 
that some CEOs are able to use their power, influence, and freedom from monitoring 
to extract high levels of compensation and/or to minimize their efforts (Agency-
Governance Hypothesis), implying a negative relation between relative pay and 
performance.  While the former example highlights an optimal relation between 
relative pay and performance, the latter profiles a case of sub-optimally high relative 
pay and low organizational performance.  To disentangle these hypotheses, it is 
important to account for governance quality since both CEO-to-employee relative 
pay and organizational performance should be impacted by board monitoring and 
                                                 
3
 As a testament to the relevance of pay-for-performance in the nonprofit setting, it is worth noting 
that several large nonprofits explicitly state that executive pay is tied to organizational 
performance.  For example, the compensation committee charter of the American Cancer Society 
states that the committee must identify the measures and levels of performance to be used when 
setting the CEO’s annual incentive plan goals 
(http://www.cancer.org/aboutus/whoweare/governance/acspc-041378).  Dignity Health states that a 
substantial portion of executive pay is linked to organizational performance 
(http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Dignity-Health-statement.pdf).  
In a 2014 job posting for Chief of Staff, Bellweather Education Partners describes a benefits 
package that is based in part on firm performance 
(http://www.bridgespan.org/Nonprofit_Jobs/Position_Details.aspx?jobId=11556). 
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governance.  Specifically, when governance quality is high, we might expect a 
positive relationship between executive pay and nonprofit performance.  In practice, 
however, any quantitative measure of governance (including the one employed here) 
provides a mere proxy for true governance quality since we cannot observe 
individual board member characteristics, such as how capable they are or the effort 
they expend.  Therefore, a finding of a negative relation between CEO-to-employee 
relative pay and nonprofit performance after accounting for the governance measure, 
would constitute additional evidence of serious governance issues at many 
nonprofits.  Hence, this paper tests whether, if at all, there exists a link between CEO 
compensation and nonprofit performance that is of a positive (Pay-for-Performance 
Hypothesis) or negative (Agency-Governance Hypothesis) variety, and how any 
such relation depends on nonprofit governance quality.  Clearly both hypotheses 
imply that CEO-to-employee relative pay and organizational performance are 
endogenous since both are likely impacted by unobservable variables such as 
executive ability, motivation and talent.  I address this likely endogeneity between 
relative pay and organizational performance using instrumental variables. 
Pay of both executives and non-executives likely differs considerably from 
one nonprofit to another.  For instance, salaries at hospitals or major universities tend 
to exceed those in preschools and local theatre groups.  To partially account for this, 
I utilize a “relative pay ratio,” defined as (the natural log of) the ratio of CEO 
compensation to average non-CEO employee compensation.  Nonprofit performance 
is captured through four measures, including the ratios of program expenses to total 
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expenses, program expenses to total assets, net fundraising revenue to total 
fundraising revenue, and (the log of) total revenue per employee (e.g., Desai and 
Yetman 2006).  As detailed below, governance quality is defined as an index of 
numerous mechanisms that illustrate the efficacy of the nonprofit’s governing body, 
governing policies, compensation policies, and accountability and transparency. 
I begin the analysis by examining the determinants of the CEO-to-employee 
relative pay ratio.  Controlling for other factors such as industry, nonprofit size, age, 
and other firm characteristics, as well as CEO tenure and gender, and controlling for 
endogeneity with instrumental variables, I find that relative pay is negatively related 
to both the index of governance quality and nonprofit performance.  The statistically 
significant negative association between the relative pay ratio and nonprofit 
performance is robust to including several factors that could impact both the relative 
pay ratio and performance, including size, donations growth, liquidity, and asset 
tangibility.  These results support the view that both nonprofit relative CEO pay and 
organizational performance are subject to agency conflicts, i.e., that at poorly 
governed nonprofits, insufficiently monitored CEOs are apparently awarded high 
levels of relative pay while minimizing their efforts. 
Next, I explore the determinants of four measures of nonprofit performance 
while controlling for traditional factors such as firm size, leverage, liquid assets, and 
asset tangibility.  The relation between performance and the governance index is 
weak and varies depending on the performance measure.  However, as previously 
observed, the negative relation between relative pay and performance is strong and 
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consistent across all four performance measures indicating that both relative pay and 
performance are subject to agency and governance problems at nonprofits.  
Additional analyses using a changes specification lend further support to the 
Agency-Governance Hypothesis. 
I also investigate how other types of executive compensation relate to 
organizational performance and governance quality.  One result of ineffective 
monitoring mechanisms could be an over-consumption of executive perquisites.  
Consistent with this theory, I find that weak governance quality (i.e., ineffective 
monitoring mechanisms) is associated with a higher likelihood of executive 
perquisites, such as first-class travel, discretionary spending accounts, and housing 
allowances.  Moreover, inferior performance (also suggestive of ineffective 
monitoring mechanisms) is associated with a greater prevalence of executive 
perquisites.  Taking the opposing view, what can be said for an organization that is 
characterized by strong governance quality and superior organizational 
performance?  I find that, although well-governed and high-performing nonprofits 
are individually less likely to award CEOs with perquisites, good governance quality 
is associated with an incremental but significant increase in the likelihood of 
perquisites among high-performing entities.  Collectively, these results suggest that 
while the Agency-Governance Hypothesis is applicable to the average nonprofit 
organization, the Pay-for-Performance Hypothesis is supported for nonprofits that 
are both well-governed and high-performing.  
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In addition to a general investigation of how expected CEO-to-employee 
relative pay and organizational performance at nonprofits are impacted by 
governance quality, I investigate how especially high relative pay and especially 
poor performance are related to governance quality.  While the results of this paper 
clearly indicate that relative pay at the average nonprofit is inversely related to the 
governance index, it is possible that extremely high relative pay is even more 
strongly related to the governance index.  Using quantile regressions to infer whether 
extremely high CEO-to-employee relative pay arises due to poor nonprofit 
governance, I find that the governance index has a much stronger impact on the 80
th
 
quantile than on the conditional mean.  Thus, while relative pay at the average firm is 
inversely related to governance quality, it appears that very high relative pay is even 
more strongly associated with poor governance.  In other words, good governance 
appears especially effective at restraining extremely high relative pay within 
nonprofit organizations.   
Finally, I analyze whether the relation between nonprofit relative pay, 
organizational performance, and governance quality differs as a function of 
nonprofits’ revenue structures.  Specifically, nonprofits constrained by reliance on a 
single source of funding likely differ from their peers along dimensions that could 
plausibly impact the pay-performance-governance intersection.  I find that the 
negative pay-for-performance relation is generally robust to nonprofit revenue 
structures.  I also find that internal governance quality plays a more prominent role in 
moderating the relative pay levels of nonprofits relying on multiple funding sources 
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relative to those with a more focused revenue structure.  Stronger competitive forces 
accompanying the focused revenue structures may act as an inherent (external) 
disciplinary force that precludes the need for strong internal governance.
 
 
This paper contributes unique evidence on the alignment of managers’ and 
owners’ interests.  Specifically, systematic differences in the external monitoring 
mechanisms of nonprofits relative to those of their for-profit counterparts create 
unique opportunities by which managers can extract corporate resources or 
manipulate corporate outcomes for their personal gain (see, for example, the earnings 
management literature of Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006 and Keating, 
Parsons, and Roberts 2008).  These distinctive attributes join together to make the 
nonprofit sector a highly desirable research setting, and one that despite its economic 
importance – with about 20% of U.S. corporations operating as nonprofits – has been 
largely neglected in existing corporate finance literature (Adelino, Lewellen, and 
Sundaram 2014).  Existing studies (described below) fall short of providing a 
complete picture of the potential consequences of (nonprofit) managers without 
owners.  In an attempt to fill this gap, I use relatively new data for a large cross-
section of nonprofits to study the relationship between executive compensation, 
organizational performance, and governance quality.   
Regarding extant literature of executive pay, relevant studies of the nonprofit 
labor market profile the intrinsic motives of nonprofit workers both from theoretical 
(e.g., Frey 1997) and empirical (e.g., Jobome 2006) standpoints.  Consistent with the 
labor donation theory hypothesis of Preston (1989), Steinberg (1990) concludes that 
9 
 
high wages can undermine the morale of (intrinsically motivated) nonprofit workers.  
Nevertheless, modern anecdotal evidence has revealed numerous instances of grossly 
overcompensated CEOs (e.g., Buettner 2011; Hancock 2013), casting doubt on the 
true motives and reward structures of nonprofit executives.  Related literature on 
nonprofit executive pay reveals a positive link between executive pay and nonprofit 
size (e.g., Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda 2012; Frumkin and Keating 2010; Hallock 
2002) that varies across industries and ownership types (Ballou and Weisbrod 2003; 
Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach, and Wosinska 2004).   
This paper also relates to existing studies that link executive compensation to 
firm performance.  In the context of the nonprofit sector, difficulty in quantifying 
nonprofit performance implies potentially few performance-based incentives for 
nonprofit executives (e.g., Erus and Weisbrod 2003).  Empirical evidence on the 
matter reveals mixed insights on any relation between nonprofit performance and 
executive pay, ranging from a weak but positive relation (Baber, Daniel, and Roberts 
2002) to a negative association (Garner and Harrison 2013) to no significant relation 
at all (O’Connell 2005; Sedatole, Swaney, Yetman, and Yetman 2014).   Relating 
CEO-to-employee relative pay to multiple measures of nonprofit performance, I find 
a strong and consistent negative relation. 
This paper also contributes to existing studies of governance quality and its 
impact on both executive pay and firm performance.  An examination of the 
importance of corporate governance mechanisms in nonprofit organizations is 
particularly essential, given the prevalence of weak governance quality in nonprofits 
10 
 
relative to their for-profit counterparts (Fama and Jensen 1983; Glaeser 2003).  
Inherent challenges to establishing an effective system of nonprofit governance stem 
from the sector’s nondistribution constraint on residual income, the absence of a 
market for corporate control, and the uniqueness of nonprofit objectives (e.g., Brody 
1996).  Extant empirical literature demonstrates that poor governance quality 
alienates donors (Hansmann 1980), while improvements in governance are 
associated with more efficient operations (Alexander and Lee 2006; Callen, Klein, 
and Tinkelman 2003).  Related studies of the nonprofit governing board – a 
monitoring mechanism described as a critical input to achieving the organization’s 
charitable and performance goals (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Miller-Millesen 2003) 
– reveals links between larger boards and decreased monitoring incentives (O’Regan 
and Oster 2005) as well as between insider boards and higher compensation levels 
(Brickley, Van Horn, and Wedig 2010; Cardinaels 2009).   
While these findings are informative, the extant literature fails to offer a 
definitive prediction as to how executive pay should relate to nonprofit performance 
nor does it test how nonprofit executive pay is related to governance measures.  
Using governance data newly made available on the IRS Form 990, this paper 
explores the impact of nonprofit governance quality on both executive compensation 
and organizational performance. 
The next section presents a discussion of relevant literature and develops my 
hypotheses regarding executive compensation, organizational performance, and 
corporate governance quality.  Section III describes the sampling procedure and 
11 
 
section IV reports the results of the empirical analyses.  Conclusions are offered in 
section V.   
 
 
II.  Nonprofit Compensation, Performance, & Governance 
The nonprofit sector is a substantial and increasingly important component of 
the U.S. economy.  In 2012, there were 1.6 million nonprofit entities registered with 
the IRS.  As of 2010, the nonprofit sector encompassed 5.5% of U.S. GDP and 9% of 
the nation's labor force.  At this time, public charities reported an aggregate $1.5 
trillion in revenues, $1.45 trillion in expenses, and $2.71 trillion in total assets.  Gifts 
from individual foundations, corporations, and bequests reached approximately 
$290.89 billion.
4
  As of year 2010, the median CEO pay among 282 large charities 
was $475,192 – a 2.7% increase over the prior year (Gose and López-Rivera 2012). 
 
A.  The Nonprofit Labor Market 
A large proportion of extant nonprofit research has explored the motives, 
roles, and responsibilities of the nonprofit worker.  While for-profit workers are 
predominantly motivated by tangible monetary incentives, nonprofit workers tend to 
be intrinsically motivated and grateful to work for the greater good (Frey 1997; 
Gallagher and Einhorn 1976; Mirvis and Hackett 1983).  The altruistic nature of 
                                                 
4
 Interestingly, while many other sectors of the economy struggled during the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, most nonprofit industries thrived, reporting an increase in both employment and wage levels 
in 2010 relative to 2000 on the order of 17% and 29%, respectively (inflation-adjusted).  This 
positive pattern runs counter to that of the for-profit business sector, which endured a drop in both 
employment and wage levels over the same period of –6% and –1%, respectively (Roeger, 
Blackwood, and Pettijohn 2013) . 
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nonprofit worker preferences has been formalized by labor donation theory (Preston 
1989), which predicts that nonprofit workers select into their roles based on the 
charitable mission of the nonprofit rather than its propensity to distribute monetary 
benefits.  For example, according to Hansmann (1980), the nonprofit sector can 
better attract intrinsically motivated workers by establishing lower pay levels relative 
to the for-profit sector.  Preyra and Pink (2001) use the multitask agent model of 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) to demonstrate that conservative pay levels can 
motivate a nonprofit manager to focus on the core (often unobservable) activities of a 
charitable organization.  In a review of related research, Steinberg (1990) concludes 
that high pay levels can actually undermine the morale of intrinsically motivated 
workers.  Handy and Katz (1988) find that committed nonprofit workers are willing 
to accept a lower salary in exchange for working in the nonprofit sector.  Weisbrod 
(1983) finds that lawyers working for the public interest accept lower pay relative to 
attorneys of private practice.  The notion that nonprofit workers donate their labor is 
also consistent with the empirical results of Jobome (2006) for a sample of U.K. 
charities, Narcy (2011) for a sample of French nonprofits, and Salamon and 
Sokolowski (2005) when finding an 11% wage differential between nonprofit and 
for-profit workers in the U.S.   
Related research on the topic of nonprofit labor markets provides insights on 
variation due to gender, skill, and industry.  For example, in a study of the U.S. labor 
market, Preston (1990) finds that the wage gap between lesser-paid nonprofit 
workers and higher-paid for-profit workers is less pronounced for females relative to 
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males.  Based on U.S. Census data, Preston and Sacks (2010) find that the average 
nonprofit worker earns about the same as a less-skilled for-profit worker.  Using data 
for Great Britain, France, and Italy for year 1998, Lucifora and Meurs (2006) find 
that, on average, highly skilled workers receive higher pay in the private sector 
relative to the public sector, while just the opposite is true for low-skill types.  They 
find that these pay differences are larger for (1) females when compared to males, 
and (2) less regulated environments (e.g., Great Britain) relative to more stringent 
regulatory environments (e.g., France and Italy).  Segal and Weisbrod (2002) find 
that volunteers will select into industries that align well with their skills and 
preferences, which creates inter-industry variation in volunteer supply. 
Extant research also demonstrates that the type – and not just amount – of 
incentives impacts managerial (and organizational) performance.  Specifically, 
nonprofit organizations are known to reward managers with perquisites such as 
elaborate offices, shorter workdays, and additional vacation time (Glaeser and 
Shleifer 2001).  Relatedly, when donor monitoring is weak, Preston (1988) contends 
that excess donations may be used to fund perquisites.  Additional insights into the 
importance of pay composition are provided in related for-profit literature (e.g., 
Ryan and Wiggins 2004). 
 
B.  Nonprofit Executive Compensation 
As a matter of U.S. law, nonprofit organizations “must not be organized or 
operated for the benefit of private interests…” (IRC § 501(c)(3)(d)(ii)).  Even so, 
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numerous cases of high nonprofit executive pay have been documented.  For 
example, Philip Levy and Joel Levy (brothers), two top executives of a Medicaid-
financed nonprofit organization serving the developmentally disabled in New York, 
faced significant scrutiny for earning nearly $1 million a year, driving state-funded 
luxury cars, and passing their children’s tuition bills onto the nonprofit group 
(Buettner 2011).  As another example, in mid-2013, Senator Charles Grassley – a 
long-time critic of nonprofit hospitals – voiced serious concerns about nonprofit 
boards rewarding CEOs with large monetary bonuses in return for their increasing 
the quantity, not the quality, of services provided (Hancock 2013).  One of the many 
other heavily scrutinized cases of apparent abuse of nonprofits’ tax-exempt status is 
that of American Bureau of Shipping, a company advertising “to promote the 
security of life & property on the seas” (American Bureau of Shipping 2011), and 
“which lavished its executives with multimillion-dollar pay packages and perks; and 
purchased an offshore hedge fund [in the Cayman Islands]” (Evans 2012).5   
While these and other well-documented cases of high executive nonprofit pay 
raise obvious concerns regarding the recruitment procedures and governance 
standards in the nonprofit sector, questions on the origins of variation in nonprofit 
executive pay schemes – both within firms (relative to non-executives) and across 
firms (relative to competing organizations) – have not been rigorously explored 
heretofore.  Existing evidence supports a positive association between executive pay 
and organizational size (e.g., Aggarwal, Evans, and Nanda 2012; Frumkin and 
                                                 
5
 For other examples involving allegations of excessive nonprofit executive pay, see Dennison (2011), 
Doyle (2011), Fries (2013), Kruesi (2011), Pogrebin and Taylor (2010), and Sataline (2010). 
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Keating 2010; Hallock 2002), systematic differences in pay levels across industries 
and ownership types (Ballou and Weisbrod 2003; Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach, 
and Wosinska 2004), a positive association between excess executive pay and excess 
liquid asset levels (Core, Guay, and Verdi 2006), and an inverse association between 
pay levels and donation inflows (Balsam and Harris 2014; Galle and Walker 2014).  
However, the literature fails to offer conclusive evidence on many important issues 
involving nonprofit compensation, such as how executive pay relates to 
organizational performance and corporate governance. 
 
C.  Nonprofit Performance and Executive Pay 
Studying the relation between nonprofit performance and any other variable 
is complicated by the fact that there is no universally accepted measure of nonprofit 
performance.  Structural differences in the profit motives and pricing structures of 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (e.g., Hoerger 1991) imply that performance 
measures are generally not interchangeable between the two sectors.  Because it is 
difficult to quantify the performance of nonprofit organizations, the compensation 
structure of nonprofit executives includes fewer performance-based incentives 
relative to that of for-profit executives (Erus and Weisbrod 2003; Roomkin and 
Weisbrod 1999; Wilding, Collins, Jochum, and Wainwright 2004).  Accordingly, 
Jobome (2006) posits that any relation between nonprofit performance and 
managerial pay should be weak, though this prediction may vary based on the 
nonprofit’s financing mix.  For example, Rose-Ackerman (1987) illustrates that a 
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nonprofit heavily relying on private donations – especially in lieu of other funding 
sources – will be held more accountable to its donors, which could affect managerial 
behaviors and performance.
6
  A predicted weak pay-for-performance relation in 
nonprofits stands in stark contrast to the repeatedly documented positive pay-for-
performance link in for-profit entities (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990; Conyon and 
He 2011),
7
 which stems from a desire to align the manager’s actions with the 
company’s profit-maximizing goals. 
Empirical studies in the nonprofit realm have yielded mixed evidence on the 
pay-for-performance relation.  For a sample of U.S. liberal arts colleges, O’Connell 
(2005) finds an insignificant relation between chief executive pay and endowment 
yield.  In a cross-sectional study of charities based in the state of Maryland for the 
period 1996-1997, Baber, Daniel, and Roberts (2002) find a weak but positive 
relation between CEO pay and nonprofit performance, where the latter captures 
changes in program spending.  Related studies, all based on the U.S. nonprofit 
sector, contribute additional and varied conclusions:  Sedatole, Swaney, Yetman, and 
Yetman (2014) find no significant relation between executive pay and program 
spending; Garner and Harrison (2013) document a negative association between 
executive pay and program spending levels when the CEO is the only executive 
listed on the Form 990; while Brickley and Van Horn (2002) find that executive pay 
                                                 
6
 A sample of the related literature demonstrating the economic impact of nonprofits’ funding mix 
includes Andreoni and Payne (2003) for the U.S., Anheier, Toepler, and Sokolowski (1997) for 
Germany, and both Posnett and Sandler (1989) and Wolk (2013) for the U.K. 
7
 An exception is Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) who find an inverse relation between firm 
performance and the excess amount of compensation to a for-profit’s CEO and directors, 
suggestive of cronyism. 
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is positively related to return on assets.  It bears repeating that studies of nonprofit 
performance share a common weakness, that being the absence of a universally 
accepted and applicable measure of nonprofit performance.  In an attempt to address 
this deficiency, I use multiple measures of performance in the main analyses of this 
paper. 
 
D.  Nonprofit Governance 
A particularly important difference between the organizational forms of for-
profit and nonprofit entities lies in their ownership structures.  Specifically, as noted 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), one of the primary avenues through which agency 
conflicts arise within for-profits is between their agents (managers) and primary 
principals (shareholders), particularly when management fails to fulfill its obligation 
to maximize shareholder wealth.  In stark contrast, nonprofit organizations are bound 
by a non-distribution constraint that prohibits the organization from distributing 
residual income to any individual with an ownership interest in the firm (Weisbrod 
1988).  Moreover, who has property rights to this residual income is not clear (Sloan 
1988).  According to Weisbrod (1989), “The principal source of [the nonprofit 
sector’s] theoretical justification is also the source of its principal liability – the 
nondistribution constraint.  This legal restriction on distributing profit to anyone who 
has control over the organization has the adverse effects of reducing managerial 
incentives to minimize costs, seek out new markets, and innovate” (p. 545).  In an 
attempt to offset these adverse effects, a nonprofit might establish a system of 
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corporate governance protections;
8
 however, available evidence suggests that the 
governance structures of nonprofits are much weaker relative to their for-profit 
counterparts (Glaeser 2003). 
A core component of any corporate governance system is the board of 
directors.  The role of a nonprofit director is particularly complex.  Brody (1996) 
attributes this complexity to the sector’s non-distribution constraint, the absence of a 
market for corporate control, and the uniqueness of each nonprofit’s objective.  
Consistent with “resource dependence theory” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), multiple 
studies have described the board as a key resource (e.g., Brown 2005; Miller-
Millesen 2003).  Hillman and Dalziel (2003) point to board capital, defined as human 
capital (e.g., expertise) and relational capital (e.g., social ties), as being a key 
resource that the nonprofit organization depends on for achieving its charitable and 
performance goals.  Nonprofits may also structure their audit committees to reflect 
demands for monitoring, which are heightened when a nonprofit receives financing 
from the government (Vermeer, Raghunandan, and Forgione 2006).  Fama and 
Jensen (1983) provide an account of what nonprofit boards should entail:  board 
members that are primarily if not entirely external to the organization, most if not all 
of whom meaningfully contribute to the organization through their wealth or time, 
and all of which are prepared to serve without pay.  Middleton (1987) identifies other 
important properties:  nonprofit boards exist to ratify (not formulate) policy, retain 
ultimate decision-making authority even though their decisions are often based on 
                                                 
8
 For formal definitions of “corporate governance,” see Anheier (2005), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
and Tirole (2001). 
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information supplied by management, and tend to dodge controversial issues in the 
interest of preserving harmony and peace among its members.  For an extensive 
synthesis of existing empirical work on nonprofit boards – and specifically on the 
balance of power between nonprofit boards and management, see Ostrower and 
Stone (2006). 
These issues beg the question of what types of governance mechanisms 
nonprofits utilize, and whether there exists a “best practices” system of nonprofit 
governance.  In a survey questionnaire of nonprofits based in the state of North 
Carolina, Iyer and Watkins (2008) provide evidence on nonprofits’ voluntary 
adoption of governance provisions resembling those that had been mandated of for-
profit entities by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Examples include independent 
audit committees, codes of conduct, certifications of financial documents, and 
internal controls.  They find that many nonprofits had implemented at least some of 
these protections, with notable exceptions including code of conduct and 
whistleblower policies.  In a study of nongovernmental development organizations in 
Spain, Andrés-Alonso, Cruz, and Romero-Merino (2006) find that one of the most 
effective governance protections is an active institutional donor.  With such a large 
stake in the entity, these donors have good reasons to carefully monitor the activities 
of managers.  As to whether there exists a one-size-fits-all “best” set of governance 
provisions, existing evidence would suggest otherwise.  Notably, Andrés-Alonso, 
Azofra-Palenzuela, and Romero-Merino (2010) contend that the optimal governance 
system (e.g., board size, number of independent board members, etc.) is 
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organization-specific, and depends on factors such as the character and expertise of 
its directors. 
 
E.  The Economic Importance of Nonprofit Governance 
Studies on the economic impact of nonprofit governance have yielded a 
diverse yet largely fragmented set of findings.
9
  As highlighted by Lynk (1995) for a 
sample of California nonprofit hospitals, there is no one-size-fits-all objective for the 
nonprofit sector.  Specifically, while for-profit entities are established for the purpose 
of maximizing profits (as their name implies), nonprofits are formed for a purpose 
much greater than to simply not make a profit, though that purpose will vary from 
nonprofit to nonprofit.  The consequence of these unique and difficult-to-value 
objectives is that many of the corporate outcomes realized in the for-profit sector are 
not applicable to nonprofits.  For example, according to Lynk (1995), mergers of for-
profit and nonprofit entities distinctly differ:  while for-profit mergers result in a net 
increase in output prices, mergers of private nonprofit hospitals result in a net 
decrease in output prices. 
Despite these challenges, many studies of nonprofit organizations have 
attempted to link nonprofit governance quality to economic variables, such as 
executive compensation.  For example, both Cardinaels (2009) and Brickley, Van 
Horn, and Wedig (2010) provide evidence of a link between high executive pay 
levels and boards composed of a large proportion of “insider” (i.e., non-independent) 
                                                 
9
 See Jegers (2009) for a comprehensive survey of nonprofit research drawn from the economics, 
health economics, management, and accounting disciplines, and their relation to principal-agent 
theory. 
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directors.  Existing evidence suggests that this result also holds for for-profits (e.g., 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999).  Fisman and Hubbard (2005) find that for 
nonprofits having poor governance, more excess funds are distributed as managerial 
pay than are retained by the nonprofit to fund future expenditures.  Eldenburg and 
Krishnan (2003) find that CEOs of municipal district hospitals receive less pay than 
CEOs of private nonprofit hospitals, principally because the boards of municipal 
district hospitals are elected by the public and their governing policies are subject to 
substantial scrutiny. 
Related literature has investigated the association between nonprofit 
governance and organizational performance.  These studies commonly find that 
stronger governance is associated with better nonprofit performance, though drawing 
such inferences is complicated by difficulties in objectively and accurately 
measuring both governance quality and nonprofit performance (e.g., Herman and 
Renz 1997, 1999, 2004).  To measure governance quality, Willems, Huybrechts, 
Jegers, Weijters, Vantilborgh, Bidee, and Pepermans (2012) develop a 26-item 
governance quality index to assess matters such as the board’s responsibilities and 
the nonprofit’s willingness to stay abreast of trends in management and governance 
practices.  Another approach to establish a link between board performance and 
organizational performance is that of Gill, Flynn, and Reissing (2005) who 
developed a Governance Self-Assessment Checklist, an instrument designed to 
inform board members of their own contributions to organizational effectiveness.  
For a sample of Arizona and Florida hospitals, Kalodimos (2014) finds that stronger 
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internal governance significantly improves the prospects of heart attack survival.  
Related work on the governance-performance link of U.S. nonprofits includes 
Callen, Klein, and Tinkelman (2003), who find a positive association between the 
ratio of expenses spent on charitable purposes and the proportion of major donors on 
its board; Alexander and Lee (2006), who document more efficient operations for 
nonprofits whose boards conform to the corporate model of a governing board; and 
Desai and Yetman (2006), who find organizational performance improvements 
pursuant to state-imposed governance provisions.  Additionally, O’Regan and Oster 
(2005) provide a variety of inferences on the economic impact of director-level 
characteristics. 
 
F.  The Intersection of Nonprofit Executive Pay, Organizational Performance, and 
Governance  
 
Additional and more sophisticated research on the intersection of executive 
compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in nonprofit 
entities is warranted for several reasons.  First and foremost, extant literature fails to 
provide a definitive directional prediction as to how nonprofit CEO pay should relate 
to organizational performance, particularly after controlling for governance quality.  
One reason for this deficiency is simply that the volume and depth of governance 
data were lacking prior to the 2008 introduction of a redesigned and much more 
detailed IRS Form 990.  By using data originating from the redesigned Form 990, 
my study overcomes governance-related data limitations. 
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A second motivation for further study of the relation between nonprofit pay, 
performance, and governance is that different empirical studies utilize different 
measures of performance, which further complicates any attempt to make 
meaningful conclusions on the nonprofit pay-for-performance link.  Uncertainty 
underlying how to best measure nonprofit performance – particularly relative to for-
profit performance – has long been recognized as problematic (Roomkin and 
Weisbrod 1999).  I alleviate these ambiguities by making use of multiple measures 
of nonprofit performance in the primary analyses of this paper.  
Lastly, the link between executive pay, performance, and governance has 
become increasingly important in response to better quality compensation 
disclosures already implemented in the U.S. (via the Dodd-Frank Act) and to those 
being seriously considered around the world (see, for example, Gumbel (2013) in the 
case of Europe; Shecter (2013) in the case of Canada; and Vina (2011) in the case of 
the United Kingdom).  In the for-profit executive compensation literature, 
researchers have responded to CEO-to-employee pay ratio disclosure mandates by 
relating firm performance to measures of relative CEO pay.  Examples include 
Faleye, Reis, and Venkateswaran (2013) who utilize a “CEO-employee relative pay 
[ratio],” defined as the ratio of CEO pay to average employee pay (in log form), as 
well as Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) who study the “CEO pay slice,” 
computed as the ratio of CEO pay to total pay to the top 5 executives.  To test for the 
possibility of high CEO compensation in the nonprofit sector, I utilize a measure of 
CEO compensation relative to average employee compensation.  Nonprofit 
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organizations are keenly aware of the fact that similar disclosure requirements, such 
as a ratio of CEO-to-employee relative pay, are likely forthcoming.
10
  By using a 
definition of relative CEO pay, my paper offers new and timely insights into 
nonprofit compensation structures. 
 
III.  Sample 
Data for this study are based on year 2008, 2009, and 2010 filings of IRS 
Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, the annual information 
return required of all large tax-exempt organizations.
11
  The form underwent a 
significant revision for tax year 2008, which included the addition of a new section 
entitled, “Governance, Management, and Disclosure.”  Because governance data 
were recently added (2008), and are presently available for tax years 2008, 2009, and 
2010 only, this study’s data are large in the cross-section but relatively short in the 
time-series.  Inherent disadvantages of a cross-sectional research design such as that 
employed in this study and much of the related literature include (1) less ability to 
draw causal inferences, and (2) the possibility that empirical results will vary when 
analyzed across different time periods.  I use instrumental variables estimations and a 
changes specification to address these concerns. 
                                                 
10
 Linking a relative measure of pay addresses requests from regulators of the nonprofit sector 
including that of Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley when indicating that “these 
kinds of comparisons might moderate the increasing pay disparity between executives and others in 
the workforce, and increase public confidence in the appropriateness of CEO compensation” 
(Office of Attorney General Martha Coakley, p. 38).   
11
 Private foundations file a Form 990-PF, and small nonprofits (other than private foundations that 
have gross receipts less than $100,000 and total assets less than $250,000) file a 990-EZ.  For the 
Form 990 and related tax documents, see http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-990,-Return-of-
Organization-Exempt-From-Income-Tax- . 
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As alluded to previously, on December 19, 2007, a dramatically redesigned 
Form 990 was issued, about which Acting Commissioner of the IRS, Kevin Brown, 
stated the following:  “We need a Form 990 that reflects the way this growing sector 
operates in the 21
st
 century.  The new 990 aims to give both the IRS and the public 
an improved window into the way tax-exempt organizations go about their vital 
mission” (Internal Revenue Service 2007).  In its redesigned state, the Form 990 
spans eleven pages, not including the many (sixteen) supplemental schedules.  
Meeting the increased number and complexity of requirements is sure to require 
additional time and effort on the part of nonprofits, the disdain for which is perhaps 
no better expressed than through the sentiment of one executive director of a large 
public charity:  “If this is the annual return we have to file, we don’t want to be tax-
exempt anymore” (Hopkins 2009, p. 115).  
A large sample of Form 990 returns are provided in the Internal Revenue 
Service Statistics of Income (SOI) microdata files, which are publicly and freely 
available.  For this study, SOI data are retrieved from the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS), which cleans and distributes nonprofit data provided 
by the IRS.  The SOI sample is weighted towards larger organizations and as a result, 
in the aggregate, encompasses over 90 percent of all nonprofit assets and revenues 
(Yetman and Yetman 2012).
 
 To capture data provided in the redesigned Form 990, 
the sample considered for this study includes all U.S.-based nonprofit organizations 
in the 2008, 2009, and 2010 tax year SOI databases.
12
  CEO identity, compensation, 
                                                 
12
 The SOI database has been utilized in much of the extant, related literature (e.g., Balsam and Harris 
2014; Core, Guay, and Verdi 2006; Garner and Harrison 2013; Keating, Parsons, and Roberts 
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and tenure are gathered from the Guidestar Premium database which, similar to the 
NCCS, disseminates Form 990 information into a digitized, machine-readable form.  
I exclude observations involving either non-positive executive compensation 
(Carroll, Hughes, and Luksetich 2005) or CEO turnovers.  It is important to note that 
since the 2008 tax year marked the first year in which the redesigned Form 990 was 
filed, not all 501(c)(3) nonprofits were required to use the new form.  Specifically, 
for tax year 2008 (2009) [2010], only those organizations with total assets of at least 
$2.5 million ($1.25 million) [$500,000] or gross receipts of at least $1 million 
($500,000) [$200,000] were required to use the redesigned Form 990.  As such, I 
restrict the sample to only those nonprofits required to file the redesigned form since 
voluntary filers might tend to be well-governed.  This restriction biases the sample 
towards larger nonprofits, but more importantly eliminates the possibility of sample 
selection bias.  Eliminating apparent coding inconsistencies (as in Core et al. 2006, 
Aggarwal et al. 2012, Baber et al. 2002, and others), observations that are classified 
as “out-of-scope” by the NCCS, and requiring sufficient data to estimate the main 
statistical models results in a maximum sample of 10,186 firm-year observations and 
5,287 unique nonprofits.  To mitigate the effect of outliers and any remaining data 
errors, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                          
2008; Yetman and Yetman 2012).  With the exception of Yetman and Yetman (2012), these studies 
rely on data drawn from the old Form 990. 
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IV.  Empirical Analysis 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of variables used in subsequent 
empirical analyses.  All variables are defined in Appendix A.  The mean (median) 
values of total assets, total revenue, and number of employees are $198.4 ($59.4) 
million, $93.0 ($23.4) million, and 879 (308), respectively.  The mean (median) 
CEO compensation is $327,212 ($222,326), and the mean (median) CEO-to-
employee relative pay ratio is 11.36 (8.06).
13
  Comparing relative pay ratios across 
major industries reveals that the highest values belong to the “Education” sector 
(mean = 14.88, median = 14.17) and lowest values to the “International” sector 
(mean = 4.65, median = 3.72).
14
  As for the primary measure of organizational 
performance utilized in this paper, the mean (median) proportion of program 
expenses to total expenses is 84.3% (86.7%).  Comparisons across major industries 
reveal that the public benefit sector has the highest ratio of program expenses to total 
expenses (mean = 87.57%, median = 90.24%) while the arts sector has the lowest 
ratio (mean = 77.97%, median = 81.05%).  In subsequent statistical tests, I account 
for differences across industries by including industry fixed effects for each of the 26 
                                                 
13
 For a group of for-profit entities between $10 million to $150 million in total assets (a range 
comparable to the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of the current sample’s total assets), the mean (median) 
relative pay ratio is 32 (11), per the author’s calculations.  Although relative pay levels are notably 
smaller for nonprofits relative to their for-profit peers, the estimates of nonprofit relative pay 
provided in this paper are in line with existing calculations.  For example, a 2005 Bloomberg 
Businessweek article notes the following:  “In 1998, chief executives [of nonprofits] earned 4.4 
times as much as the average nonprofit worker, while in 2003 they earned 4.8 times as much.  If the 
trends in executive and worker pay continue, by 2018, chief executives will be making six times 
what other employees are paid” (Lipman 2005).  These forward-looking projections are consistent 
with more recent examples of nonprofits seeking to establish an upper bound on the ratio of CEO to 
lowest full-time employee pay:  6-to-1 in the case of San Francisco’s city-supported nonprofits 
(Takagi 2008) and 10-to-1 in the case of St. Mary’s College in Maryland (Pyke 2014). 
14
 See the NTEE-10 Industry Classifications and NTEE-26 Industry Classifications variable 
definitions in Appendix A for industry classifications. 
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major nonprofit industry groupings (as identified by the National Taxonomy of 
Exempt Entities (NTEE)). 
 The governance index consists of sixteen components assessing several 
aspects of nonprofit governance quality, including its governing board, governing 
policies, compensation policies, as well as transparency and accountability, and is 
described in detail in Panel 2 of Appendix A.  Most index components consist of 
“Yes”/ “No” questions coded as 0-1 indicator variables, where a value of 1 signifies 
the response hypothesized to indicate better governance quality.  Each component 
was chosen from the redesigned Form 990 (primarily the “Governance, 
Management, and Disclosure” section) on account of:  (1) its possible relevance to 
either CEO compensation or nonprofit performance based on the for-profit and 
nonprofit literatures, and (2) the likelihood that the source question would be 
answered honestly.
15
  The Form 990 includes several questions in which virtually all 
nonprofits answer in the same direction; as such, to keep the governance index 
manageable, questions with especially similar responses across organizations 
(specifically, those in which at least 95% of organizations agree in their responses) 
are eliminated.  Also, in an effort to assign higher weights to components associated 
with more diverse responses, I weight each component by its cross-sectional 
                                                 
15
 For example, the governance index includes an indicator variable for whether at least two-thirds of 
the organization’s board of directors is independent.  There is a large stream of literature 
documenting the impact of board independence on executive pay (e.g., Brickley et al. 2010 for 
nonprofits; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999 for for-profits).  As another example, the 
governance index also includes indicator variables for whether the nonprofit abides by strong 
governing policies related to conflict of interest, whistleblower, and document retention matters.  
The importance of having strong governing policies in place has been repeatedly stressed for its 
potential to curb self-interested managers’ tendencies (see, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and recommendations of the Panel of the Nonprofit Sector). 
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standard deviation (see Appendix B for each component’s respective weight; and 
Van Bruggen, Lilien, and Kacker (2002) as well as Behrman, Mitchell, Soo, and 
Braco (2010) on the importance of adopting a survey aggregation method that 
produces more accurate inferences).  For each firm-year observation, the governance 
index is defined as the average of the values of four sub-indices (Governing Body, 
Governing Policies, Compensation Policies, Accountability & Transparency), where 
each sub-index is defined as the ratio of the weighted sum of the individual 
components as a proportion of the observation-specific total number of possible 
responses, such that governance quality is increasing in the magnitude of the index.  
The mean (median) standard deviation weighted governance index is 0.363 (0.356), 
with the public benefit sector having the highest governance index scores (mean = 
0.380, median = 0.392) and education sector being associated with the lowest values 
(mean = 0.322, median = 0.312). 
The measure of governance utilized in this paper improves upon related 
literature in several respects.  First, the new Form 990 data provide a comprehensive 
picture of nonprofit governance mechanisms and precludes having to rely on one or a 
few metrics such as donor presence on boards of directors (Callen et al. 2003), board 
independence (e.g., Brickley et al. 2010), or board size (Aggarwal et al. 2012).  
Second, the governance index is primarily composed of “Yes” / “No” questions; this 
standardized format facilitates a more objective measure of governance – an 
otherwise difficult hurdle to overcome (e.g., Herman and Renz 1997; 1999; 2004).  
Finally, the inferences of nonprofit governance quality presented in this paper are not 
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restricted to a single state (as in Iyer and Watkins 2008) or a single industry (as in 
Brickley et al. 2010).   
Table 2 provides correlations among CEO compensation, its possible 
determinants, and measures of organizational performance and nonprofit 
governance.  As expected, (the log of) the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio is 
positively related to both (the log of) the number of employees and (the log of) total 
assets, with correlations of 0.68 and 0.42, respectively.  Moreover, the correlation 
between these two measures of organizational size is also quite high (0.53).  Other 
noteworthy correlations include that between nonprofit age and the number of 
employees (0.42), suggesting that more mature nonprofits tend to employ a larger 
number of employees; and a mechanically-induced large negative correlation 
between the performance measure Log(Revenue per Employee) and the proportion of 
total revenue received by the government (–0.52).  All other correlations are less 
than 0.40 in absolute value. 
 
A.  Contrasting Views of the Relationship between Nonprofit Governance, Pay, and 
Performance 
 
The main focus of my empirical analyses is to investigate the intersection of 
nonprofit CEO pay, organizational performance, and governance quality.  
Specifically, it may be the case that CEOs are rewarded for achieving optimal 
organizational performance, whether it be for maximizing charitable spending (in 
lieu of administrative or fundraising spending), raising a significant amount of 
donations in a cost efficient manner, or ensuring their organization is productive as 
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evidenced by a large ratio of total revenue per employee.  I label this prediction the 
Pay-for-Performance Hypothesis.  In contrast, in poorly governed nonprofits, CEOs 
may be free to prioritize their own best interests rather than those of the organization, 
leading poorly monitored CEOs to minimize their efforts and/or neglect to optimize 
organizational performance.   I title this prediction the Agency-Governance 
Hypothesis.  
To disentangle these predictions about the nature of the relationship between 
the relative pay ratio and nonprofit performance, I begin by estimating the following 
two equations: 
 
Log(Relative Pay) it = β0 + β1 Organizational Performance it +  
 β2 Governance Index it + 
  ∑ β
j
n
j=3 Other Determinantsit +  
 ∑ γ
k
n
k=1 Industry𝑘 + ∑ δt
n
t=1 Yeart + εit   (1) 
 
Organizational Performance it = α0 + α1 Log(Relative Pay) it + 
  α2 Governance Index it + 
 ∑ αk
n
k=3 Other Determinantsit + 
  ∑ γ
k
n
k=1 Industry𝑘 + ∑ δt
n
t=1 Yeart + εit   (2) 
 
where industries are based on the NTEE’s 26 major groupings.  Both models include 
year effects and, consistent with the empirical recommendations of Gormley and 
Matsa (2014), both specifications include industry effects.
16
  Organizational 
                                                 
16
 Gormley and Matsa (2014) demonstrate that the fixed effects estimator produces consistent 
estimates and is empirically superior to alternative approaches such as industry-adjusting (e.g., 
deducting the mean from) the dependent variable.  
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Performance is one of four measures of performance:  (1) the ratio of program 
expenses to total expenses (“Program Spending Ratio”), (2) the ratio of program 
expenses to total assets (“Program Expenses to Assets”), (3) the ratio of net 
fundraising revenue (fundraising revenue net of fundraising expenses) to total 
fundraising revenue (“Fundraising Ratio”), and (4) (the log of) the ratio of total 
revenue per employee (“Log(Revenue per Employee)”).17  The Program Spending 
Ratio has been utilized as a measure of organizational performance in multiple 
related studies (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2012; Baber et al. 2002).  The ratios Program 
Expenses to Assets and Fundraising Ratio are based on performance metrics utilized 
by Desai and Yetman (2006).  Log(Revenue per Employee) builds upon extant 
nonprofit literature (e.g., Pauly and Redisch 1973; Shen 2003) as well as a study in 
the for-profit literature by Faleye et al. (2013).   
The models include control variables that, based on prior literature, have the 
potential to impact executive compensation, organizational performance, or the 
relation therein.  For example, both models control for organizational size (the 
number of employees and total assets) which is known to affect both executive pay 
(e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2012) and organizational performance (e.g., Garner and 
Harrison 2013).  Both models also control for liquidity, as an abundance of liquid 
resources can complicate nonprofit manager-stakeholder relations (e.g., Core, Guay, 
                                                 
17
 On the Form 990, a nonprofit can choose to allocate compensation expense to three classifications:  
(1) Program Service Expenses, (2) Management & General Expenses, and (3) Fundraising 
Expenses.  Because some of these expense totals are included in the performance variables (e.g., 
Program Service Expenses in the Program Spending Ratio and Program Expenses to Assets 
measures, as well as Fundraising Expenses in the Fundraising Ratio measure), I avoid including 
compensation expense in both the dependent and independent variables of the regression models by 
presenting all performance variables net of CEO compensation expense.  See Appendix A for 
detailed definitions. 
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and Verdi 2006); government funding for its ability to serve as a managerial 
monitoring mechanism (e.g., O’Regan and Oster 2002); the size of the board of 
directors since smaller boards may make more effective monitors (e.g., Yermack 
1996); to control for the entity’s growth prospects, the age of the nonprofit (e.g., 
Garner and Harrison 2013); the proportion of fixed assets to total assets as a measure 
of asset tangibility and the entity’s strategic flexibility (e.g., Gopalan, Milbourn, and 
Song 2010); donations growth to account for the impact of donor influence on both 
pay and performance (e.g., Balsam and Harris 2014); and an indicator variable for 
whether at least 90% of the nonprofit’s revenues originate from program service 
activities (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2012).  Additional control variables exclusive to 
equation 1 include CEO tenure, since longer-standing CEOs may receive greater 
compensation (e.g., Cheng 2004); CEO gender to control for any pay differential 
across males and females (e.g., Brick, Palmon, and Wald 2006); and median state-
level household income to control for regional differences in pay levels (e.g., Deng 
and Gao 2013).  Additional control variables exclusive to equation 2 include two 
variables for financial reporting quality:  an indicator variable for whether the 
nonprofit reported zero fundraising expenses (e.g., Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 
2006; nonprofits have a tendency to shift fundraising expenses to program expense 
classifications), and the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (e.g., Vermeer, 
Edmonds, and Asthana 2014; higher leverage incentivizes nonprofits to misreport 
their financial statements in an effort to appease lenders).  Detailed definitions of all 
variables are provided in Appendix A.   
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 Regarding equation 1 (2), β1 (α1) measures the relationship between nonprofit 
performance and CEO pay.  The Pay-for-Performance Hypothesis implies a positive 
β1 coefficient.  The Agency-Governance Hypothesis predicts a negative relationship 
between organizational performance and CEO pay, i.e., a negative β1.  In the context 
of equation 1, the Agency-Governance Hypothesis also implies a negative 
relationship between relative CEO pay and governance quality, though imperfect 
measurement of true governance quality is likely to produce a β2 coefficient that is 
approximately zero.
 18, 19
  To summarize, the Pay-for-Performance (Agency-
Governance) Hypothesis implies a positive (negative) pay-performance relationship. 
 
B.  Endogeneity of CEO Pay and Nonprofit Performance 
As implied by the model specifications in equations 1 and 2, both relative pay 
and organizational performance are likely endogenous.  Indeed, according to the 
Agency-Governance Hypothesis, both are impacted by governance quality and, 
according to the Pay-for-Performance Hypothesis, both are impacted by CEO skill or 
effort.  For example, according to the Agency-Governance Hypothesis, unobservable 
                                                 
18
 Note that these predictions acknowledge the imperfect nature of the governance index (arising due 
to non-quantifiable aspects of governance quality); if instead the governance index measured 
nonprofit governance quality perfectly and sufficiently, the Agency-Governance Hypothesis would 
imply a β1 coefficient that is approximately zero and a β2 coefficient that is negative in value, as the 
governance index would capture the full effect of governance on relative pay. However, 
realistically speaking, any governance index is imperfect and, given the Agency-Governance 
Hypothesis’s expectation of higher relative pay in poorly governed nonprofits, the prediction 
becomes a negative β1. 
19
 An alternative prediction about the relationship between relative CEO pay and governance quality 
stems from an empirical finding in the for-profit literature.  The argument states that intense 
monitoring is associated with lower executive pay levels since shareholders will see less of a need 
to compensate a CEO who is already held accountable by way of the company’s strong governance 
mechanisms (Acharya and Volpin 2010).  These employment conditions would be viewed 
negatively by the CEO, and could encourage him to bargain for higher compensation, implying a 
potentially positive link between relative CEO pay and governance quality. 
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aspects of governance quality, such as the quality and motivation of individual board 
members, may affect both executive compensation and organizational performance 
in that one could expect good governance quality to mitigate high levels of CEO pay 
and promote organizational performance.  Relatedly, under the Pay-for-Performance 
Hypothesis, the talent and motivation levels of a CEO likely impact both pay and 
organizational performance.   
In the context of equation 1 where nonprofit performance is treated as 
endogenous, I use as an instrumental variable (IV) the analogous performance 
measures at nonprofits that are similar in size, industry, and location.  Similarly, for 
equation 2 and treating CEO compensation as endogenous, I utilize as an IV the 
executive compensation levels of nonprofits that are similar in size, industry, and 
location.  Unobservables, such as the quality and motivation of the CEO and board 
members, should impact both pay and performance of the nonprofit in question but 
have little impact on other nonprofits.  At the same time, pay and performance at 
individual nonprofits should be correlated with those of similar sized nonprofits in 
the same industry and geographic area.  
Literature on information transmission among nonprofit organizations 
suggests that social norms and institutional pressures prompt nonprofits to pattern 
their behaviors after those of local peer firms (Zorn, Flanagin, and Shoham 2011).  
An emerging body of empirical evidence supporting behavioral clustering, although 
currently confined to for-profit entities, attributes the tendency to greater ease and 
reduced cost in acquiring valuable information (e.g., Dougal, Parsons, and Titman 
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2015; Kedia and Rajgopal 2009; Pirinsky and Wang 2006).  With regard to 
spillovers in organizational performance, Engelberg, Ozoguz, and Wang (2013) find 
stronger co-movement in the earnings and investment levels of companies located in 
the same industry and geographic area.  As for executive compensation, Engelberg, 
Gao, and Parsons (2013) document a positive relationship between the compensation 
to a CEO relative to their local competitors.  The importance of geography in 
establishing executive compensation levels is also demonstrated by Bouwman 
(2013).  In constructing the IVs, the number of sample splits on size (industry) 
[region] is 3 (8) [9], as detailed in Panel 3 of Appendix A.  In each case the size-
industry-region IV is calculated excluding nonprofit i.
 20
     
 
C.  Determinants of CEO-to-Employee Relative Pay 
Table 3 reports IV estimates of equation 1 where (the log of) the CEO-to-
employee relative pay ratio is regressed on its traditional determinants, measures of 
nonprofit performance (with instruments as described above), and the governance 
quality index, in addition to industry and year fixed effects.  The table includes 
separate regressions for each of the four different measures of organizational 
performance considered.  For all instrumental variables estimations of equations 1 
and 2, the Hausman tests reject the hypothesis of exogeneity (p-values < 0.05).  Of 
primary importance among Table 3 results is the negative relation between all four 
measures of organizational performance and the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio 
(p-values < 0.0001 in three of the four specifications).  These results lend support to 
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 Least squares estimations of equations 1 and 2 are available from the author upon request. 
37 
 
the Agency-Governance Hypothesis in that poor performing nonprofits are also 
characterized by high levels of relative pay, implying weak governance and 
ineffective monitoring mechanisms.   
Table 3 also provides evidence that good governance quality may alleviate 
high levels of executive pay, with statistically significant negative coefficients 
documented in two of the four specifications (p-values < 0.05).  In terms of 
economic significance, from column I, a single standard deviation improvement in 
the governance index (0.096) is associated with a relative pay ratio that is 1.3% 
smaller in magnitude.  Additionally, the results indicate a non-linear relation between 
the relative pay ratio and board size, suggesting that CEOs of nonprofits having 
larger boards are associated with higher relative pay ratios.  The coefficients on 
board size (positive) and its squared term (negative) imply that the increase in 
relative pay as a function of board size occurs at a decreasing rate but is positive for 
all reasonable board sizes.  
Table 3 identifies several other important determinants of relative CEO pay.  
For example, the relative pay ratio is positively related to (the log of) the number of 
employees, (the log of) total assets, and (the log of) CEO tenure, and is negatively 
related to government revenue, (the log of) median state-level household income, 
and an indicator variable set to 1 if the CEO is a female.  The positive association 
between CEO pay and organizational size supports a widely documented finding in 
the related nonprofit literature (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2012; Frumkin and Keating 
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2010; Hallock 2002).
21
 The result that CEO pay is increasing in CEO tenure suggests 
that entrenched, long-standing CEOs may be able to extract higher compensation or, 
alternatively, could represent additional pay for experience.  One possible 
explanation for the negative association between relative pay and government 
revenue is that greater reliance on the government for resources corresponds to 
closer monitoring, and thus more reasonable CEO compensation levels.  The 
negative association between relative pay and median household income is likely 
mechanical:  holding CEO pay constant, as average worker pay (and income) 
increases, the relative pay ratio decreases.  The (female) gender indicator variable 
enters with a negative and significant coefficient, possibly because women are more 
willing to accept lower paying positions when operating in a charitable environment 
or that female CEOs are more generous than other staff members.     
In sum, the results in Table 3 support the Agency-Governance Hypothesis, 
particularly the negative and significant associations between CEO pay and both 
nonprofit performance and governance quality.  These results are consistent with 
agency and governance problems in many nonprofits. 
 
D.  Determinants of Nonprofit Performance 
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that highly-compensated nonprofit 
CEOs are associated with both inferior organizational performance and poor 
                                                 
21
 To ensure that the size-pay relationship is properly modeled, I estimate several variants of equations 
1 and 2 by replacing the logarithmic size variables Log(No. of Employees)  and Log(Total Assets) 
with (1) total assets and its squared term along with employees and its squared term, and (2) total 
assets and its inverse along with employees and its inverse.  The main models with logarithmic size 
variables provide the highest explanatory power of all alternative specifications. 
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governance quality.  The beneficial impact of good governance quality in moderating 
high compensation levels motivates an important follow-up question:  do better-
governed nonprofits out-perform their poorly-governed peers?   
Table 4 provides IV estimates corresponding to equation 2 where four 
different measures of nonprofit performance are regressed on their traditional 
determinants, (the log of) the relative pay ratio, as well as the governance index, in 
addition to industry and year fixed effects.  Similar to Table 3, this table includes a 
separate column for each of the four different measures of organizational 
performance.  A statistically negative relationship is observed between the relative 
pay ratio and all four measures of organizational performance (p-values < 0.01).  In 
terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in (the log of) the 
relative pay ratio (0.856) is associated with a 19.2% smaller Program Spending 
Ratio.  In sum, the results provided in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate a strong and 
consistent inverse relation between pay and performance, suggesting that both CEO 
compensation and nonprofit performance are subject to agency and governance 
problems.  I acknowledge that even after instrumental variables estimations, some 
endogeneity likely remains in that governance and pay or performance depend on the 
same unobservable variables though most sources of endogeneity imply a positive 
bias while I find evidence of a negative relation.   
For the remainder of the paper, I focus on a single measure of performance:  
the program spending ratio.  One reason to prioritize this performance metric over 
competing alternatives is for its conceptually appealing qualities.  Specifically, 
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nonprofit organizations are expected to fulfill a charitable mission, the core expenses 
for which are captured in program expense categories.  Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that a nonprofit devoting a high proportion of its total spending towards 
charitable causes (relative to administrative or fundraising alternatives) is directing 
its resources towards activities that will further the organization’s charitable mission, 
although spending practices do not necessarily imply a high level of (non-financial) 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency.  Another reason to focus on the program 
spending ratio is a matter of precedence, given that it is a widely-accepted 
organizational performance metric utilized in related literature (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 
2012; Baber et al. 2002). 
 
E.  The Impact of Governance on Relative Pay surrounding Changes in 
Organizational Performance 
 
The empirical results presented thus far suggest that CEO pay is negatively 
related to nonprofit performance, yet good governance quality helps to offset high 
relative pay ratios.  Next, I examine the relation between changes in relative pay and 
changes in charitable spending for different levels of governance quality.  That is, I 
analyze whether governance quality counteracts the negative relation between 
relative pay and organizational performance.  To offset the loss of observations 
accompanying a changes specification, CEO turnover years are included and their 
effect captured by a CEO Turnover Dummy indicator variable.  Table 5 reports the 
results.  Although changes in program spending and changes in the relative pay ratio 
are negatively related, I find that – relative to their poorly-governed peers – CEOs of 
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well-governed nonprofits realize incrementally and significantly higher relative pay 
in response to increases in charitable spending levels (p-value < 0.0001).  This 
finding lends further credibility to the notion that adopting strong governance 
mechanisms translates into a more efficient pay-performance relation. 
 
F.  Executive Perquisites, Nonprofit Performance, and Governance 
 The results presented in this paper support a negative relationship between 
CEO pay and both governance quality and organizational performance.  How do 
other types of executive compensation relate to nonprofit performance and 
governance?  In this section, I analyze the relationship between executive 
perquisites, organizational performance, and governance quality.  One aspect of the 
revised Form 990 is more detailed information on executive compensation.  For 
example, the first question on Schedule J (“Compensation Information”) asks 
whether the organization provided perquisites to any officer, director, trustee, key 
employee, or highly compensated employee.  Among the eight listed perquisite 
categories are first-class or charter travel, travel for companions, a discretionary 
spending account, and housing allowances, to name a few.  Note that the Form 990 
does not require information on the dollar value of such perquisites, which inhibits 
any analysis on the costs attached to certain perquisites (such as first-class travel) 
relative to others or their evolvement through time (Yermack 2006). 
To begin, I estimate a multivariate logit model predicting the probability of at 
least one type of perquisite being awarded to an executive in a given year.  
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Subsequently, I consider the probability that at least one executive is awarded first-
class or charter travel – a specific and luxurious type of perquisite that is conceivably 
highly sensitive to governance quality.  In both models, the independent variables of 
interest include (1) an indicator variable for superior nonprofit performance 
(specifically, reporting a program spending ratio above the annual industry median), 
(2) governance quality, captured by the governance index, and (3) the interaction of 
the variables described in (1) and (2).  The models control for traditional 
determinants of the relative pay ratio, where determinants are those referred to in 
equation 1 with baseline results in column I of Table 3.   
Columns I and II of Table 6 present the results of the logit regression 
predicting the probability that at least one type of perquisite is awarded, while 
columns III and IV report results predicting the probability of first-class or charter 
travel.  The direction and significance of the coefficients of interest are comparable 
between the two models.  The indicator variable capturing superior nonprofit 
performance enters with a negative and statistically significant coefficient in three of 
four specifications (p-values < 0.05).  This result suggests that superior 
organizational performance (and effective monitoring mechanisms) is inversely 
related to the likelihood of receiving executive perquisites, which supports the earlier 
result of a negative relation between nonprofit performance and reportable 
compensation.  The governance index enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient in all four specifications (p-value < 0.0001), indicating that well-
governed, effectively monitored firms are less apt to award perquisites to managing 
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executives.  Of particular importance is the interaction term between these two 
variables, which enters with a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient 
(p-value < 0.0001).  This latter result suggests that, although high-performing and 
well-governed firms are individually less likely to award executive perquisites, good 
governance quality is associated with an incremental but significant increase in the 
likelihood that executives of high-performing nonprofits will be rewarded with 
perquisites (relative to their poorly-governed peers). 
I also investigate the relationship between the variety of executive 
perquisites, nonprofit performance, and governance quality.  Specifically, I estimate 
a multivariate ordered probit model relating the number of perquisites awarded 
during the year (i.e., the sum of perquisite indicators) to the same independent 
variables.  Results, reported in columns V and VI of Table 6, include coefficients 
that enter with signs and statistical significance levels that are very similar to those 
corresponding to the logit models.  Specifically, I find that the variety of executive 
perquisites decreases in cases of superior nonprofit performance and in cases of good 
governance quality, but that a well-governed nonprofit is associated with an 
incremental but significant increase in a high-performing nonprofit organization’s 
variety of executive perquisites (relative to their poorly-governed counterparts).  In 
other words, the negative perquisite-performance relation breaks down in the 
presence of strong governance.  Collectively, the results in Table 6 further support a 
negative association between managerial compensation and nonprofit performance 
that is incrementally impacted by the organization’s governance quality. 
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G.  The Impact of Governance Quality on Extreme Values of Relative Pay and 
Nonprofit Performance 
 
 To summarize, the results of this paper demonstrate a strong negative relation 
between nonprofit CEO pay and organizational performance.  Opposite to the Pay-
for-Performance Hypothesis and most evidence from the for-profit literature, higher 
relative pay is associated with poorer, not better performance.  This suggests that 
both high pay and poor performance are associated with agency issues which 
governance at nonprofits fails to correct.  As further support of this view, I find that 
relative pay is also negatively associated with an index of nonprofit governance 
quality.  To this point the analysis has employed standard regressions which measure 
how the conditional means of pay and performance are impacted by the governance 
index and other factors.  If the aforementioned negative relation between pay and 
performance is associated with agency concerns, it is reasonable to expect the impact 
of governance quality on both pay and performance to be incrementally greater at 
extreme values of these variables.   In other words, one would expect governance 
quality to play a particularly important role in reducing extremely high CEO 
compensation and in avoiding extremely poor nonprofit performance.  To test this 
implication, I re-estimate equations 1 and 2 using quantile regressions with 
instrumental variables constructed as before.  Quantile regressions represent a 
convenient method of estimating conditional quantile models, as opposed to least 
squares estimations which estimate the conditional mean (e.g., Koenker and Hallock 
2001). 
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 To measure the impact of governance mechanisms on extremely high CEO 
pay levels, I re-estimate equation 1 using a quantile regression specification where 
the effects of organizational performance and governance quality on compensation 
are estimated at the 80
th
 percentile of the distribution of the CEO-to-employee 
relative pay ratio.  In an effort to alleviate endogeneity concerns, instrumental 
variables are employed throughout the analyses.  Results, presented in Table 7, 
indicate a negative pay-for-performance link for these extreme values of CEO 
compensation.  More interesting is the incrementally larger impact of governance 
quality on CEO compensation, with coefficients that are larger in both magnitude 
and significance when compared to the corresponding instrumental variables results 
reported in Table 3.  For instance, in the regression where performance is measured 
using the program spending ratio, the coefficient of the governance index is –0.433 
in Table 7 versus –0.138 in Table 3.  Therefore, while strong governance appears 
somewhat effective at restraining compensation at the average nonprofit, it appears 
much more effective at restraining extremely high compensation levels.  
 In quantifying the impact of governance mechanisms on extremely low 
nonprofit performance levels, I re-estimate equation 2 using a quantile regression 
specification where the effects of CEO pay and governance quality on nonprofit 
performance are estimated at the 20
th
 percentiles of each of the four distributions of 
organizational performance.  As before, these regressions are estimated using IVs.  
Results, provided in Table 8, again support a link between high levels of pay and low 
levels of performance.   
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 It may prove informative to analyze which one or more of the four sub-
indices of the governance index may be driving the results documented in Tables 7 
and 8.  To address this question, I re-estimate the quantile regression specifications 
corresponding to equations 1 and 2  replacing the Governance Index with its sub-
indices, i.e., Governing Body, Governing Policies, Compensation Policies, and 
Accountability & Transparency (described in detail in Panel 2 of Appendix A).  
Results are provided in Table 9 (estimates of equation 1) and Table 10 (estimates of 
equation 2).  While the coefficients of all four governance sub-indices are virtually 
all negative in the four regressions in Table 9, the Governing Board and 
Accountability & Transparency sub-indices appear especially important in 
constraining very high levels of relative pay.  Turning to Table 10 where 
organizational performance at the 20
th
 percentile is modeled as a function of the 
governance sub-indices, the results provide relatively little conclusive evidence on 
how each governance sub-index relates to nonprofit performance, with the 
Compensation Policies entering with a positive and significant coefficient in two of 
the four specifications and  both the Governing Board and Accountability & 
Transparency sub-indices entering with negative and significant coefficients in three 
of the four performance measures.  Taken as a whole, the empirical results in this 
section provide evidence that the negative pay-for-performance link stands firm at 
extreme values of both CEO pay and organizational performance, with governance 
quality playing a particularly important role.  Collectively, these findings lend 
support to the Agency-Governance Hypothesis. 
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H.  Nonprofit Executive Pay, Organizational Performance, and Governance as a 
Function of Nonprofit Revenue Structures 
 
It is reasonable to expect the relation between nonprofit pay, performance, 
and governance to differ as a function of a nonprofit’s revenue structure.  
Specifically, a nonprofit that is constrained by relying on a single source of income 
will likely operate in a more competitive environment and, in response, attempt to be 
a better steward of available resources.  This shift in behavior could plausibly affect 
the nature of the relationship between relative pay and organizational performance.  
To address this possibility, I re-estimate the main empirical specifications of this 
paper for sub-samples of “commercial” and “traditional” nonprofit organizations.  
“Commercial” nonprofits are defined as those with at least 90% of revenues from 
program services (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2012; Steinberg 2004).
22
  In contrast, 
“traditional” nonprofits operate on a greater variety of revenue sources such as 
donations, government grants, and rental income.  The commercial versus traditional 
nonprofit classification tends to cluster along industry lines.  For example, the 
hospital industry is dominated by commercial nonprofits (87%), while traditional 
nonprofits dominate the arts and public benefit industries (95% and 81%, 
respectively).  On average, commercial nonprofits tend to be larger compared to 
traditional nonprofits in terms of the number of employees (mean for commercial = 
1,303; mean for traditional = 450), total revenue (mean for commercial = $138.9 
million; mean for traditional = $46.8 million), and total assets (mean for commercial 
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 Formally, this metric is defined as the ratio of Program Services Revenue to the sum of Program 
Services Revenue and Donations Revenue. 
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= $225.0 million; mean for traditional = $172.6 million).  As for compensation, 
CEOs of commercial nonprofits benefit from a higher average salary (mean = 
$419,317; median = $278,241) relative to the average pay for CEOs of traditional 
nonprofits (mean = $234,715; median = $180,664).   
Earlier regression specifications incorporated an indicator variable, 
Commercial Dummy, to control for potential differences in the revenue structures of 
nonprofit organizations.  As another way to check whether the negative pay-for-
performance relation holds for commercial versus traditional nonprofits, I re-
estimate equations 1 and 2 after splitting the sample into commercial and traditional 
sub-groups.  Instrumental variables are again used in all estimations.  Results, 
provided in columns I and II (equation 1) and III and IV (equation 2) of Table 11 
demonstrate a consistently negative association between the relative pay and 
program spending ratios, and one that is consistently statistically significant for 
commercial nonprofits.  Additionally, governance appears to play a more prominent 
role in moderating the pay levels of traditional nonprofits’ CEOs.  This result may be 
driven by differences in the competitiveness of commercial and traditional 
nonprofits; specifically, the higher level of competition native to commercial 
nonprofits may discipline the actions of managers, making internal governance 
relatively less important.  In sum, the results suggest that the negative pay-for-
performance relation applies to commercial and traditional nonprofits alike, lending 
further support to the Agency-Governance Hypothesis.
 23
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 In untabulated robustness checks, I find that the results associated with equations 1 and 2 are robust 
to (1) using excess relative pay in place of its level and (2) incorporating state fixed effects, given 
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I.  Limitations 
1.  Proper Measurement of Managerial Incentives 
A limitation native to all empirical studies of managerial incentives is that 
compensation is merely the output of a remuneration system which we cannot 
directly observe.  To the extent that remuneration is contingent on financial 
performance, observed pay should be positively related to performance.  Thus, the 
negative pay-performance link documented in this paper indicates an even more 
negative relation between a priori pay and performance.    
A potential concern specific to studies utilizing a relative compensation 
measure (such as the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio used in this paper) is on the 
interpretation of changes in relative pay as a function of changes in financial 
performance.  Specifically, a negative pay-performance relation could arise if the 
CEO’s pay is fixed but ordinary workers’ compensation depends on performance.  
However, the majority of existing literature (e.g., Brickley and Van Horn 2002; 
Jobome 2006) and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Hancock 2013; Pogrebin and Taylor 
2010) focuses on how executive compensation (and not that of ordinary workers) is 
contingent on organizational performance, thereby inducing a positive pay-
performance relation in most cases.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                          
that some U.S. states have instituted mandatory governance standards (Desai and Yetman 2006). 
Note that in (2), the inclusion of household income as an independent variable in equation 1 
measures the time series impact of variations in state income.  Instrumental variables are used for 
these estimations.  Additionally, I find qualitatively similar results when using quantile regressions 
estimated at the median.  Results are available upon request. 
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2.  Proper Measurement of Nonprofit Performance 
An inevitable complication of any empirical study of the nonprofit sector is 
that there is no measure of performance that is uniformly applicable to a broad set of 
nonprofit organizations.  This impediment is particularly relevant for inter-industry 
settings such as the sample employed in this paper.  In an attempt to address this 
concern, I use multiple measures of (financial) performance, including the charitable 
spending ratio which is commonly used in related literature (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 
2012; Baber et al. 2002; Sedatole et al. 2013).  The reliability of these financial 
performance measures depends in part on financial reporting quality; specifically, a 
nonprofit manager’s decision to misreport financial statements can render financial 
performance measures misleading (by, for example, recording zero fundraising 
expenses; see Krishnan et al. 2006).  As a means to address this concern, in 
untabulated tests I find qualitatively comparable results when re-estimating the main 
models (equations 1 and 2) for observations where the Form 990 was audited by an 
independent financial accountant.   
 
3.  Proper Measurement of Governance Quality 
The measure of governance quality used in this paper is defined as an index 
of mechanisms pertaining to the nonprofit’s governing body, governing policies, 
compensation policies, and accountability and transparency.  As mentioned 
previously, quantitative measures of governance serve as proxies for true corporate 
governance quality.  Moreover, inferring the hypothesized impact of some 
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governance provisions requires assumptions that may not hold for all nonprofits or in 
all circumstances; for example, the decision to delegate managerial duties to an 
outside company may weaken the governance quality of some nonprofits, though in 
this paper it is assumed to strengthen governance for the majority of organizations.  
Although these weaknesses are not specific to my setting, in untabulated sensitivity 
tests I address the external validity of the governance index by examining its relation 
to additional measures of accountability and transparency culled from organizations’ 
websites by Charity Navigator.  These metrics include whether the nonprofit’s 
website provides a donor privacy policy, audited financial statements, its most recent 
Form 990, a list of its board members, and a list of its staff members – all metrics 
which should indicate better governance if answered in the affirmative.  I find that 
the mean governance index score is higher for four of the five metrics, with the 
difference being statistically significant in three of the four cases.   
 
4.  Other Inefficient Pay-Performance Arrangements 
The primary hypotheses of this paper offer a set of competing predictions on 
the directional link between nonprofit executive pay and organizational performance:  
(1) positive, where hard-working managers are rewarded for their optimizing 
organizational performance; or (2) negative, where managers extract high levels of 
relative pay while realizing inferior organizational performance.  Moreover, these 
predictions are proposed from the standpoint of their interaction with agency 
concerns and corporate governance quality.  However, if nonprofit managers are on 
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average motivated by utility gained through altruism rather than that arising from 
compensation, one could imagine that high pay levels could actually discourage an 
executive from fulfilling the organization’s performance goals.  Thus, for a nonprofit 
manager that is highly intrinsically motivated, less compensation is better than more.  
This case predicts a positive (negative) pay-performance link for low (high) levels of 
pay, but for a different reason than that proposed by the Pay-for-Performance 
(Agency-Governance) Hypothesis.  Although altruistic motives are difficult to 
observe or to quantify, an abundance of anecdotal evidence (discussed earlier) 
pointing to nonprofit executives’ desires to maximize the amount of pecuniary 
benefits (e.g., Buettner 2011; Evans 2012; Hancock 2013) runs counter to this 
alternative explanation. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 Allegations of grossly overpaid nonprofit CEOs have become increasingly 
common, yet whether high executive pay levels are typically established in an 
optimal or sub-optimal manner remains an unanswered question.  Specifically, a 
capable and hard-working nonprofit CEO may be rewarded for achieving optimal 
organizational performance.  In contrast, in a nonprofit marred by agency conflicts 
and poor governance, an incompetent, lazy, or dishonest CEO may prioritize their 
own interests before those of their organization, resulting in both poor organizational 
performance and high relative pay.  In an effort to disentangle these predictions, I 
investigate whether high levels of nonprofit CEO pay are associated with superior or 
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inferior nonprofit performance.  In addition, I examine how CEO pay and nonprofit 
performance relate to an index of nonprofit governance based on new data. 
 After accounting for other determinants of pay and performance, I document 
a statistically significant and economically meaningful negative relation between 
CEO-to-employee relative pay and organizational performance at large nonprofits.  I 
further find that relative pay is negatively related to an index of the quality of the 
nonprofit’s governance.   Similarly, management consumption of perquisites is 
negatively related to both performance and governance quality after controlling for 
other factors.   I also find that extremely high relative pay is strongly associated with 
poor governance, and that governance quality plays a more prominent role in 
moderating the relative pay levels of nonprofits that are not bound by the disciplinary 
forces accompanying intense product market competition.  Finally, I show that 
although changes in the relative pay ratio and changes in charitable spending are 
negatively related in general, the CEO of a nonprofit that is well-governed realizes as 
incremental but statistically significant increase in relative pay pursuant to increases 
in charitable spending levels.   These results point to serious agency conflicts and 
governance issues at large nonprofits such that weak governance tends to lead to 
both poor performance and high relative pay.   
 The results in this paper demonstrate the potential for good governance 
quality to alleviate the undesirable consequences that tend to accompany cases of 
ineffective and/or insufficient monitoring mechanisms.  Although this conclusion is 
based on a sample of organizations particularly susceptible to especially severe 
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agency conflicts, it is not unique to the nonprofit organizational form.  Rather, the 
beneficial properties of good governance quality documented in this paper extend to 
for-profits and nonprofits alike, thus providing a basis for all organizational types to 
implement strong governance mechanisms as a means to ward off the undesirable 
consequences of firm-specific agency conflicts. 
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Chapter 2 
Cost Shifting in Nonprofit Hospitals
24
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Over the past several years there has been growing concern over the 
affordability of health care in the United States.  Health care costs have risen 
dramatically and some question the quality of care offered to those that are uninsured 
or underinsured.  Despite recent efforts to address these concerns (e.g., the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010), the sustainability of government-
related health care programs remains uncertain (e.g., Alonso-Zaldivar 2010, Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2008).  
Nonprofit hospitals play an interesting role in the health care debate. By 
receiving tax-exempt status through their nonprofit status, they save billions in tax-
related costs.  These savings are expected by politicians and other groups to result in 
greater community benefits, thereby addressing the high-cost health care crisis.  
However and perhaps surprisingly, nonprofit hospitals are often more profitable than 
their for-profit counterparts but provide only a similar level of community benefits 
through charity care.  As a result, many question whether the cost of their tax-exempt 
status outweighs the realized benefits.  In fact, to the extent that their tax-exempt 
status represents an inefficient allocation of scarce resources (e.g., excessive CEO 
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salaries), nonprofit hospitals may further exacerbate the problems associated with 
rising health care costs. 
Given the intense scrutiny from the media, donors, regulators, politicians, and 
third-party payers, nonprofit hospitals reporting seemingly high profits may wish to 
mask their allocation of resources.  One means by which managers of nonprofit 
hospitals can attempt to disguise these profits, and thereby avoid such scrutiny, is 
shifting costs from non-patient-centered (hereafter, “non-core”) to patient-centered 
(hereafter, “core”) activities. By shifting costs in this manner, core profitability 
decreases while non-core expenses decrease.  Thus, the hospital creates the 
appearance that it is better fulfilling its charitable mission and patient-centered focus, 
while providing services at affordable prices.  We expect that when a nonprofit 
hospital reports bottom-line earnings well above the zero-profit benchmark, it is 
more likely to shift costs to core activities directly related to patient services. 
We also examine hospitals’ cost shifting behavior when they report bottom-
line earnings below the zero-profit benchmark.  Similar to for-profit organizations, 
when a nonprofit hospital reports earnings below the zero-profit benchmark, it risks 
facing the inability to continue as a going concern.  Such a situation likely creates 
both compensation and employment concerns for managers.  Losses may also create 
additional criticisms from the community that managers are using resources 
inefficiently by spending excessively on non-patient-related expenses.  Thus, 
hospitals reporting below the zero-profit benchmark may have similar incentives to 
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shift expenses from non-core activities to core activities, reducing profits on patient-
related services and reducing costs of non-patient-related services. 
Given these reporting pressures faced by nonprofit hospitals, it is not 
surprising that prior research has detected earnings management in nonprofit 
hospitals through the management of accruals and use of real activities to avoid 
reporting earnings that fall below or well above the zero-profit benchmark (e.g., 
Leone and Van Horn 2005; Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee, and Soderstrom 2011).  We 
consider that hospital managers may also engage in an additional form of earnings 
management through classification shifting (e.g., McVay 2006; Fan, Barua, Cready, 
and Thomas 2010; Barua, Lin, and Sbaraglia 2010).  Studies on classification 
shifting provide evidence that for-profit managers shift expenses from core activities 
to non-core activities to inflate core profitability.  In contrast, we seek to provide 
evidence of whether nonprofit hospitals deflate core profitability by shifting 
expenses to core activities.  Specifically, we examine whether nonprofit hospitals 
that report bottom-line net income below or well above the zero-profit benchmark 
are more likely to shift expenses from non-core to core classifications. 
To examine cost shifting behavior, we consider nine types of nonprofit 
hospitals that are expected to be more likely to engage in this type of earnings 
management.  These include hospitals that are rural, have a church affiliation, are 
part of a system, provide high charity care, have low Medicare utilization, have low 
Medicaid utilization, are not audited, have low external fiscal fees, or have high 
donations.  These hospitals are more likely to shift because they face greater 
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normative pressures from the community (rural, church-related, system, or high 
charity care), have lower regulatory oversight (low Medicare or low Medicaid), have 
fewer accounting controls (no audit or low external fiscal fees), or rely more on 
external financing through donations (high donations). 
We employ a sample of nonprofit, California hospitals over the period 2002 
to 2010 and find evidence generally consistent with our expectations.  When bottom-
line net income is well above the zero-profit benchmark, nonprofit hospitals 
suspected of having more incentives and ability to shift costs from core expenses to 
non-core expenses tend to do so (p-value < 0.0001 for a two-tailed test).  When 
profits are below the zero-profit benchmark, we find marginal evidence of shifting 
(p-value = 0.075 for a one-tailed test).  
The tests above are based on an aggregate measure of the general tendency of 
hospitals to shift.  To provide a potentially more informative test of the specific types 
of hospitals engaging in cost shifting, we examine individual hospital characteristics.  
This test has the advantage of offering more specific conclusions about cost shifting 
behavior but the disadvantage of individual measures potentially providing lower-
power tests.  When earnings are well above the zero-profit benchmark, we find 
statistically significant evidence of shifting costs from non-core to core activities for 
hospitals that are rural, provide high charity care, have low Medicaid utilization, or 
have high donations.  When bottom-line net income is below the zero-profit 
benchmark, hospitals that have low Medicare utilization, have low Medicaid 
utilization, or have high donations engage in cost shifting. 
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Our results provide an interesting perspective on cost shifting behavior. As 
discussed briefly above, research in this area (e.g., McVay 2006; Fan, Barua, Cready, 
and Thomas 2010; Barua, Lin, and Sbaraglia 2010) typically motivates shifting 
behavior on incentives to increase core profitability.  While these incentives are clear 
for for-profit organizations, we identify a situation where organizations face 
incentives to decrease core profitability.  At both ends of the performance spectrum 
– when profits are below or well above the zero-profit benchmark – nonprofit 
hospitals face incentives to decrease core profitability (and decrease non-core 
expenses) by shifting non-core expenses to core expenses.  Thus, we provide a non-
linear prediction on cost shifting behavior in our setting that has not been 
investigated in prior research. 
We also expect our findings to have broad relevance, given the relatively 
limited research on healthcare-related reporting issues.  Health care is the largest 
industry in the U.S. but one that faces significant social, political, and economic 
challenges.  In recent years, health care costs have risen dramatically, while more 
Americans become uninsured or underinsured. Some argue that health care coverage 
should be a right guaranteed to all by the government because doing so would 
improve public health, reduce overall health care costs, promote economic growth 
(by allowing more flexible employment  and reducing the risk of personal 
bankruptcy), and increase social goods to the less fortunate.  However, the 
sustainability of government-related health care programs is in serious question.  
Given that nearly one-third of the population is expected to need government-
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assisted health care by 2030, the importance of understanding the performance and 
operating efficiency of health care providers is critical, yet remains relatively 
unexplored by accounting researchers. 
Nonprofit hospitals are directly relevant to the health care debate because of 
their prominence in the health care industry and their tax-exempt status.  Of the 
630,000 beds in Medicare-certified community hospitals in the United States in 
2003, 68 percent were located in nonprofit hospitals.
25
  Thus, the operating activities 
of nonprofit hospitals have a material impact on our nation’s health care system.  
Further exacerbating the impact of nonprofit hospitals on the nation’s health care 
system is their exemption from various federal, state, and local taxes. Congress’ Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimated tax benefits of nonprofit hospitals to equal nearly 
$13 billion in 2002 (Congressional Budget Office 2006b).  To the extent that the tax 
savings are used to provide benefits to the community, this resource allocation may 
be justified as the best approach to maximizing social welfare.  However, many 
politicians and other groups question whether, in fact, nonprofit hospitals adequately 
and efficiently provide community benefits sufficient to justify their tax-exempt 
status. 
Nonprofit hospitals are most commonly criticized because of their seemingly 
high profits, extravagant upgrades to facilities, high executive compensation, and 
large expenditures on potentially unproductive non-core activities (e.g., research). 
Carreyrou and Martinez (2008) report that the combined net income of the 50 largest 
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 Sixteen percent were located in for-profit hospitals, and 15 percent were located in government 
(nonfederal) facilities (Congressional Budget Office 2006a). 
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nonprofit hospitals jumped nearly eight-fold to $4.27 billion between 2001 and 2006, 
and that 77% of all nonprofit hospitals are profitable while only 61% of for-profit 
hospitals are profitable.  At the same time, the amount of charity care provided by 
nonprofit hospitals is virtually the same as that provided by for-profit hospitals, 
leading many to question where the tax savings are being spent.  Some nonprofit 
hospitals have engaged in questionable reporting practices to justify their tax-exempt 
status.  For example, St. Louis-based BJC HealthCare claims to have provided $1.8 
billion in benefits to various communities in 2004.  Closer examination reveals that 
BJC counted the salaries of its employees as community benefits.  These salaries, 
including the CEO’s $1.8 million compensation, accounted for $937 million of total 
community benefits, while actual charity care represented a meager $35 million. 
To the extent that cost shifting occurs, nonprofit hospitals can mask 
inefficient allocation of scarce resources and mislead financial statement users, 
regulators, politicians, hospital donors, and others into believing the nonprofit 
hospital’s tax-exempt status is warranted.  Moreover, the effectiveness of existing 
legislation (e.g., the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) and all future 
legislation (e.g., on the sustainability of Medicare) at least partially depends on the 
(reported) financial performance of hospitals.  We expect our findings to yield clarity 
on the quality of nonprofit hospitals’ earnings by looking beyond bottom-line net 
income.
26
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 Zismer and Proeschel (2009, p. 88) write, “‘Wall Streeters frequently comment on the quality of 
earnings for public companies.  The quality of the earnings affects investors’ and credit markets’ 
perspectives on the value of companies. … Similarly, community-based, not-for-profit health care 
system management and boards should analyze the quality of earnings as they evaluate 
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In the next section we discuss reporting incentives of nonprofit hospitals, as 
well as prior research in this area.  Section III presents our hypothesis related to cost 
shifting behavior when bottom-line net income is below or well above the zero-profit 
benchmark.  In section IV, we outline the sampling procedure and present the 
research design of estimating the relation between unexpected core expenses and 
unexpected non-core expenses, which is our test of cost shifting behavior.  The 
results are reported in section V, and conclusions are offered in section VI. 
 
II.  Background 
A.  Incentives to Manage Earnings in Nonprofit Hospitals 
It is well-documented that the earnings benchmark for a nonprofit hospital is 
commonly thought to be zero (e.g., Eldenburg et al. 2011, Leone and Van Horn 
2005).  One obvious reason that nonprofit hospitals wish to avoid reporting repeated 
losses is that it will risk facing the inability to continue as a going concern.  In 
addition, related to CEO compensation and job stability, Brickley and Van Horn 
(2002) find that both the compensation and turnover of nonprofit hospital managers 
are significantly related to the hospital’s financial performance.  Specifically, they 
find that the manager’s compensation will be higher when profits are zero or slightly 
positive (instead of negative), while his risk of termination will be higher when 
profits are consistently negative.  Moreover, if hospital donors become aware of such 
mismanagement of resources via the media or otherwise, they may withhold their 
                                                                                                                                          
performance.  The reason?  The bottom line alone (operating margin) does not tell the whole 
story.” 
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donations.
27
  The incentives of nonprofit hospitals to avoid losses are similar to those 
faced by for-profit organizations. 
However, unlike for-profit organizations, nonprofit hospitals also have 
incentives to avoid high profits.  High profits can generate a host of scrutiny from the 
media, hospital donors, regulators, politicians, and third-party payers.  Media 
scrutiny on the basis of a nonprofit hospital’s excess profits can devalue the entity’s 
reputation.  Hospital donors may deem a hospital unworthy of contributions and 
regulators may question the worthiness of a nonprofit hospital’s IRS 501(c)(3) tax-
exempt status should the hospital realize an excessively positive stream of profits.  
Some nonprofit hospitals have lost their tax-exempt status because of excessive 
profits and failure to report sufficient charity care.
28
  Finally, third-party payers will 
also have leverage to place price pressure on nonprofit hospitals and negotiate 
reimbursement terms that are less favorable to the entity in cases of excessive profits.  
With the number and importance of these incentives in mind, we next present 
evidence of earnings management in nonprofit hospitals. 
 
B.  Evidence of Earnings Management in Nonprofit Hospitals 
Perhaps the two studies most closely related to ours because of their focus on 
nonprofit hospitals’ ability to manage earnings to maintain the zero-profit benchmark 
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 Frank, Salkever, and Mitchell (1990) document that when making donation decisions, donors take 
into account the level of the nonprofit hospital’s earnings and also the amount of charity care being 
provided. 
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 For example, in Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, the Illinois Supreme 
Court ruled in 2010 that because Provena Covenant Medical Center in Urbana provided charity 
care equal to less than one percent of its revenues, it should lose its tax-exempt status.  
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are Leone and Van Horn (2005) and Eldenburg et al. (2011).  These studies focus on 
accrual manipulation and real activities management.  We discuss these studies next. 
First, consistent with findings in Hoerger (1991), Eldenburg et al. (2011) find 
that nonprofit hospitals manage earnings through altering real activities.
29
  
Specifically, they find that when nonprofit hospitals have pre-managed earnings 
below (well above) zero, they tend to decrease (increase) expenditures related to 
non-operating activities, while expenditures for core patient care activities remain 
unchanged.  Thus, managers are willing to alter discretionary spending but not at the 
expense of patient care when performance is below expectations.  They also find that 
when profits are well above zero, nonprofit hospitals tend to report fewer asset sales 
for gains, implying that managers are saving these gains for future periods.
30
  
Overall, their results are consistent with nonprofit hospitals managing their 
expenditures to better achieve the zero-profit benchmark. 
Second, beyond real activities management, Leone and Van Horn (2005) 
predict and find that nonprofit hospital managers also use discretionary accruals 
(e.g., adjustments to the third-party-allowance, and allowance for doubtful accounts) 
to lower earnings towards zero. In so doing, nonprofit hospitals can avoid the stigma 
and associated costs of reporting “too much” income.  They further find that these 
managers also manage accruals upward to avoid reporting losses.  However, these 
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 Hoerger (1991) documents that relative to for-profit hospitals, the earnings of nonprofit hospitals 
are less variable and also less responsive to exogenous factors such as changes in government 
policy.  He suggests that this evidence is consistent with hospitals’ willingness to adjust 
discretionary spending to report earnings at (or just above) zero. 
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 An additional interesting analysis in their study is the incremental impact that a manager’s pay-for-
performance has on his willingness to alter reported performance through discretionary spending. 
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managers do not appear to manage accruals to avoid earnings decreases, which 
seems reasonable given that repeated earnings increases could place the hospital’s 
tax-exempt status in jeopardy. 
We consider that managers of nonprofit hospitals may engage in a third form 
of earnings management – cost shifting.  That is, managers of nonprofit hospitals 
may have incentives to reclassify one expense as another type of expense (i.e., shift 
reported costs).  While such earnings management does not alter reported bottom-
line net income, it potentially affects financial statement users’ perceptions of the 
hospital.  The purpose of our study is to examine the extent to which managers of 
nonprofit hospitals shift expenses when bottom-line net income deviates from the 
zero-profit benchmark.  To help motivate the likelihood of such earnings 
management behavior, we rely on studies which provide general evidence of cost 
shifting in nonprofit hospitals, although these studies do not investigate the zero-
profit setting.  
Krishnan and Yetman (2011) evaluate whether nonprofit hospital managers 
inflate program service expenses relative to fundraising and management & general 
expenses, where program service expenses can be described as those dedicated to 
any “activity of an organization that accomplishes its exempt purpose” (Internal 
Revenue Service 2010).  Notably, they find more shifting in hospitals that face high 
normative pressures such as church affiliation, but low regulative pressures such as 
low Medicare revenues as a proportion to total revenue.
31
  Eldenburg and Vines 
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 Krishnan and Yetman (2011) examine the cost shifting behavior of California nonprofit hospitals on 
the Form 990.  As discussed in more detail later, we examine California nonprofit hospitals’ Office 
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(2004) find that in response to a 1990 accounting rule change pertaining to the 
disclosure of uncompensated care, nonprofit hospital managers reclassified bad debt 
to charity care, a decision that forwent the hospital’s ability to collect on the 
receivable but one that also potentially improved the hospital manager’s reputation.  
This effect appeared to be most pronounced in high cash, low operating margin 
hospitals.  We take the findings in these studies as evidence in favor of nonprofit 
hospital managers’ incentive, ability, and tendency to shift expenses and hope to 
build on these results by examining the shifting behaviors of those hospitals whose 
earnings deviate from the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
III.  Hypothesis Development 
In direct contrast with for-profit entities, when nonprofit hospitals perform 
well and realize significantly positive profits, nonprofit hospital managers have 
incentives to manage earnings downward.  As discussed previously, some reasons 
for this decision include a motivation to avoid scrutiny from the media, politicians, 
and donors, to present at least the appearance of providing sufficient charity care that 
warrants 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, and to avoid providing third-party payers the 
opportunity to negotiate reimbursement terms that are less favorable to the hospital.  
                                                                                                                                          
of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) reports.  We believe understanding cost 
shifting behavior on the OSHPD report will be particularly important.  The OSHPD reports are the 
primary reports analyzed by California state auditors for assessing nonprofit hospitals’ operations.  
In fact, examination of the Form 990 is not common and IRS audits of this form are extremely rare 
(United States Government Accountability Office 2002).  Thus, regulators’ focus on the OSHPD 
reports allows us to offer evidence of direct relevance to policy makers.  Krishnan and Yetman 
(2011) make the explicit assumption that OSHPD reports will not be manipulated, thus motivating 
their examination of Form 990s.  However, we find evidence of cost shifting behavior on the 
OSHPD reports in our zero-profit constraint setting. 
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At the same time, the nonprofit hospital cannot continue as a going concern should it 
report losses on a consistent basis. 
To convince the users of financial statements that resources were used wisely 
and in conformity with the entity’s charitable mission and patient-centered focus, we 
hypothesize that nonprofit hospital managers will “micro-manage” their income 
statement.  In particular, we expect that the nonprofit hospital manager may choose 
to reclassify non-core expenses (e.g., general and administrative services) to core 
expenses (i.e., patient care, ambulatory, and ancillary services), thereby portraying 
reduced profitability in direct patient-related services.  For hospitals well above the 
zero-profit benchmark, such cost shifting helps the hospital’s appearance of 
providing affordable health care (i.e., not charging patients too much).  For hospitals 
with profits below the zero-profit benchmark, reclassification of expenses from non-
core activities to core activities allows managers to blame poor performance on the 
willingness of the hospital to provide high-quality (i.e., high expense) health care at 
low prices, instead of inefficiently using resources on non-core activities that tend to 
be unrelated to direct patient care.  Thus, cost shifting by hospitals reporting earnings 
below or well above the zero-profit benchmark portrays the appearance that the 
hospital is achieving its overall mission of high-quality, affordable health care to the 
community, while using resources efficiently.  Such shifting is also important 
personally to the manager for maintaining her favorable reputation (both 
professionally and within the community).  
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In summary, we predict that nonprofit hospitals whose earnings deviate from 
the zero-profit benchmark will engage in more cost shifting relative to those 
hospitals that meet the zero-profit benchmark, because those that deviate will want to 
project at least the appearance to financial statement users that the deviation occurred 
for “good reason” (i.e., for reasons in line with the nonprofit hospital’s charitable 
mission and patient-centered focus). 
We also have expectations on which hospitals are more likely to shift 
expenses.  Below we discuss nine hospital factors, and in section IV we discuss how 
our research design incorporates these factors to provide potentially more 
informative tests of hospitals’ cost shifting behavior when profits are below or well 
above the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
A.  Rural Hospitals 
Rural hospitals serve a critical role as health care providers to less populated 
communities and, as a result, are highly visible.  Rural hospitals have also proven 
especially susceptible to financial distress pursuant to regulatory changes, such as 
during the transition to Medicare’s prospective payment system when the increase in 
costs was so extensive that some rural hospitals were forced to close (Li, Schneider, 
and Ward 2009).  Moreover, the visibility of a rural hospital attracts the attention of 
donors, regulators, the media, and other stakeholders and results in greater pressure 
to meet expectations (e.g., Goodstein 1994; Julian, Ofori-Dankwa, and Justis 2008).  
Thus, we predict that rural hospitals are more likely to engage in cost shifting. 
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B.  Church Hospitals 
A church hospital must uphold religious-oriented standards in order to 
maintain its church affiliation.  For example, Catholic Healthcare West (CHW), the 
largest Catholic-affiliated health care system in the western U.S., must comply with 
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services as outlined by 
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (2001).  CHW identifies “serving 
and advocating for our sisters and brothers who are poor and disenfranchised” as one 
of the three key areas for which the hospital dedicates its resources (Catholic 
Healthcare West 2011).  Hence, compliance with church hospital directives and 
expectations results in added scrutiny.  Moreover, church hospitals are also expected 
to operate efficiently and be of equal competitors with non-church hospitals (Scott 
and Davis 2007).  Thus, we predict that church-related hospitals are more likely to 
engage in cost shifting. 
 
C.  System Hospitals  
System hospitals are typically held accountable to many constituencies across 
multiple layers of horizontal and vertical integration.  System hospitals appear to 
recognize and attempt to fulfill these normative expectations (Alexander, Weiner, 
and Succi 2000) while also maintaining a high level of community orientation 
(Proenca , Rosko, and Zinn 2000).  Moreover, the higher reputation accompanying 
system hospital membership is accompanied by higher costs (Dranove and Shanley 
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1995) and generally no enhancement of financial performance (Tennyson and Fottler 
2000).  Thus, we predict that system hospitals are more likely to engage in cost 
shifting. 
 
D.  Charity Care Provision 
Just as rural hospitals fulfill a critical role to less populated communities, 
hospitals that provide charity care offer access to those patients who would otherwise 
be unable to afford care.  As such, the more charity care a hospital provides, the 
more it will be valued by the community and the more pressure it will face to operate 
efficiently.  However, high levels of charity care will also place financial burdens on 
the hospital (Rosko 1999).  As a result, communities will advocate for more charity 
care when a hospital is performing well financially, while physicians will prefer to 
invest residual profits in technology and not charity care (Eldenburg, Hermalin, 
Weisbach, and Wosinska 2004).  While we predict that normative pressures 
associated with high levels of charity care will induce more cost shifting in hospitals 
who depart from the zero-profit benchmark, we acknowledge the existence of 
mitigating factors that might induce lesser or even the absence of shifting. 
 
E.  Medicare and Medicaid Utilization 
Medicare is a national program that provides insurance to qualified elderly 
and disabled individuals.  Medicaid (termed Medi-Cal in California) is a state-based 
program that provides insurance to those individuals and families with limited 
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means.  Both the Medicare and Medicaid programs are administered by the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services.  Hospitals that provide services to Medicare 
and/or Medicaid patients may be audited by the Office of Audit Services (OAS), a 
division of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services.  Moreover, Chang, 
Steinbart, and Tuckman (1993) find that a nonprofit hospital faces a higher 
probability of an OAS audit as the proportion of Medicare patients to total patients 
increases.  If performed with appropriate diligence, these audits would have the 
effect of reducing the ability of hospitals to misclassify expenses for the purpose of 
cost shifting.  Thus, we predict that hospitals with lower levels of Medicare and 
Medicaid utilization (and therefore subject to less regulatory oversight) are more 
likely to engage in cost shifting. 
 
F.  Audit and Professional Fees for Accounting Services 
In the nonprofit industry, the use of an outside accountant has been shown to 
reduce the likelihood of expense misreporting (Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 
2006).  We propose that the lack of an independent financial audit for financial 
reports will be associated with more shifting.  Similarly, we predict that lower fees 
paid to external professionals for fiscal services (e.g., general ledger accounting, 
credit and collection services) will be associated with more shifting.  In both cases, 
we expect that the nonprofit hospital manager’s ability to influence financial reports 
will be greater and hence, there will be more opportunity for cost shifting.   
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G.  Donations Revenue 
In many cases, nonprofit hospitals depend on public donations for 
sustainability and at times, even survival.  Harvey and McCrohan (1988) find that 
donors are more willing to contribute to the nonprofit hospital if they perceive that it 
is operating efficiently.  Moreover, because the financial statements of hospitals 
receiving donation revenue will generally be subject to additional scrutiny (United 
States GAO 2002, Weisbrod and Dominguez 1986), managers have more incentives 
to manage reported performance.  By shifting non-core expenses to core expenses, 
the manager creates the appearance to the hospitals’ donors that resources have been 
devoted to patient care at affordance prices, while costs related to non-patient 
activity have been minimized (i.e., the hospital is operating efficiently in achieving 
its charitable mission).  Reducing core profitability may also facilitate fundraising by 
portraying the need for additional donations to maintain the hospital’s current level 
of patient care without raising prices.  We predict that hospitals with higher levels of 
donations are more likely to engage in cost shifting. 
Our summary hypothesis is stated below: 
Hypothesis:  Nonprofit hospitals suspected of having greater incentives and ability to 
reclassify non-core (non-revenue-generating) expenses as core 
(revenue-generating) expenses will do so when their profits are below 
or well above the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
By “suspected,” we mean hospitals that are characterized as rural, church-
related, part of a system, high charity care, low Medicare, low Medicaid, not audited, 
low external fiscal fees, or high donations. 
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IV.  Sample and Research Design 
A.  Sample 
All data are retrieved from California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning 
and Development (OSHPD) website.
32,33
  Financial statement data filed with the 
OSHPD must reconcile with hospitals’ financial reports, which are prepared under 
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  The income statement included in 
the OSHPD’s Hospital Annual Financial data is reproduced in summary form in 
Figure 1.  We note that the richness of OSHPD data has elicited their use in multiple 
prior analyses of the hospital manager’s earnings management behavior (e.g., 
Eldenburg et al. 2011, Elshafie 2007, Krishnan and Yetman 2011).  The sample 
includes church-owned and community hospitals registered as tax-exempt entities.  
An initial screen reveals 1,868 nonprofit hospital-year observations during the 2002-
2010 period.  We impose several exclusions which are generally consistent with 
Eldenburg et al. (2011) and Krishnan and Yetman (2011).  First, we exclude 
specialty hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, and substance abuse hospitals due to their 
differing patient mix, services provided, and reimbursement structures relative to 
general hospitals.  Next, we exclude hospitals that filed non-comparable financial 
reports as identified by the OSHPD.  This set consists of Kaiser hospitals, long-term 
care emphasis hospitals, Shriner’s hospitals, and state hospitals, among others.  We 
also eliminate hospitals with fewer than 50 licensed beds due to the unique economic 
nature of small-bed hospitals (e.g., Abraham, Gaynor, and Vogt 2005; Balakrishnan 
                                                 
32
 See http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/DataFlow/HospMain.html . 
33
 As of October 2011, the OSHPD freely provides annual financial data report files dating back to 
fiscal years ending in 2003, with prior years’ data dating back to 1976 available for purchase. 
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and Soderstrom 2006; Krishnan, Joshi, and Krishnan 2004).  Finally, we eliminate 
22 observations due to insufficient data.  The final sample consists of 1,282 hospital-
year observations and is detailed in Table 12. 
 
B.  Research Design 
We propose a test of nonprofit hospitals shifting non-core expenses 
(NONCORE_EXP) to core expenses (CORE_EXP) when overall profitability is 
below or well above the zero-profit benchmark.  To provide such a test, we need to 
estimate unexpected core expenses and unexpected non-core expenses.  We first 
estimate expected CORE_EXP and expected NONCORE_EXP using the following 
models (hospital subscripts omitted). 
 
CORE_EXPt = α0
C + α1
CCORE_EXPt−1 + α2
CATOt + α3
CΔREVt +  
 α4
CNEG_ΔREVt +  α5
CCURRENTt + α6
CDAYS_CASHt +  
 α7
CTEACHINGt + α8
CLnAGEt + α9
CLnASSETSt +  
 α10
C CMIt + α11
C HHIt + εt (3) 
 
NONCORE_EXPt = α0
NC + α1
NCNONCORE_EXPt−1 + α2
NCATOt + α3
NCΔREVt +   
 α4
NCNEG_ΔREVt +  α5
NCCURRENTt + α6
NCDAYS_CASHt +  
 α7
NCTEACHINGt + α8
NCLnAGEt + α9
NCLnASSETSt +  
 α10
NCCMIt + α11
NCHHIt + εt (4) 
 
For each hospital i, we estimate both models using all other hospitals in the 
same fiscal year.  Coefficient estimates times actual amounts for hospital i are used 
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to calculate expected expenses for hospital i.  Actual expenses less expected 
expenses equal unexpected expenses (U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP).  
 
U_CORE_EXPt = CORE_EXPt – E(CORE_EXPt) (5) 
 
U_NONCORE_EXPt = NONCORE_EXPt – E(NONCORE_EXPt) (6) 
 
 
For precise data definitions of variables used in models (3)-(6), see Appendix 
C.  Variables in models (3) and (4) are meant to control for natural business factors 
which affect a hospital’s level of CORE_EXP and NONCORE_EXP.  Lagged core 
expenses (CORE_EXPt-1) and non-core expenses (NONCORE_EXPt-1) control for the 
expected persistence of these expenses.  Asset turnover (ATOt), the percentage 
change in gross patient revenue (ΔREV), and the percentage change in gross patient 
revenue if ΔREV is less than 0 (NEG_ΔREV) are chosen based on similar variables 
used in prior research to control for expected performance (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 
2010).  The current ratio (CURRENT) and days cash on hand ratio (DAYS_CASH) 
are included to account for the impact of liquidity on nonprofit hospitals’ level of 
core and non-core expenses (Eldenburg and Vines 2004; Krishnan and Yetman 
2011).  An indicator variable for teaching hospitals (TEACHING), log of the number 
of years since the hospital was originally licensed based on OSHPD Utilization data 
files (LnAGE), and log of total assets (LnASSETS) are included to control for the 
academic status, age and reputation, and size of the hospital, respectively.  To control 
for the acuity of patients served, we include case mix index based on OSHPD Case 
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Mix Index files (CMI).  Finally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) controls for 
the level of local competition (Krishnan and Yetman 2011). 
It is important to note that in the presence of cost shifting, the predicted 
relation between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP is negative.  If hospital 
managers reclassify non-core expenses as core expenses, the level of U_CORE_EXP 
(U_NONCORE_EXP) in year t  is increasing (decreasing) in the amount of 
reclassification that occurs.  Empirically, however, it is quite possible to observe a 
positive relation between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP, even in the 
presence of shifting.  The positive relation could occur to the extent we measure 
unexpected expenses with error.  That is, a hospital may incur higher than usual 
overall expenses in a given year for any number of valid economic conditions.  If 
core and non-core expenses are similarly affected by unforeseen economic forces 
(i.e., those factors not included in our expectations models), U_CORE_EXP and 
U_NONCORE_EXP will tend to occur in the same direction.  Thus, shifting induces 
a negative relation between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP, while 
measurement error in our expectations models induces a positive relation.  Given that 
nonprofit hospitals’ expense expectations models are not well-developed in the 
literature and the inherent difficulty in measuring (unobservable) unexpected 
expenses, it is reasonable to assume that measurement error exists in our tests. 
To address this measurement error, we compare the relation between 
U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP for hospitals expected to engage in cost 
shifting to that of other hospitals.  We predict that hospitals suspected of engaging in 
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cost shifting will show a more negative (or less positive) relation between 
U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP.  For each hospital-year, we define a 
variable (SUSPECT
A
) that equals the summation of nine indicator variables based on 
factors hypothesized in section III.  Each of the nine indicator variables is coded as 
one if the hospital has the particular hospital characteristic and reports earnings well 
above the zero-profit benchmark (e.g., RURAL
A
 = 1 if the hospital is located in a 
rural area and reports earnings well above the zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise).  
SUSPECT
A
 ranges from 0 to 9 and represents the increasing likelihood that the 
hospital will engage in cost shifting.  For easier interpretation of the results, we scale 
SUSPECT
A
 by 9 so that the variable ranges from 0 to 1.  The differential relation 
between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP for suspect hospitals versus non-
suspect hospitals is measured using the following model. 
 
U_CORE_EXPt = β0 + β1SUSPECTt
A
 + β2U_NONCORE_EXPt + 
 β3U_NONCORE_EXPt × SUSPECTt
A
 + εt (7) 
 
β3 tests our hypothesis.  We expect the incremental relation between 
U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP for suspect hospitals to be negative.  Thus, 
our hypothesis test of cost shifting becomes β3 < 0.
34
  β2 measures the relation 
between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP for non-suspect hospitals. 
For our test of cost shifting for hospitals below the zero-profit benchmark, we 
follow the same research design.  We define SUSPECT
B
 as the summation of the 
                                                 
34
 Note that this test purposely excludes hospitals that report earnings below the zero-profit 
benchmark.  Tests for cost shifting by these hospitals are detailed below. 
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nine indicator variables (scaled by 9) for hospitals reporting earnings below the zero-
profit benchmark (e.g., RURAL
B
 = 1 if the hospital is located in a rural area and 
reports earnings below the zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise).  After substituting 
SUSPECT
B
 into equation (7), we again expect β3 < 0.  As hospitals’ incentive and 
ability to shift expenses increase, the relation between U_CORE_EXP and 
U_NONCORE_EXP is expected to decrease.  These results would be consistent with 
cost shifting behavior for hospitals below the zero-profit benchmark. 
The final dimension of our research design is classifying hospitals relative to 
the zero-profit benchmark.  We classify hospitals as below the benchmark if they 
report net income less than zero.  Classifying hospitals above the benchmark is more 
subjective.  Our underlying hypothesis suggests that hospitals which are “well 
above” zero earnings have incentives to shift non-core expenses to core expenses, 
and those “just above” zero have less (or no) incentive.  The point at which profits 
are “well above” zero for a nonprofit hospital is subjective and likely occurs along a 
continuum.  Therefore, we seek to clearly distinguish those hospitals that are well 
above the benchmark from those that are just above to provide a more reliable test.  
To do this, we classify hospitals with net income (scaled by lagged total assets) 
greater than 0.10 as hospitals that are well above the benchmark. Benchmark 
hospitals are classified as those reporting net income (scaled by lagged total assets) 
greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.04 (Eldenburg et al. 2011).  Hospitals 
that fall within the 0.04 to 0.10 range are not included in either the above-benchmark 
group or the benchmark group, although we report sensitivity analyses on this 
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sample later.  Our classification system results in about 24% (27%) of the sample 
observations being classified as above (below) the benchmark, and 23% being 
classified as benchmark hospitals.  The remaining 26% of the possible hospitals have 
net income greater than the benchmark hospitals but less than the above-benchmark 
hospitals.  See Figure 2. 
 
V.  Results 
A.  Calculation of Unexpected Expenses 
Table 13 provides the distributions of variables used to calculate unexpected 
expenses in models (3) and (4).  Core expenses are only approximately 65% greater 
than non-core expenses.  Thus, non-core expenses provide managers a material 
amount of expenses to shift in an attempt to alter external parties’ perceptions of the 
resources devoted to core activities.  The amounts reported for the explanatory 
variables seem reasonable.  Also as expected, the means of unexpected core and non-
core expenses are close to zero.  This would be true almost by definition based on 
our estimation procedure.  We are not necessarily interested in the amount of 
unexpected expenses for certain hospitals.  Instead, our tests rely on the relation 
between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP being lower for hospitals expected 
to engage in greater cost shifting when they deviate from the zero-profit benchmark. 
Table 14 provides coefficient estimates of a pooled model which includes all 
1,282 hospital-year observations in our sample.  Note that we show coefficients from 
a pooled model to provide descriptive evidence of the overall relations between (core 
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and non-core) expenses and their explanatory variables.  However, when estimating 
expected expenses of hospital i in year t, we estimate a model that includes only 
hospitals other than hospital i in the same fiscal year.  Coefficient estimates from 
these models times actual amounts for hospital i in year t are used to calculate 
expected expenses for hospital i in year t. 
There is a strong positive relation between current expenses and lagged 
expenses.  The level of expenses (scaled by gross patient revenue) is negatively 
related to revenue growth (ΔREV) but more so for hospitals with revenue declines 
(NEG_ ΔREV).  Asset turnover (ATO), the current ratio (CURRENT), and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on total discharges (HHI) are positively related 
to core expenses.  The days cash on hand ratio (DAYS_CASH) is positively related to 
non-core expenses.  The remaining variables are insignificant. Both models show 
high fit, with adjusted R
2
s of 0.907 and 0.874. 
Table 15 provides correlations among U_CORE_EXP or U_NONCORE_EXP 
and our partitioning variables.  The first result to note is that the correlation between 
U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP is positive, whereas our prediction in the 
presence of cost shifting would be negative.  To us, this suggests that normal 
economic events and hospital characteristics beyond those controlled for in models 
(3) and (4) jointly affect the level of CORE_EXP or NONCORE_EXP, creating 
unexpected amounts that occur in the same direction.
35
  However, this is not critical 
to our research design, but it does necessitate our choice of comparing SUSPECT 
                                                 
35
 It is also the case that cross-sectional variation in coefficient estimates or nonlinear relations 
between expected expenses and explanatory variables would induce measurement error, even if the 
expectations models included all relevant variables. 
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hospitals to other hospitals.  We expect that the correlation between U_CORE_EXP 
and U_NONCORE_EXP will be less positive (or negative) for hospitals more likely 
to shift.  These include hospitals with certain characteristics discussed in section III 
and that report earnings below or well above the benchmark level of earnings.  We 
test this in the next section.  The remainder of the correlations among the partitioning 
variables are relatively low with one exception.  Not surprisingly, hospitals with high 
Medicare utilization tend not to be hospital with high Medicaid utilization.  While 
nonprofit hospitals perhaps can afford to provide a proportionally high amount of 
services to one of either Medicare or Medicaid patients, doing so for both would be 
disadvantageous.  Specifically, Medicare and Medicaid programs are known to 
provide lower reimbursement rates relative to private payers and, as documented by 
Kramer and Santerre (2010), a payer mix that entails a higher proportion of public to 
private payers is associated with lower CEO pay. 
 
B.  Tests of Hypothesis 
Panel A (B) of Table 16 provides our test of the hypothesis by examining the 
incremental relation between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP for hospitals 
well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark based on SUSPECT
A
 (SUSPECT
B
) 
scores.  In Panel A, we first note the positive coefficient on U_NONCORE_EXP.  
The coefficient suggests that for non-suspect hospitals, the relation between 
U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP is significantly positive.  While one might 
predict no relation between these two variables in the absence of cost shifting, 
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finding a positive relation likely suggests measurement error in expected expenses 
being positively correlated for core and non-core expenses.  However, for hospitals 
that engage in cost shifting, we expect the relation between unexpected expenses to 
become smaller (or even negative).  The coefficient on the interaction of 
U_NONCORE_EXP and SUSPECT
A
 provides our test of the incremental relation 
between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP for hospitals expected to have 
greater incentives and ability to shift costs that report earnings well above the zero-
profit benchmark.  Consistent with our hypothesis, the incremental relation between 
U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP is significantly negative for SUSPECT
A
 
hospitals. 
In Panel B we test our hypothesis for suspect hospitals that report earnings 
below the zero-profit benchmark.  Similar to Panel A, we find that non-suspect 
hospitals have a significantly positive relation between U_CORE_EXP and 
U_NONCORE_EXP.  For SUSPECT
B
 hospitals, the incremental relation is negative, 
as expected, but not significant at conventional levels for a two-tailed test.  From the 
results in Table 16, we conclude that the strongest evidence of shifting occurs for 
hospitals that are more likely to have incentives and ability to shift and that report 
earnings well above the zero-profit benchmark. 
To further interpret the results, we split each sample into those with positive 
and negative U_NONCORE_EXP.  The reason for doing so follows.  In Table 16, we 
document that the incremental relation between U_CORE_EXP and 
U_NONCORE_EXP is significantly negative for SUSPECT
A
 hospitals.  However, 
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finding this negative relation does not necessarily indicate that expenses are being 
shifted to core activities from non-core activities.  In fact, one would observe this 
same negative relation between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP if cost 
shifting were occurring in the opposite direction (i.e., from core to non-core 
activities).  To the extent that cost shifting is occurring in the hypothesized direction, 
U_CORE_EXP should be positive (i.e., core expenses are greater than expected) 
while U_NONCORE_EXP should be negative (i.e., non-core expenses should be less 
than expected).  In other words, U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP should 
show the most evidence of a negative relation when U_NONCORE_EXP is negative.  
If, however, we observe that the negative relation between U_CORE_EXP and 
U_NONCORE_EXP occurs primarily when hospitals report positive 
U_NONCORE_EXP, then it is more difficult to believe that hospitals are shifting 
expenses in the manner we hypothesize.  Thus, splitting the sample into those 
observations with positive and negative U_NONCORE_EXP allows for stronger 
conclusions. 
Panel A (B) of Table 17 provides these additional tests for hospitals well 
above (below) the zero-profit benchmark.  In Panel A, we observe that the 
incremental relation between U_CORE_EXP and U_NONCORE_EXP for 
SUSPECT
A
 is both highly negative and statistically significant only when 
U_NONCORE_EXP is negative.  For observations with positive 
U_NONCORE_EXP, the incremental relation is close to zero and is not statistically 
significant.  Further, an F-test of equality of coefficients across samples indicates 
84 
 
that the incremental relation when U_NONCORE_EXP is negative is statistically 
different from when U_NONCORE_EXP is positive (p-value < 0.0001).
36
  In Panel 
B, we find that when U_NONCORE_EXP is negative the incremental relation is 
negative but not significant at conventional levels for a two-tailed test (significant at 
only the 0.075 level for a one-tailed test).  An F-test of equality of coefficients across 
samples reveals that the incremental relation when U_NONCORE_EXP is negative 
does not differ statistically from when U_NONCORE_EXP is positive.  Thus, we 
continue to conclude that evidence of cost shifting is greater for hospitals well above 
the zero-profit benchmark but marginal, at best, for hospitals below the benchmark.  
The more significant findings when profits are well above versus below the 
zero-profit benchmark seem reasonable when considering the sentiment surrounding 
nonprofit hospitals.  Nearly all of the negative media publicity and critical comments 
by regulators, politicians, and community groups occur when nonprofit hospitals 
report excessive profits.  Thus, empirically demonstrating that shifting is more likely 
to occur when profits are well above the zero-profit benchmark gives us greater 
confidence in our research design and conclusions. 
                                                 
36
 To compute an F-test of equality of coefficients, we estimate a combined model of positive and 
negative unexpected non-core expenses.  Specifically, the model we use is as follows:  
 U_CORE_EXPt = β0
neg
 + β
0
pos
 + β
1
negSUSPECTt
A + β
1
posSUSPECTt
A + β
2
neg
U_NONCORE_EXPt +  
  β
2
pos
U_NONCORE_EXPt + β3
neg
U_NONCORE_EXPt × SUSPECTt
A +  
  β
3
pos
U_NONCORE_EXPt × SUSPECTt
A  + εt 
The coefficients 𝛽𝑘
neg
 and 𝛽𝑘
pos
 (k = 0, 1, 2, 3) correspond to negative and positive unexpected non-
core expenses, respectively.  Our F-test becomes β
3
neg = β
3
pos. 
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C.  Tests of Individual Hospital Characteristics 
Our next tests consider detailed examinations of which hospital 
characteristics contribute to the more negative relation between U_CORE_EXP and 
U_NONCORE_EXP when suspect hospitals deviate from the zero-profit benchmark.  
To do this, we separate SUSPECT
A
 into nine indicator variables using the hospital 
characteristics discussed in section III.  This allows for nine separate tests.  This 
analysis has the advantage of providing more specific conclusions about which 
hospitals are likely engaging in cost shifting.  At the same time, using individual 
measures likely provides lower-power tests because of the smaller sample size.  
In Panel A of Table 18, we test for cost shifting when earnings are well above 
the benchmark by again separately investigating observations with positive and 
negative U_NONCORE_EXP.  In Panel A, when U_NONCORE_EXP is negative, 
we find that five of the nine characteristics are negative but only four are significant.  
Hospitals that are rural, provide high charity care, have low Medicare utilization, or 
have high donations exhibit more evidence of shifting non-core expenses to core 
expenses when net income is well above the benchmark.  Doing so allows these 
hospitals to portray less profitable core operations, thereby seemingly projecting 
performance more in line with their charitable mission and patient-centered focus. 
When U_NONCORE_EXP is positive, only low Medicaid hospitals display a 
significant incremental negative relation.  Furthermore, this negative relation 
approximately equals that of low Medicaid hospitals when U_NONCORE_EXP is 
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negative.  Thus, our previous conclusions related to these hospitals’ shifting behavior 
is confounded by these results.
 
In Panel B of Table 18, we provide analyses for cost shifting when earnings 
are below the zero-profit benchmark.  When U_NONCORE_EXP is negative, we 
find that hospitals with low Medicare, low Medicaid, or high donations show the 
most evidence of cost shifting.  We further note that the coefficients for these 
hospitals are also more negative than those of hospitals with positive 
U_NONCORE_EXP, reinforcing our conclusions that costs are being shifted from 
non-core to core activities.  Thus, while our aggregate measure of cost shifting for 
hospitals below the zero-profit benchmark (SUSPECT
B
) does not provide strong 
evidence, tests of individual hospital characteristics are consistent with some 
hospitals acting in this manner. 
 
D.  Alternative Benchmark Definitions 
As discussed earlier, it is somewhat subjective to define what constitutes 
earnings “well above” the zero-profit benchmark.  To address this, we perform two 
sensitivity tests on our results in Table 18.  First, we redefine the benchmark group to 
include net income (scaled by lagged total assets) greater than or equal to 0.00 and 
less than or equal to 0.10.  Untabulated results reveal very similar findings using this 
alternative definition of the benchmark group.  Specifically, when 
U_NONCORE_EXP is negative, five (four) of nine coefficients are in the predicted 
direction (i.e., negative) for the above-benchmark (below-benchmark) group with 
87 
 
four (three) of these being at least marginally statistically significant.  Moreover, the 
coefficients in the sample split where U_NONCORE_EXP is negative are more 
negative or less positive than coefficients arising from when U_NONCORE_EXP is 
positive in five (three) of nine cases for above-benchmark (below-benchmark) 
hospitals.  
Second, we redefine the above-benchmark group to include net income 
(scaled by lagged total assets) greater than or equal to 0.04.  Untabulated results 
again support our hypothesis, with five of nine coefficients being negative for each 
of the above-benchmark and below-benchmark groups, three (four) of which are at 
least marginally statistically significant for the above-benchmark (below-benchmark) 
group.  For negative U_NONCORE_EXP, five (four) of nine coefficients are more 
negative or less positive than the corresponding positive U_NONCORE_EXP 
coefficients in the above-benchmark (below-benchmark) group.  Therefore, we find 
our results to be robust to inclusion of nonprofit hospital earnings greater than or 
equal 0.04 but less than or equal to 0.10. 
We also redefine the benchmark group according to different upper bounds. 
Holding the below-benchmark and above-benchmark definitions constant (i.e., as 
defined in section IV), we redefine benchmark hospitals as those reporting net 
income (scaled by lagged total assets) greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.02 
and 0.03, respectively.  Untabulated results using these alternative benchmark group 
definitions again support our hypothesis and are very similar to results presented.
37
  
                                                 
37
 Specifically, by defining the upper bound of the benchmark profit range to be 0.03 and when 
U_NONCORE_EXP is negative, five coefficients are negative and four are at least marginally 
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Therefore, our results are robust to a more restrictive definition of what constitutes 
meeting the zero-profit benchmark. 
Finally, we redefine the below-benchmark group by excluding those 
observations with very small losses.  It may be the case that reporting very small 
losses is “close enough” to zero that the hospital faces no incentive to shift expenses.  
When we exclude observations with net income (scaled by lagged total assets) 
between zero and −0.01, results are similar to those reported.38  In summary, our 
overall conclusions are robust to minor modifications in the classification of 
hospitals falling short of, meeting, or exceeding the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
While the profit motive of nonprofit hospitals differs from for-profit 
institutions, similar earnings management techniques are used to achieve this 
objective.  Specifically, instead of being charged with maximizing profits as in the 
case of for-profits, nonprofit hospitals are expected to fulfill a zero-profit benchmark 
(Hoerger 1991, Leone and Van Horn 2005).  If a nonprofit hospital realizes repeated 
                                                                                                                                          
statistically significant for each of the above-benchmark and below-benchmark groups.  The 
coefficients corresponding to U_NONCORE_EXP that is negative are more negative or less 
positive than coefficients arising from when U_NONCORE_EXP is positive in six (four) of nine 
cases for above-benchmark (below-benchmark) hospitals.  By defining the upper bound of the 
benchmark profit range to be 0.02 and when U_NONCORE_EXP is negative, five (four) 
coefficients are negative for the above-benchmark (below-benchmark) group and four of these 
coefficients are at least marginally statistically significant for each of the above-benchmark and 
below-benchmark groups.  The coefficients corresponding to U_NONCORE_EXP that is negative 
are more negative or less positive than coefficients arising when U_NONCORE_EXP is positive in 
six (four) of nine cases for above-benchmark (below-benchmark) hospitals. 
38
 After eliminating small losses and when U_NONCORE_EXP is negative, five (four) coefficients are 
negative and four (three) are at least marginally statistically significant for the above-benchmark 
(below-benchmark) group.  The coefficients corresponding to U_NONCORE_EXP that is negative 
are more negative or less positive than coefficients arising when U_NONCORE_EXP is positive in 
five of each of the above-benchmark and below-benchmark groups. 
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losses, it may face the inability to continue as a going concern, and hospital 
managers suffer lower compensation or higher unemployment risk.  If a nonprofit 
hospital reports excessively positive profits, it will likely face scrutiny from the 
media, donors, regulators, politicians, and third-party payers.  Prior research 
indicates that nonprofit hospitals manage accruals (e.g., Leone and Van Horn 2005) 
and real activities (e.g., Eldenburg et al. 2011) to accomplish the zero-profit 
objective.  Moreover, preliminary evidence has confirmed that cost shifting is used 
to inflate core expenses devoted to the hospital’s charitable mission and patient-
centered focus (e.g., Krishnan and Yetman 2011).  Our study combines existing 
knowledge in these areas by providing evidence of cost shifting in nonprofit 
hospitals whose earnings are below or well above the zero-profit benchmark relative 
to those hospitals who meet this profit objective. 
We expect that nonprofit hospitals whose bottom-line net income is below or 
well above the zero-profit benchmark have incentives to shift non-core (i.e., non-
patient-centered) expenses to core (i.e., patient-centered) expenses.  By shifting costs 
to core expenses, core profitability decreases, creating the appearance that the 
hospital is better fulfilling its charitable mission and patient-centered focus, while 
providing services at affordable prices.  At the same time, shifting expenses from 
non-core activities may reduce criticisms from the community and others that 
managers are using resources inefficiently by spending excessively on activities not 
directly related to patient care. 
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To test cost shifting behavior, we first estimate unexpected core expenses and 
unexpected non-core expenses.  If nonprofit hospitals shift expenses from non-core 
to core activities, we should observe a negative relation between unexpected core 
and unexpected non-core expenses.  We compare the relation between unexpected 
core expenses and unexpected non-core expenses for nonprofit hospitals suspected to 
engage in cost shifting versus non-suspect hospitals.  
We find that nonprofit hospitals with greater normative pressures, lower 
regulatory oversight, and greater reliance on external financing through donations 
tend to shift costs when reporting bottom-line net income that deviates from the zero-
profit benchmark.  Specifically, when bottom-line net income is well above the zero-
profit benchmark, hospitals that are rural, provide high charity care, have low 
Medicaid utilization, or have high donations tend to shift expenses from non-core 
activities to core activities.  When bottom-line net income is below the zero-profit 
benchmark, hospitals that have low Medicare utilization, have low Medicaid 
utilization, or have high donations engage in cost shifting. 
Beyond providing additional evidence of manipulative reporting behavior by 
hospitals, our study may also provide information directly relevant to regulators of 
nonprofit hospitals.  These hospitals receive tax-exempt status, and their right to do 
so represents an implicit allocation of scarce government resources.  Given the 
growing concerns over the sustainability of government-assisted health care, 
regulators (and others) need to better understand the performance and cost efficiency 
of health care providers.  To the extent that cost shifting occurs, nonprofit hospitals 
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may mask inefficient allocation of scarce resources and mislead external parties into 
believing the nonprofit hospital’s tax-exempt status is warranted.  This misleading 
financial reporting may also hinder regulators’ ability to identify the real issues 
plaguing the health care industry, further aggravating the effectiveness of current and 
future legislation.  We hope that our findings shed light on the existence of a 
relatively unknown form of earnings management in nonprofit hospitals. 
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Chapter 3 
The Impact of Political Connectedness on Firm Value and 
Corporate Policies:  Evidence from Citizens United
 39
 
 
 “At bottom, the Court’s opinion [in Citizens United] is thus a rejection of the 
common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to 
prevent corporations from undermining self-government since the founding, 
and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate 
electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt.  It is a strange time to 
repudiate that common sense.  While American democracy is imperfect, few 
outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws included a 
dearth of corporate money in politics.” 
– Dissenting opinion of Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens,  
Citizens United v. FEC 
 
I.  Introduction 
Do corporate political connections enhance or destroy firm value?  Existing 
insights into political connectedness as it relates to firm value are inconclusive, likely 
owed at least in part to endogeneity concerns.
40
  This paper exploits an exogenous 
enhancement in the impact of political connections on firm value and corporate 
policies that accompanied a landmark Supreme Court ruling, Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission (hereafter, “Citizens United”) which lifted long-
standing limits on corporate political contributions.  In doing so, we are able to help 
                                                 
39
 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Vahap B. Uysal. 
40
 Notably, in response to endogeneity concerns, prominent researchers have called for more careful 
inspection of the relationship between corporate political activism and firm value.  For example, 
Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) state the following: “[…] do we document evidence of a 
causal link from firm PAC contributions to future stock prices?  Answering this question in the 
affirmative requires resolving potential endogeneity problems with our data… Our hope is that 
future work… can further analyze the issue of causality and the related topic of whether the 
correlations between contributions and returns arise from mispricing or risk” (2010, p. 690). 
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fill a gap in the literature with regard to the value implications of corporate political 
connectedness. 
Political connectedness may destroy shareholder value if the political 
connectedness of a company is driven by management’s political agenda – an agenda 
that diverges from that of the company’s stakeholders.  Specifically, connected firms 
place their resources in jeopardy of being exploited by politicians (Fan, Wong, and 
Zhang 2007; Caprio, Faccio, and McConnell 2013), and are marred by agency 
conflicts (Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang 2012; Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Saffar 
2013).  Under this view, Citizens United amplifies the value-destroying effect of 
political connectedness through its lifting of restrictions on corporate political 
contributions; thus, historically politically connected firms are likely to realize an 
unfavorable market reaction surrounding the Citizens United decision (Agency Cost 
Hypothesis).  
A competing view states that political connectedness enhances shareholder 
value (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2010).  Specifically, politically 
connected firms can derive a benefit (1) from preferential access to financing 
(Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven 2008), (2) 
through less risk and an accompanying lower cost of capital (Boubakri, Guedhami, 
Mishra, and Saffar 2012), (3) when a politically connected individual joins the 
corporation’s board (Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009), or (4) when a businessperson 
enters politics (Faccio 2006).  As Citizens United amplified the value implications of 
political connectedness, this view predicts that connected firms will enjoy a 
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favorable market reaction surrounding the announcement of Citizens United (Value 
Enhancing Hypothesis).   
 To address the value implications of political connectedness, we exploit an 
exogenous and landmark Supreme Court ruling, Citizens United, as a quasi-natural 
experiment.  Decided in January 2010, Citizens United lifted long-standing limits on 
corporate political contributions.  However, the verdict was unanticipated and did not 
come easily, as the issue was accompanied by considerable disagreement (e.g., 
Bravin 2010; Barnes 2010b; Biskupic 2009).  The 5-4 vote in favor of its passing 
further verified division amongst members of the Court.
41
  
The controversial and uncertain nature of Citizens United offers an ideal 
research setting to examine the effect of political connectedness on both firm value 
and corporate policies.  Specifically, much of the extant, related literature relies on a 
simple, cross-sectional research design that is subject to endogeneity concerns.  
Since predicting the likely outcome of Citizens United was highly infeasible (e.g., 
Barnes 2010a; Biskupic 2009; Eggen 2010), it is difficult to argue that either 
investors or corporations were able to anticipate its favorable vote and proactively 
                                                 
41
 Soon after the ruling, President Barack Obama voiced vigorous criticism, declaring the decision “a 
green light to a new stampede of special interest money” (Barnes and Eggen 2010).  The majority 
vote adamantly defended their belief that corporate political contributions are a form of free speech 
and, as such, constitutional under the First Amendment.  Not surprisingly, the months following 
passage of Citizens United have been marked by controversy and turmoil, with some lawmakers 
and investors urgently pleading that the Supreme Court reconsider the expansive and profuse 
provisions accompanying Citizens United, in addition to urging the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to consider adopting disclosure requirements for corporate political contributions. 
Notably, in June 2012, the Supreme Court refused a request to reconsider its Citizens United 
decision (Bravin 2012).  As of mid-2013, the SEC was continuing to consider petitions by 
advocates of campaign finance reform calling for stark improvements in the disclosure of corporate 
political contributions (SEC 2011).  
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adjust their behaviors accordingly.  The surprise nature of Citizens United lends to its 
credibility as a valid quasi-natural experimental setting.  
A primary channel through which corporations become politically connected 
is through campaign contributions to candidates for office.  We follow previous 
studies (Aggarwal et al. 2012; Claessens et al. 2008; Goldman et al. 2009) in basing 
our definition of political connectedness on corporate campaign contributions, as 
reported in the Center for Responsive Politics.  Specifically, for companies 
belonging to the S&P 500, we define a firm as politically connected if its median 
firm-level, pre-Citizens United political contributions (scaled by net total assets) falls 
in the top quartile.  
By operationalizing the political connectedness measure in the quasi-natural 
experiment of Citizens United, this paper provides novel evidence on the impact of 
political activism on firm value.  Specifically, after estimating abnormal returns 
using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) that accounts for cross-correlated error 
terms – a distinction and empirical improvement relative to related papers – we find 
that political connections destroy shareholder value.  Notably, historically politically 
connected firms realized an abnormal price drop of –0.475% on the date the Citizens 
United decision was announced, and a cumulative abnormal loss of –1.219% five 
days after the announcement date.  In contrast, historically non-politically connected 
firms enjoyed positive returns on announcement date in the order of 0.240%.  The 
difference between the announcement date reactions of politically connected firms 
and non-politically connected firms is also highly statistically significant.  In 
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multivariate analyses that control for firm characteristics, we continue to find a 
negative and significant effect of political connectedness on shareholder value.  
Furthermore, the negative effect of political connectedness is significant only for the 
subsample of firms with weak corporate governance.  Collectively, these findings 
support the Agency Cost Hypothesis.  
Given our finding that political connections reduce firm value, we exploit 
differences in corporate policies as a means to further investigate whether political 
connectedness and agency conflicts are positively related.  Since corporate policies 
and political connectedness are jointly determined, we use the quasi-natural 
experimental setting of Citizens United to overcome endogeneity limitations.  This 
improvement over related, existing literature offers an opportunity to draw more 
sound conclusions on the relationship between corporate policies and political 
connectedness.  
We study this relationship in the context of cash management policies.  
Building upon previous studies that show that greater agency conflicts are associated 
with higher cash holdings (e.g., Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; Harford 1999), we 
compare the cash holdings of politically connected firms to their less-connected 
counterparts.  Specifically, we utilize a difference-in-differences approach to capture 
differences between firms of differing political connectedness and during different 
periods of time (i.e., pre- versus post-Citizens United).  After controlling for 
traditional determinants of cash holdings, we find that switching from non-politically 
connected status to politically connected status results in an incremental increase in 
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corporate cash holdings of almost 20% following passage of Citizens United. Poor 
corporate governance quality also exacerbates the agency problems inherent to 
politically connected firms.  Specifically, politically connected firms with entrenched 
managers, busy boards of directors, and overcompensated CEOs retain even more 
cash relative to their well-governed counterparts in the post-Citizens United period.  
We also find that the mere entertaining of a shareholder proposal that would restrict 
political contributions acts as a monitoring mechanism and, by extension, reduces the 
cash holdings of politically connected firms.  Further, our results reveal that within-
firm political tension, defined as divergence in management’s political preferences 
from those of his employees, is associated with incrementally higher cash holdings.  
Collectively, these findings support the existence of agency costs in politically 
connected firms.  
We conduct several sensitivity tests to validate our findings. Specifically, we 
provide evidence that the parallel trends assumption required for difference-in-
differences estimation is not violated in our research setting.  Additionally, our 
conclusions regarding the value implications of corporate political connections hold 
after accounting for potentially confounding events as well as in a placebo analysis, 
in which we compare politically connected companies to a group of “placebo-
politically-neutral” firms.  Our findings related to the agency conflicts of politically 
connected firms are robust to an analysis of excess cash holdings.  Finally, we 
demonstrate that our empirical findings remain intact after excluding politically 
exposed firms belonging to the defense, energy, and utilities industries.  These 
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robustness checks lend further support to the value-destroying effects of corporate 
political connections and a positive association between political connectedness and 
agency costs. 
This paper adds to emerging literature on the value-decreasing effects of 
political connections on stock prices.  In a study of the effects of Citizens United, 
Coates (2012) finds that political connectedness is negatively related to Tobin’s Q 
ratio, suggesting agency problems in politically connected firms.
42
  Using the event 
study methodology, we document an unfavorable (favorable) capital market reaction 
to Citizens United for politically (non-politically) connected firms.  Our paper fulfills 
a request repeatedly stated in related literature to explore the ramifications of 
Citizens United on corporate political activism, particularly since the landmark 
decision is expected “to greatly increase the use of corporate funds for political 
donations” (Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang 2012, p. 2).  Through a study of Citizens 
United and its exogenous enhancement in the value implications of political 
connectedness, we are better able to provide a causal link between political 
connections and changes in firm value.
 
 
This paper is also related to extant literature that examines the impact of 
political connectedness on corporate policies.  Relevant studies have shown that 
political connectedness is significantly and positively related to executive 
compensation (Aslan and Grinstein 2012), leverage (Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar 
                                                 
42
 Previous studies show that Tobin’s Q ratio is correlated with several other factors (e.g., growth 
opportunities, capital structure) which do not fully reflect shareholder value (e.g., Anderson and 
Reeb 2003; Hail and Leuz 2009).  We offer a more direct examination of shareholder value by 
making use of an event study methodology.  
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2012; Faccio 2010; Hutton, Jiang, and Kumar 2013), and liquidity (Boubakri, El 
Ghoul, and Saffar 2013).  In a cross-country study of corporate cash holdings, 
Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Saffar (2013) find that politically connected firms hold 
more cash relative to non-politically connected firms, suggesting that politically 
connected firms face acute governance problems known to correlate with cash 
hoarding behaviors (e.g. Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990).  These excessive cash reserves 
can then be exploited by politicians in an attempt to advance political and social 
agendas at the expense of shareholders.  In contrast, a study of political lobbying 
expenditures by Hill, Fuller, Kelly, and Washam (2014) demonstrates an inverse 
relation between cash holdings and lobbying costs.  The authors attribute this finding 
to the liquidity-related benefits of political connections (such as better access to 
external financing), and the known tendency for firms to hold smaller cash balances 
when the cost of illiquidity is low (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
1999).  Our contribution to this stream of literature is two-fold. First, we demonstrate 
that political connectedness is a measure of agency problems and is distinct from 
both traditional determinants of cash holdings and governance measures.  While the 
majority of previous studies rely on inferences drawn from cross-sectional data, the 
primary focus and findings of our paper revolve around a quasi-natural experiment, 
thus significantly alleviating endogeneity concerns.  Second, our results shed light on 
the dynamics of internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.  
Specifically, by showing significant effects of political connectedness and its 
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interaction with corporate governance measures, this study suggests that political 
connectedness further exacerbates agency conflicts within the firm.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion of Citizens 
United is presented in the next section. Section III presents our hypotheses and 
related literature. Section IV describes the sampling procedure, and our empirical 
analysis is offered in section V.  We conclude in section VI. 
 
II.  Background 
 Historically, corporations were prohibited from actively campaigning on 
behalf of politicians through donations of independent expenditures, which were 
strictly forbidden during the period from World War II through 2010.
43, 44
  This ban 
was challenged by the nonprofit organization Citizens United through their 2008 
release of a conservative-inspired documentary attacking then-senator Hillary 
Rodham Clinton’s record and instilling doubts as to her qualifications to be 
president.  The Federal Election Commission restricted Citizens United on their 
advertisements of the movie, a limitation that Citizens United CEO David Bossie – a 
long-time adversary of Senator Clinton – claimed to violate his First Amendment 
                                                 
43
 Independent expenditures are defined as funds “expressly advocating the election of or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate who is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the 
request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a 
political party or its agents” (11 CFR 100.16(a)).  An example of an independent expenditure would 
be a corporation’s decision to finance television commercials endorsing the candidate of their 
choosing. 
44
 The first explicit ban on the use of general treasury funds for campaign expenditures was delivered 
through a provision in the Taft-Hartley Act (1947).  Subsequent court rulings (e.g., Federal Election 
Commission Act (1971, 1974), Austin vs. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (2002)) reinforced this ban. For a comprehensive review of legal decisions 
leading up to Citizens United, see Briffault (2011). 
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and right to free speech (Rucker 2010).  The response to Citizens United’s challenge 
was a landmark Supreme Court decision in January 2010, where prohibitions on 
certain forms of corporate political activism were rendered unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment. 
Some aspects of the regulatory environment surrounding corporate political 
activism did remain unchanged following Citizens United.   Notably, corporations 
are still prohibited from contributing corporate funds directly to a political candidate. 
Instead, corporations derive a large proportion of their political connectedness 
through Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions.  Managers, employees, and 
shareholders can contribute to their company’s PAC, and subsequently the PAC will 
channel the said funds to a political candidate.  Interestingly, corporations are 
permitted to use internal funds to finance the fundraising efforts of PACs.  Despite 
these regulatory consistencies, a logical yet relatively unexplored implication of 
Citizens United is an increase in corporate political activism through all means 
available, and not just through channels that were previously off limits. 
Election spending reached new highs following passage of Citizens United.  
The estimated $6 billion spent on the year 2012 election represents a new record and 
exceeds the cost of the second most expensive election by more than $700 million 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2012).  While corporations have never been barred 
from lobbying to reform policies, passage of Citizens United essentially opened the 
floodgates for corporations to take an active, direct, and economically meaningful 
role in campaigning for preferred political candidates.  Moreover, given the 
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previously-documented complementary nature of the various types of political 
activism, Citizens United stimulated corporate political involvement of all forms, 
even those types that were allowed to be used prior to its passage (Coates 2012).
45,46
 
 A distinction of this paper is its focus on Citizens United, a powerful and 
controversial decision but one whose effects are limited to the United States.  That is, 
our focus differs from cross-country studies (e.g., Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Saffar 
2013; Faccio 2006) and country-specific studies (Bunkanwanicha and 
Wiwattanakantang 2009; Ferguson and Voth 2008; Fisman 2001; Johnson and 
Mitton 2003; Ramalho 2007; Roberts 1990) in that we concentrate on how a timely, 
exogenous shock (Citizens United) affects the political connectedness landscape of 
corporations located within the United States.  Restricting our focus to an 
unanticipated change in corporate political contributions policy in the United States 
provides an ideal setting to test the implications of corporate political contributions 
on firm value and corporate policies while holding important within-country factors 
                                                 
45
 For additional evidence on the repeatedly documented and widely-accepted complementary nature 
of different forms of corporate political activity, see, for example, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and 
Tripathi (2002), Lord (2000), Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer (2002), and Wright (1990). 
46
 It is important to recognize that many forms of corporate campaign activity need not be disclosed. 
This reality complicates studies of political connectedness, since corporations can choose to 
strategically disguise their political activism.  For example, a firm can avoid disclosure altogether 
by channeling political contributions through a separate entity (i.e., a “conduit”, or “independent” 
organization).  In the case that the independent entity subsequently contributes said funds to a 
political campaign, it may be required to disclose the identity of its donors.  However, if the entity 
restricts its contributions to independent expenditures, no disclosure is required. These strategic yet 
unobservable channels of political activism were utilized even more in the post-Citizens United 
period.  Specifically, the identities of donors who sourced more than 50 percent of the $266.4 
million contributed by outside groups in 2010 remain unknown (Public Citizen 2010).  The 
unobservable nature of some forms of corporate political activity results in conservative estimates 
of political contributions and should only bias against our ability to document a link between 
political connectedness and corporate policies. 
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constant, such as cultural values, political views, regulations, and government 
structure.  
 
III.  Hypothesis Development 
A.  Agency Cost Hypothesis 
 As illustrated next, there exist several arguments for why the political 
motives of managers create or further exacerbate agency conflicts and are thus 
associated with a reduction in firm value.  The potential negative consequences in 
this context are perhaps best identified through the testimony of Columbia law 
professor John C. Coffee, Jr. before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, who noted the 
following: 
 
“…The goal, however, has to be not only to increase transparency and 
disclosure, but to give shareholders an effective remedy by which to 
challenge decisions of which they disapprove, because this is a world in 
which shareholder and managerial interests are not well aligned.  There may 
be perfectly legitimate corporate contributions, but for every dollar 
contributed by a corporation that maximizes shareholder wealth, there are 
other dollars that are contributed to pursue the personal, political, or 
ideological agenda of senior managers, all of that is hidden… [Citizens 
United] assumes that shareholders have practical remedies by which to 
contest decisions of managers to make contributions.  In fact, they have very 
few rights.” (Corporate Governance after Citizens United 2010)47 
 
                                                 
47
 Relatedly, in his 2010 report to the shareholders of the New York City Retirement Systems, John C. 
Liu, Comptroller of the City of New York, indicated that, “In the wake of Citizens United, it is even 
more important that boards provide the oversight and disclosure necessary to ensure that any 
political spending ultimately benefits shareholders, not the managers who control the corporate 
purse strings” (Comptroller of the City of New York 2010, p. 3). 
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More recent headlines directly tied to Citizens United involve incidents in 
which top-level corporate executives use their stature to influence the political 
leanings and voting decisions of lower-level employees, consistent with the presence 
of agency problems.  For example, an October 2010 New York Daily News article 
revealed that the owner of several Ohio-based McDonald’s restaurants sent 
Republican advertisements to employees as a means to strongly encourage them to 
vote for GOP candidates in the mid-term election.  The owner, Paul Siegfried, went 
so far as to threaten the employees with pay and benefit cuts should they choose to 
not comply (Shahid 2010).  These instances of political coercion are only becoming 
more common in the post-Citizens United period, as the freedoms imparted by the 
law have left many managing directors to believe that money is not the only 
unrestricted resource to be used for political means, but that employees can be used, 
too (e.g., Paarlberg 2012; Charles 2012; McCarthy 2012).
48
  
Given their overarching negative influence, corporate political connections 
may harm shareholder value. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) show that politicians 
                                                 
48
 Examples of agency conflicts within politically connected organizations are abundant. For instance, 
consider Roland Arnall, founder of Ameriquest Mortgage Co. and the single biggest contributor to 
President George W. Bush during the 2002-2004 time frame.  During the 2002-2007 period, Mr. 
Arnall and his wife contributed at least $12.25 million to the Bush campaign – an investment that 
would generate a very high rate of return.  For example, in several states, Ameriquest benefited 
from the relaxing of stringent regulations that would have adversely affected the company’s 
subprime lending practices.  Moreover, President Bush later appointed Mr. Arnall to the prestigious 
position of ambassador to the Netherlands.  Lastly, in exchange for their generosity, the Arnalls 
were invited to the inaugural dinner in January 2005, along with numerous other balls, receptions, 
and galas (Simpson 2007; Esdall and Bimbaum 2005).  As a more recent example, a March 2012 
Associated Press report revealed that “more than half of President Barack Obama’s most generous 
campaign fundraisers have visited the White House at least once for meetings with top advisers, 
holiday parties, or state dinners… [and] scores have made multiple visits” (Gillum 2012).  As 
another example, a December 2010 meeting hosted by President Obama involved 20 of the most 
politically active CEOs in corporate America.  Collectively, these 20 executives had made $8.2 
million in political contributions over the prior 20 years and were described by the Center for 
Responsive Politics as “a pretty friendly crowd” (Riley 2010). 
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may attempt to extract a politically connected firm’s resources to advance their own 
agendas.  Shleifer and Vishny (1994) theoretically demonstrate this tendency as one 
where politicians compel corporate donors to pursue their social policy goals.  
Caprio, Faccio, and McConnell (2013) use a country-specific measure to 
demonstrate that a company’s propensity to shelter assets increases when the 
potential of political extraction is high.  Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2012) and 
Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Saffar (2013) find that politically connected firms are 
marred by agency conflicts.  In a study of changes in congressional committee 
chairmanships, Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) demonstrate that increases in state-
level government spending deter (i.e., “crowd out”) private-sector investment of 
geographically proximate corporations.  If political connections decrease firm value, 
the announcement of new regulations that effectively approve of and promote 
corporate political activism should be accompanied by a negative reaction to 
historically politically connected firms.  Therefore, the argument for political 
connections having value-destroying implications predicts a negative market reaction 
to politically connected firms surrounding the Citizens United decision.  Moreover, 
as agency costs are associated with higher cash holdings, the Agency Cost 
Hypothesis predicts that politically connected firms are more likely to hoard cash 
relative to their less-connected counterparts.
49
  
 
                                                 
49
 A direct relationship between cash holdings and agency problems has garnered support from much 
of the relevant, extant literature.  See, for example Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Harford (1999), 
Faleye (2004), Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003); and Chen, Chen, Schipper, Xu, and Xue 
(2012). 
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B.  Value Enhancing Hypothesis  
Political connections may instead extend value-enhancing benefits to 
shareholders.  In an international study, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find 
that politically connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out by the 
government in times of distress relative to non-politically connected firms.  
Relatedly, Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) document politically connected 
firms’ preferential access to financing.  As an example, Solyndra, a former 
manufacturer of solar panels, is thought to have reaped significant financial benefits 
in response to its political connections.  Specifically, in 2009, the company received 
a $535 million loan guarantee from the Department of Energy.  In August 2011, 
Solyndra filed for bankruptcy, with the government projected to recoup a mere 19 
cents on the dollar (Bathon 2012).  A twist in this story originates in George Kaiser, 
an extremely wealthy Oklahoma oilman whose foundation owned one-third of the 
company.  Kaiser is reported to have raised between $50,000 and $100,000 for 
President Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign for presidency.  One might conclude that 
Kaiser’s loyalty to the President paid off in a big way; namely, some have suggested 
that the Solyndra plant built in Kaiser’s hometown of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was secured 
through his generous political contributions (Mildenberg and Robison 2011).  
Another instance of politicians catering to their donors arises through the 
combined efforts of congressional representatives Brian Bilbray, Erik Paulsen, and 
Jim Gerlach, who in June 2012 voted against a 2.3% excise tax on medical devices 
(H.R. 436) that went on to pass by a vote of 270-146.  An examination of the 
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legislators’ contribution inflows reveals clear political motives, with PACs of leading 
health care companies such as Abbott Laboratories, Life Technologies Corporation, 
and the Medical Device Manufacturers Association topping Bilbray’s list of major 
donors (Walters 2012).  A politician’s decision to promote the profitability of his 
donors (in this case, through tax breaks) represents a clear channel through which 
firms can use political contributions to enhance their financial stability and, by 
extension, firm value.  Furthermore, a politically connected firm may derive value-
enhancing benefits from a reduction in risk and lower cost of capital (Boubakri, 
Guedhami, Mishra, and Saffar 2012; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009; Faccio 2006).  
If political connections increase firm value, the announcement of new 
regulations that effectively approve of and promote corporate political activism 
should be accompanied by a positive reaction to historically politically connected 
firms.  As such, the notion that political connections are value-enhancing predicts a 
positive market reaction to politically connected firms surrounding the passage of 
Citizens United.  Moreover, the value-enhancing effects of political connections may 
also be derived from liquidity and soft-budget constraints that effectively free up the 
flow of cash (e.g., Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar 2012).  Thus, according to the Value 
Enhancing Hypothesis, politically connected firms respond to their financially 
unconstrained position by holding less cash relative to their less-connected 
counterparts. 
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IV.  Sample 
 We obtain political contributions data from the Center for Responsive 
Politics (CRP).  The CRP provides numerous data sets that can be used to gauge 
political activism, including campaign finance, lobbying, and the personal financial 
conditions of members of Congress and has been used repeatedly in related literature 
(e.g., Aslan and Grinstein 2012; Belo, Gala, and Li 2013; Goldman et al. 2009).  The 
focus of this paper is on corporate campaign finance activity, as gathered from the 
CRP and originating through Federal Election Commission (FEC) records.  Major 
subsets of the campaign finance data include individual contributions and 
(separately) political action committee (PAC) contributions, both to candidates and 
to committees.  Any individual contributing more than $200 is required by law to 
report the contribution, as well as to disclose their employer and occupation to the 
FEC.  The stringency of this requirement sheds light on employee-level contributions 
as being an important component of a company’s political activism. 
 To compute a measure of corporate campaign finance activity, we gather 
contribution-level observations for contributions made to candidates by PACs and by 
employees, both those tied to parent and to wholly-owned subsidiary companies.  
Subsequently, we pool all contributions at the parent-level each fiscal year. PAC 
committee names and identifying information are gathered from the FEC and then 
matched to contribution-level observations in the CRP data.  Employee contributions 
are identified by company name within the CRP data.
50
  Consistent with Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2009) and Coates (2012), among others, we restrict the sample to 
                                                 
50
 We manually reviewed all search results for actual matches and coded them accordingly. 
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S&P 500 firms.
 
 Financial statement data are gathered from the Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual file, stock returns are collected from CRSP, and names of 
subsidiary companies are retrieved from Mergent Online.  We pull governance data 
from the RiskMetrics Directors database, RiskMetrics Shareholders Proposals file, 
and Execucomp Annual Compensation database.  Our sample spans federal election 
cycle years 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012, or fiscal years from 2005 to 2011.
51
  To be 
included in the sample, a firm must appear in the data set in at least one pre-Citizens 
United year (2005, 2006, 2007, or 2008), and at least one post-Citizens United year 
(2010 or 2011).   
 
V.  Empirical Analysis 
Table 19 provides descriptive statistics of political contributions on aggregate 
(Panel A) and firm-level (Panel B) bases.  The mean (median) of firm-level political 
contributions is $142,448 ($57,225) across all firms, $24,703 ($4,800) for 
historically non-politically connected firms, and $297,735 ($169,170) for historically 
politically connected firms.  When considering the sample in the aggregate, PAC 
contributions represent about 53% of the 373,393 contribution-level observations in 
our data set, but 67% of the sample-wide total contributions of slightly more than 
$441 million dollars.  Non-executive employee contributions represent 35% of all 
contributions by count and 23% by dollar value, while executive contributions 
constitute 12% of all contributions by count and 9% by dollar value. 
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 To provide a cleaner test, fiscal year 2009 observations (i.e., those immediately preceding passage 
of Citizens United) are excluded.  The main results of the paper are qualitatively very similar if this 
restriction is not imposed. 
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A.  Tests of Hypothesis 
 January 21, 2010 marked a significant day of change in corporate political 
activism.  Specifically, the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in favor of 
Citizens United lifted long-standing limits on corporate political contributions.  We 
exploit the announcement of Citizens United as a means to assess the effect of 
political connectedness on firm value.  However, evaluating the market reaction to 
Citizens United is complicated by the fact that all sample firms have the same event 
date (January 21, 2010).  Event clustering in calendar time induces cross-correlation 
in estimates of abnormal returns which creates downward-biased standard errors and 
upward-biased test statistics.  As such, rather than use standard event study 
methodology, we instead estimate each sample firm’s reaction to the ruling through a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  The SUR framework simultaneously 
estimates a set of firm-specific equations that include cross-correlated error terms:  
 
Ri = αi + βiRm + δiEvent + εi (8) 
 
where Ri is the return series for individual firm i, Rm is the return series for the CRSP 
value-weighted index (including dividends), and Event is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 on days included in the event window (0 otherwise).  For example, for the 
(0,+2) window, Event is set to one on January 21, 2010 (Thursday), January 22, 2010 
(Friday), and January 25, 2010 (Monday), and is zero otherwise.  Daily returns are 
measured between April 1, 2008, and March 31, 2010, and are retrieved from the 
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CRSP daily returns file.  The SUR methodology was developed by Schipper and 
Thompson (1983) and has since become increasingly utilized in corporate finance 
research (e.g., Doidge and Dyck 2015; Fernandes, Lel, and Miller 2010).  This 
method enables us to measure the overall stock market reaction to Citizens United, 
while also accounting for cross-correlation in abnormal returns.  Our main interest is 
in firm-specific estimates of 𝛿i and, in particular, whether (1) the estimates jointly 
and significantly differ from zero, and (2) the estimates significantly differ across 
firms having varying degrees of political connectedness. 
 Table 20 reports the market reaction to Citizens United for our sample of 
historically politically connected firms (“POLITICAL”) and historically non-
politically connected firms (“NEUTRAL”).  Our measure of historical political 
connectedness is based on median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions 
(scaled by net total assets), where POLITICAL captures firms in the fourth quartile 
and NEUTRAL captures firms in the first quartile as well as historically non-
politically active firms.
52, 53
  Since 𝛿i represents the average abnormal return for firm 
i, we multiply the average value of 𝛿i estimates in each event window by increments 
of 100% for each day in the event window to obtain the cumulative abnormal return 
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 Using this definition, an example of a historically politically connected company in our data set is 
Corning Inc.  A 2006 New York Times article declared Corning to be one of then-senator Hillary 
Clinton’s largest sources of campaign contributions (McIntire and Hernandez 2006).  Notably, in 
response to the announcement of Citizens United, shareholders of Corning Inc. realized a 
cumulative abnormal loss of –0.79% five days after the announcement date of Citizens United.  
53
 Consistent with much of the existing, related literature (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2012; Aslan and 
Grinstein 2012; Belo et al. 2013; Coates 2012), we rely on monetary political contributions to 
classify companies as being politically connected or not.  However, we acknowledge the existence 
of a variety of other definitions of political connections.  For example: Faccio and Parsley (2009) 
define a politically connected company as one that is headquartered in a politician’s hometown; 
Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) capture political connectedness through political ties to a 
company’s board of directors.  
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(CAR). For example, CAR(0,+2) is computed as the average value of 𝛿i estimates 
resulting from a SUR regression where Event = 1 on days 0, +1, and +2, multiplied 
by 300% for the three days in the event window.  Panel A provides descriptive 
statistics of abnormal returns for all sample firms and degrees of historical political 
connectedness.  The mean (median) abnormal return on the date of the Citizens 
United decision is –0.08% (–0.12%) with a standard deviation of 1.59%.  The mean 
(median) cumulative abnormal return for the (0,+5) window surrounding Citizens 
United is –0.48% (–0.61%) with a standard deviation of 3.65%.  The average firm in 
our sample of POLITICAL and NEUTRAL firms has total assets (net of cash) of 
approximately $18.2 billion and market-to-book ratio of 2.25. 
Panel B of Table 20 provides univariate tests of CARs. Results indicate a 
negative market reaction to historically politically connected firms persisting for five 
days beyond the announcement date, with a statistically significant negative reaction 
noted for all event windows considered [(0, 0), (0,+2), and (0,+5)].  On the 
announcement date, the average abnormal return to politically connected firms is –48 
basis points (p-value = 0.028), with an average cumulative loss of 122 basis points 
five days after announcement date (p-value = 0.028).  In contrast, historically non-
politically connected firms exhibit a positive but insignificant market reaction over 
all event windows studied.  For example, on the announcement date, this “neutral” 
subsample realized an average abnormal return of 0.240% (p-value = 0.173), and an 
average cumulative abnormal return of 0.123% five days after announcement date 
(p-value = 0.728).  Tests for differences in means are statistically significant for all 
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three event windows (p-values of 0.010, 0.007, and 0.041 for the (0, 0), (0,+2), and 
(0,+5) windows, respectively).  Nonparametric test results, provided in Panel B of 
Table 20, also support this result, with approximately 72%, 77%, and 68% of the 
POLITICAL group’s CARs being negative for the (0, 0), (0,+2), and (0,+5) 
windows, respectively, all of which are statistically significant.  Overall, these results 
suggest that politically connected firms face an unfavorable market reaction to 
Citizens United, and provide preliminary evidence that political connections destroy 
shareholder value.
 54
  
 As a formal test of our prediction that the market reacted differently to 
Citizens United based on whether the firm was politically connected, we examine 
how the estimated CARs (average 𝛿i from equation 8, expressed as percentage 
returns) differ with regard to a measure of historical political connectedness.  To do 
so, we estimate the following regression model using ordinary least squares: 
 
𝛿i = β0 + β1Political Dummyi + β2Xi + εi  (9) 
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 Contrary to our and Coates’s (2012) findings, Werner (2011) finds that Citizens United constituted 
a “nonevent,” posing no impact to firm value.  Our research design differs from the Werner (2011) 
study in several respects.  First, we use a seemingly unrelated regression design to account for the 
fact that all sample firms have the same event date.  Second, consistent with Goldman et al. (2009), 
Coates (2012), and others, we utilize a sample of S&P 500 firms.  The S&P 500 should yield more 
representative results than Werner’s sample of Fortune 500 firms.  Third, we classify firms into 
politically and non-politically connected sub-groups based on their median firm-level pre-Citizens 
United political contributions.  Using total firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions as Werner 
does could bias the classification methodology when firms entered or exited the Fortune 500 during 
his sample period.  This bias is likely more severe in a study of Fortune 500 firms than of S&P 500 
firms, given the high degree of year-to-year turnover in the Fortune 500 (for a list of Fortune 500 
exits in 2011, see http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/movers/exits.html).  
Fourth, we follow Aggarwal et al. (2012), Claessens, Feijen, and (2008), Goldman et al. (2009), 
among others, in basing our definition of political connectedness on campaign contributions rather 
than the lobbying expenditures utilized in Werner (2011).  Lastly, we provide a much more 
expansive study of Citizens United’s impacts, spanning the areas of firm value, corporate policies, 
and governance implications. 
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where 𝛿i originates from the SUR estimation in equation 8, Political Dummy is our 
measure of historical political activism, and Xi is a vector of control variables 
measured in fiscal year 2009.  For precise definitions of variables, see Appendix D.  
 Table 21 reports the coefficient estimates corresponding to equation 9.  After 
controlling for size, the market-to-book ratio, and leverage, we find that the 
coefficient on Political Dummy is negative and statistically significant for all three 
event windows studied (p-values of 0.007, 0.012, and 0.042, for the (0, 0), (0,+2), 
and (0,+5) windows, respectively).  In terms of economic significance, the 
coefficient on Political Dummy suggests that the day of the Citizens United decision 
resulted in the market penalizing historically politically connected firms by 75 basis 
points compared to historically non-politically connected firms.  Considering the 
cumulative effect of Citizens United spanning the announcement day through the 
five days following, historically politically active firms realized a 133 basis points 
loss relative to their less-connected counterparts.
55, 56
  The evidence shown in Tables 
20 and 21 lend support to the main prediction of this paper in favor of the Agency 
Cost Hypothesis.
57
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 The analysis of the market reaction to Citizens United is a gauge of the decision’s short-term impact 
on shareholder value.  However, we conjecture that by lifting limits on political contributions, the 
decision meaningfully impacted the present value of all future contributions.  In doing so, we also 
expect the Citizens United ruling to offer far-reaching effects on other corporate policies – a 
hypothesis that we formally test in the next section. 
56
 In untabulated results, we investigate whether the negative reaction of politically connected firms 
holds using an alternate definition of political connectedness.  Specifically, we create a rank 
variable based on median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by Net Total Assets).  
The results remain intact when we conduct the multivariate market reaction regression on this 
alternative political connectedness measure. 
57
 In untabulated results, we examine the potential price reversals of politically connected firms in the 
long-run.  Specifically, we construct monthly, equally-weighted portfolios that are long in 
115 
 
 
B.  Corporate Policies and Citizens United 
Given our finding that political connections destroy firm value, we next 
investigate whether the cash management practices of historically politically 
connected firms significantly differed from those of historically non-politically 
connected firms following passage of Citizens United.  Table 22 provides univariate 
tests of cash holdings for firms exhibiting varying degrees of pre-Citizens United 
political connectedness.  Panel A of Table 22 demonstrates that the most politically 
connected firms (upper quartile) hold significantly larger cash balances than less 
politically connected firms (lower quartile) in both the pre- and post-Citizens United 
periods.  Comparing cash holdings levels in the pre- and post-Citizens United periods 
within each quartile, we find that most politically connected firms report larger cash 
balances (as a proportion of net total assets) in the post-Citizens United period.  That 
is, politically connected firms significantly increased their cash holdings from the 
pre- to post-Citizens United periods, whereas the difference in cash holdings (pre- 
versus post-Citizens United) of the least politically connected firms is not statistically 
significant.
58
  This initial evidence supports the existence of agency costs in 
politically connected firms. 
                                                                                                                                          
politically connected firms and short in neutral firms in the post-Citizens United period (March 
2010-December 2012).  We regress the returns to this portfolio on the four factors from the Fama 
and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) models.  The intercept term of this regression is insignificant, 
suggesting that there is no price reversal in the long run. 
58
 The mean (median) annual contributions-to-assets ratio across all firm-years is approximately 0.7% 
(0.5%).  Although we do not claim that the amount of campaign contributions will be especially 
large for all firms in all fiscal years, it is important to recognize that their cumulative impact over 
time is indeed economically meaningful. 
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We also examine the association between traditional determinants of cash 
holdings and political connections.  From Panel A of Table 22, we find no significant 
difference between the most politically connected firms (upper quartile) and the least 
politically connected firms (lower quartile, ignoring non-politically active firms) on 
important, traditional determinants of cash holdings.  Specifically, in the post-
Citizens United period, politically connected firms do not significantly differ from 
non-politically connected firms on the basis of size (either in terms of Net Total 
Assets or Sales), leverage, profitability, or the propensity to pay dividends.  
Moreover, as demonstrated in Panel B of Table 22, in the post-Citizens United 
period, these groups of firms do not significantly differ on the basis of any of the key 
governance metrics studied.  Additionally, within quartiles of historical political 
connectedness, very few firm characteristics or measures of governance quality 
significantly differ in the post-Citizens United period relative to the pre-Citizens 
United period.  Collectively, these results suggest that political connectedness is 
distinct from both traditional determinants of cash holdings and governance 
measures.   
Did historically politically connected firms indeed increase their campaign 
contributions following the Citizens United decision?  To investigate how political 
contributions changed in the post-Citizens United period and as a function of 
historical political connectedness, we estimate the following model during the post-
Citizens United period (2010-2011): 
 
Contributions/NTAi,t = β0 + β1Political Dummyi + β2Xi, t-1 + εi,t (10) 
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where Political Dummy is our measure of historical political activism,
 
and Xi is 
vector of control variables.  We use lagged values of control variables to overcome a 
potentially endogenous relationship between contemporaneous political 
contributions and cash holdings.  A positive (negative) β1 coefficient would suggest 
that historically politically connected firms increased (decreased) their political 
contributions following the Citizens United decision.  We note that our main interest 
is not in the amount in which historically politically connected firms contribute 
following Citizens United, but rather in their cash management policies surrounding 
this exogenous shock. 
Table 23 provides the results of this equation estimated just for fiscal years 
2010-2011.  The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the Political 
Dummy (our measure of historical political activism) suggests that politically 
connected firms increased their political contributions following Citizens United. 
To examine how cash holdings changed as a function of the change in 
political contributions in the post-Citizens United period relative to the pre-Citizens 
United period for our S&P 500 firms, we estimate the following changes 
specification: 
 
∆Log(Cash/NTA)i = β0 + β1∆Contributions/NTAi + β2∆Xi + εi (11) 
 
where Contributions/NTA is our measure of political involvement, Xi is vector of 
traditional determinants of cash holdings, and changes are computed as the value in 
2010 (post-Citizens United) relative to the value in 2008 (pre-Citizens United).  If the 
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level of corporate cash holdings is increasing in the degree of political connectedness 
(suggesting the existence of agency costs), we expect to find a positive β1 coefficient.  
In modeling the determinants of cash holdings, we control for several firm 
characteristics.  Specifically, consistent with Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (1999), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) and others, we control for 
firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, contemporaneous cash flows, the standard 
deviation of cash flows, net working capital, R&D expenditures, capital 
expenditures, and the propensity to pay dividends.  Although this model does not 
consider historical political activism, it provides a preliminary look into whether and, 
if so, how cash holdings and political contributions differed in 2010 relative to 2008.  
Table 24 reports coefficient estimates corresponding to the simple difference 
regression (post- relative to pre-Citizens United) specified in equation 11.  We find a 
positive and significant coefficient on ∆Contributions/NTA (p-value = 0.043).  That 
is, as political contributions increased from the pre- to post-Citizens United periods, 
so did corporate cash holdings.  This evidence is consistent with the notion that 
politically connected firms are marred by agency conflicts. 
To formally investigate whether the cash holdings levels of politically 
connected firms significantly differed from that of their less-connected counterparts 
following the Citizens United decision, we use a difference-in-differences research 
design.  In this test, the differences stem from (1) a measure of historical political 
activism, and (2) pre- versus post-Citizens United periods.  We model cash holdings 
119 
 
as a function of historical political activism in the pre- versus post-Citizens United 
periods: 
 
Log(Cash/NTA)i,t = β0 + β1Political Dummyi +  
 β2Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t + 
 β3 (Political Dummyi × Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t)  +  
 β4 Xi, t-1 + εi,t (12) 
 
 
where Post-Citizens United Dummy is set to 1 for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 (0 
otherwise), and all other variables are as defined previously.  Regarding equation 12, 
β1 measures the relation between cash holdings and political connectedness, while β3 
measures the differential relation between cash holdings and political connectedness 
during the post-Citizens United period.  The primary empirical advantage of a 
difference-in-differences estimation is the ability to control for permanent 
differences between and time-varying differences within treatment and control 
groups (e.g., Roberts and Whited 2013).  In our context, Political Dummy controls 
for permanent differences between POLITICAL and NEUTRAL firms (such as the 
tendency for politically connected firms to [on average] hold larger cash balances, as 
evidenced by Table 20), while Post-Citizens United Dummy accounts for trends 
among POLITICAL and NEUTRAL firms (such as the tendency for both groups to 
[on average] increase their cash holdings from the pre- to post-Citizens United 
period, as illustrated in Table 20).  The remaining variation is the change in cash 
holdings levels (the outcome variable of interest) experienced by POLITICAL firms 
relative to the change in cash experienced by NEUTRAL firms, post- relative to pre-
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Citizens United.  The test of our hypothesis becomes β3 ≠ 0.  That is, in reference to 
equation 12, β3 < 0 (> 0) would suggest that political connections motivate a firm to 
hold less (more) cash relative to their less-connected counterparts following passage 
of Citizens United compared to before its passage.  
Table 25 provides coefficient estimates and p-values based on standard errors 
clustered by firm corresponding to equation 12.
59
  We find a positive association 
between political connections and cash holdings.  Specifically, the relation between 
cash holdings and our measure of historical political connectedness significantly 
increased during the post-Citizens United period relative to the pre-Citizens United 
period (p-value = 0.026).  In contrast, cash holdings of historically non-politically 
connected firms fell following Citizens United, although this finding is not 
statistically significant.  In terms of economic significance, switching from non-
politically connected status to politically connected status results in an incremental 
increase in corporate cash holdings of 19.84% following passage of Citizens 
United.
60
  Taken as a whole, these findings are consistent with the view that 
politically connected firms suffer from agency problems (indicated by the retention 
of high cash holdings), but their less politically connected counterparts do not. 
 Coefficient estimates on traditional determinants of cash holdings are also 
largely consistent with previous studies (Opler et al. 1999; Harford et al. 2008).  
Specifically, current year cash holdings are positively associated with lagged values 
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 Petersen (2009) explains that fewer than ten time clusters is not sufficient to cluster standard errors 
by time. Thus, we report standard errors clustered by firm. Regardless, in untabulated analysis, 
results remain intact when we cluster standard errors by both firm and time. 
60
 The incremental and economic effect of politically connected status in the post-Citizens United 
period = e
0.181
 – 1 = 0.1984. 
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of cash holdings, the market-to-book ratio, cash flow, cash flow volatility, and R&D 
expense.  Current year cash holdings are negatively related to size, leverage, net 
working capital, capital expenditures, and the propensity to pay dividends.  We also 
note that the adjusted R
2
 of 79.8% provided in Table 25 is consistent with prior 
studies utilizing similar specifications that include the lagged value of cash holdings 
as an explanatory variable (e.g., Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 2008; Agrawal and 
Nasser 2012).
 
 
 
C.  Corporate Governance Quality and Political Connections 
 The evidence presented so far in this paper is consistent with the hypothesis 
that politically connected firms are characterized by agency problems.  In this 
section, we examine whether corporate governance quality incrementally affects this 
overall finding.  Existing evidence suggests that poor corporate governance quality 
magnifies agency conflicts between managers and stakeholders and diminishes the 
value of cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes 2003; Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 2008).  Building upon the finding 
provided in Table 22 that political connectedness is distinct from traditional 
measures of corporate governance, we next investigate whether corporate 
governance quality moderates the effect of political connectedness on cash holdings.  
Specifically, we test whether poorly-governed, historically politically connected 
firms have higher cash holdings relative to well-governed and/or historically non-
politically connected firms. 
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 We capture governance quality through four measures.  The first measure is 
the managerial entrenchment index (E-Index) proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2009).  Firms that facilitate the entrenchment of managers, characterized by 
staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden 
parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments, are 
of inferior governance quality.  The second measure is the external involvement of 
board members.  Busy boards, defined here as the proportion of independent 
directors that serve on three or more boards, tend to become distracted and are less 
effective monitors because their attention is diverted away from the “home” 
corporation (Fich and Shivdasani 2006).  The third measure of governance quality is 
defined in terms of excess CEO compensation.  Excessive CEO compensation is 
more common in corporations with poor corporate governance structures (Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker 1999).  Since governance quality is decreasing in all three 
of these measures, we predict that the agency conflicts plaguing politically connected 
firms will be amplified when managerial entrenchment levels, the proportion of busy 
board members, and level of excess CEO compensation are high.  
 Our fourth measure of corporate governance quality addresses the role of 
investor activism as a monitoring mechanism.  In the context of corporate political 
contributions, we search the RiskMetrics Shareholder Proposals database for 
politically-oriented shareholder proposals.  We are not necessarily interested in 
determining the fate of these proposals, but instead consider the mere knowledge that 
a proposal is being considered to act as a monitoring mechanism and, as such, 
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impose restraints on a manager’s tendency to hoard cash.  For our POLITICAL 
(NEUTRAL) subgroup, 54.7% (65.5%) of firms entertained a politically oriented 
shareholder proposal during our sample period. 
 To test our predictions, we augment the cash holdings difference-in-
differences model (equation 12) by incorporating measures of corporate governance:  
 
Log(Cash/NTA)i,t = β0 + β1Political Dummyi +  
 β2Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t + β3Governancei,t +  
 β4(Political Dummyi × Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t) + 
 β5(Political Dummyi × Governancei,t) + 
   β6(Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t × Governancei,t) + 
   β7(Political Dummyi × Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t × Governancei,t) + 
   β8 Xi, t-1 + εi,t (13) 
 
where Governance is one of the four measures of corporate governance quality 
mentioned previously.  Since we take governance quality to be worsening in the 
busy-ness of directors, excessive compensation to CEOs, the magnitude of 
managerial entrenchment, and a lack of investor activism in politically-oriented 
matters, we posit that the agency problems (as captured by a build-up of cash) of 
historically politically connected firms in the post-Citizens United period are more 
severe when the degree of managerial entrenchment, the proportion of busy board 
members, and excessive compensation to the CEO are high, and when the firm is not 
required to entertain a politically-oriented shareholder proposal.  That is, for these 
four proxies of governance quality, our prediction becomes β7 > 0.  
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 Table 26 provides results of our tests of the impact of governance quality on 
the agency implications of corporate political connections.  Columns I, II, and III 
provide estimates of equation 13 using the first three proxies of governance quality.  
The results are largely consistent with agency costs of politically connected firms.  
Specifically, we find that the busy-ness of boards is associated with larger cash 
holdings for historically politically connected firms in the post-Citizens United 
period (p-value = 0.065).  Similarly, an excessively compensated CEO is associated 
with an incremental enhancement of agency problems in historically politically 
connected firms following the Citizens United decision (p-value = 0.028).  
Additionally, we find that higher managerial entrenchment levels are associated with 
a build-up of cash among politically connected firms following the Citizens United 
decision, though this finding is not significant at conventional levels (p-value = 
0.114).  Taken together, the results provided in the first three columns of Table 26 
are largely consistent with the prediction that weak governance exacerbates agency 
problems in politically connected firms. 
 The remaining three columns of Table 26 provide the results of estimating 
equation 13 using politically-oriented shareholder proposals as the measure of 
governance quality (columns IV, V, and VI).  Consistent with expectations, we find 
that failing to entertain a politically-oriented shareholder proposal during either the 
2007-2008 (pre-Citizens United) or 2010-2011 (post-Citizens United) periods results 
in an incremental increase in the cash holdings of historically politically connected 
firms relative to historically non-politically connected firms in the post-Citizens 
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United period relative to the pre-Citizens United period (p-value = 0.035).  We 
further find that the incremental increase in agency problems (and cash holdings) is 
much greater for politically-oriented shareholder proposals entertained during the 
post-Citizens United period (column VI of Table 26; p-value = 0.062).  This result 
supports the intuition that the passage of a rule that lifted long-standing restrictions 
on corporate political activism only amplified existing agency conflicts of politically 
connected firms.  Taken together, these findings support a positive association 
between political connections and agency costs.  
 
D.  A Clash of Colors:  Red versus Blue Corporate Contributions 
 The results of this paper suggest that political connections are value-
destroying, and that connected firms are marred by agency conflicts.  Agency 
conflicts arise when a manager’s motives diverge from that of his stakeholders.  It is 
rational to expect agency problems to be heightened by a divergence in the party 
affiliation of political contributions made by executive employees and those made by 
non-executive employees.  To capture the degree of political tension within a 
corporation, we calculate the absolute deviation between the proportion of executive 
employee contributions to Republicans and the proportion of non-executive 
employee contributions to Republicans for historically politically active firms.  We 
compute the median firm-level deviation during the pre-Citizens United period, and 
sort firms into deciles.  To examine for the existence of agency costs in the post-
Citizens United period, we estimate the following model: 
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Log(Cash/NTA)i,t = β0 + β1Political Deviationi +  
 β2Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t + 
   β3 (Political Deviationi × Post-Citizens United Dummyi,t) +  
 β4 Xi, t-1 + εi,t  (14)     
 
where Political Deviation is a continuous variable ranging from 0.10 (bottom decile 
of deviation) to 1.00 (top decile of deviation) and Xi is a vector of lagged control 
variables as defined previously.  Equation 14 is estimated for firms in the upper 
quartile of pre-Citizens United contributions and for years in which these firms 
report both positive executive contributions and positive non-executive 
contributions.  We predict agency conflicts to be increasing in the extent to which the 
party affiliation of executive contributions deviates from that of non-executive 
contributions.  Moreover, we expect Citizens United to only exacerbate the agency 
problems of firms with historically high degrees of political tension.  Given our 
predictions, we expect to find a positive β3.  
 Table 27 depicts the impact of within-firm political tension on cash holdings.  
The results suggest that as the degree of deviation between the party affiliation of 
executive and non-executive political contributions increases, corporate cash 
holdings increase in the post-Citizens United period (p-value = 0.011).  These results 
lend further support to agency conflicts as a plausible explanation for the value-
destroying effects of corporate political connections. 
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E.  Alternative Explanations & Robustness Checks 
1.  Alternative Explanations 
We next address several alternative explanations of our findings.  First, we 
acknowledge the possibility that Citizens United transformed the competitive 
landscape to a focus on corporate political activism (and its associated impact on 
cash holdings).  To account for this possibility, it is important that we incorporate 
metrics whose reliability is not affected by Citizens United. Our analysis of corporate 
governance quality achieves this goal.  That is, by focusing on widely-accepted 
governance metrics whose dependability was not affected by Citizens United (Table 
22), we are better able to exploit the exogenous enhancement in firm value and 
corporate policies that accompanied Citizens United.  
Second, we recognize that the media scrutiny and related negative attention 
accompanying Citizens United may have made it more difficult for all companies to 
use political involvement as a means to enhance firm value.  To address this concern, 
we have utilized a measure of political connectedness that is based on historical 
campaign contributions.  Specifically, our finding that politically connected firms 
realized a negative market reaction to the Citizens United decision is based on their 
political activism in the pre-Citizens United period (Tables 20 and 21).  Most 
importantly, this result does not depend on the amount, cost, and potentially 
unfavorable consequences of their post-Citizen United political activity.  
Third, we revisit our presumption that Citizens United more meaningfully 
impacted historically politically active firms relative to their politically inactive 
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counterparts.  A counter-argument states that because Citizens United lifted 
restrictions on certain forms of previously barred political activities, the decision 
gave the upper hand to historically non-politically active firms.  If true, we would 
expect to observe a significant positive market reaction on the part historically non-
politically active firms.  Instead, our results reveal that Citizens United was 
accompanied by an insignificant (though positive) market reaction to non-politically 
active firms (Table 20 Panel B), thus disputing this counter-argument. 
Lastly, we address the conjecture that the negative reaction to historically 
politically active firms surrounding the Citizens United decision was driven by a 
higher cost of political connections.  That is, Citizens United opened up a new 
channel through which corporations could funnel their political contributions.  We 
propose that the negative market reaction to politically connected companies is 
driven by the agency costs of political connections and, specifically, self-interested 
managers’ tendencies.  A counter-argument states that adding a new mode of 
corporate political activity will compel politically connected firms to contribute 
larger sums of money to political causes in order to maintain an equivalent (pre-
Citizens United) level of political connectedness.  We do not dispute this possibility 
and, in fact, provide empirical evidence to support this idea (see Table 23).  
However, if dollar-for-dollar political connections enhance firm value (Value 
Enhancing Hypothesis), the incrementally higher contributions of politically 
connected companies should be viewed favorably by market participants.  If instead 
an additional $1 of political contributions destroys firm value (Agency Cost 
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Hypothesis), the now larger level of contributions should be viewed unfavorably by 
market participants.  Indeed, the premise and implications of our hypotheses stand 
independent of this alternative explanation.  
 
2.  Parallel Trends Assumption 
To infer causality from difference-in-differences (DID), the parallel trends 
assumption must hold: in the absence of treatment, historically politically connected 
firms (treated group) and historically non-politically connected firms (untreated 
group) should exhibit a common trend.  To test this assumption, we mechanically 
shift the post-Citizens United event window backwards by 1, 2, and 3 years (e.g., 
Amore and Bennedsen 2013; Irani and Oesch 2013).  That is, we consider the change 
in cash holdings of historically politically connected firms relative to their non-
connected counterparts surrounding fictitious Citizens United events occurring on 
January 21
st
 of years 2009, 2008, and 2007.  If our result of higher cash holdings by 
historically politically connected firms in response to Citizens United is not the result 
of overall trends, we expect to find an insignificant coefficient on the interaction 
term corresponding to equation 12.  Results, provided in Table 28, support this 
conjecture and corroborate the reliability of inferences drawn from DID estimates in 
our research setting. 
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3.  Potential Confounding Events 
A fundamental concern underlying event studies is that other events occurred 
during the event window.  These confounding events can interfere with our ability to 
draw accurate inferences about the impact of the event of interest.  We repeat our 
analysis of the market reaction to Citizens United after excluding firms that 
announced earnings or other significant corporate events, as identified in company 
press releases and newswire reports in the LexisNexis Academic database.  Of the 
combined, initial sample of POLITICAL and NEUTRAL firms (133 observations), 
the number of firms with confounding events ranged from 8 (for the –1, 0 window) 
to 43 (for the –1, +5 window).  Results of this sensitivity check, provided in section I 
of Tables 29 and 30, are consistent with earlier event study results (Tables 20 and 
21).  For example, after excluding firms with potential confounding events, section I 
of Table 29 demonstrates that historically politically connected firms realized an 
abnormal price drop of –0.592% on announcement date (p-value = 0.002) and a 
cumulative abnormal loss of –0.785% five days after announcement date (p-value = 
0.090).  Thus, our finding that political connections are value-decreasing is robust to 
controlling for confounding events. 
 
4.  Politically Exposed Industries 
Companies are inherently motivated to influence the legislative process in 
order to achieve more favorable corporate outcomes (Grossman and Helpman 1994).  
Moreover, as suggested by Stigler (1971), this incentive is likely more prevalent in 
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regulated industries as regulated firms tend to exhibit a heightened sensitivity to 
protecting their private interests and, as such, are more willing to join forces when 
lobbying for or against legislative proposals.  Firms belonging to the defense, energy, 
and utilities industries face significantly greater political exposure relative to other 
industries.  One might expect that politically exposed companies would be unduly 
harmed by Citizens United since they are, by definition, compelled to contribute to 
political campaigns.  In particular, it is possible that the value-destroying effects of 
political connections documented in this paper are primarily driven by companies 
whose political contributions are largely involuntary and, as such, most likely not 
attributable to agency conflicts. 
To ensure that these politically exposed industries are not driving the results, 
we repeat our analysis of the market reaction to Citizens United as well as the 
primary difference-in-differences test used to evaluate whether political connections 
are positively associated with agency costs.  First, similar to Goldman, Rocholl, and 
So (2009), we repeat our analysis after excluding the defense, energy, and utilities 
industries.  Second, we redefine our measure of historical political connectedness 
(Political Dummy) based on a firm’s median firm-level pre-Citizens United 
contributions relative to the industry median.  Results of sensitivity tests on the 
market reaction results are provided in sections II and III of Table 29 (univariate) 
and Table 30 (multivariate); results for the primary difference-in-differences results 
are provided in columns I and II of Table 31.  Collectively, these results demonstrate 
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that our empirical findings are qualitatively unchanged after accounting for varying 
degrees of political exposure.
61
  
 
5.  Placebo Analysis 
A question native to all empirical analyses of quasi-natural experiments is 
whether the documented results are truly driven by the purported effect or are instead 
a mere artifact of the data.  As it applies in our setting, a reader may question 
whether the negative market reaction to politically connected companies surrounding 
the Citizens United decision can be explained by some factor other than corporate 
political connections.  To address this concern, we conduct a “placebo analysis” in 
which we compare the market reaction of politically connected companies to a group 
of otherwise similar companies (“placebo-neutral” firms).  A group of “placebo-
neutral” firms is defined as companies that match to politically connected firms on 
industry (two-digit SIC) and size (Log of Total Assets) within the same fiscal year, 
where potential matches are drawn from the entire universe of Compustat firms.  We 
re-estimate the impact of Citizens United by comparing the market reactions of 
historically politically connected companies to their “placebo-neutral” counterparts.  
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 In untabulated results, we evaluate the market reaction and cash holdings implications of Citizens 
United after defining an indicator variable, Exposed Dummy, to capture the defense, energy, and 
utilities industries.  Specifically, our multivariate test of the market reaction to Citizens United 
becomes ?̂?i = β0 + β1Political Dummyi + β2Exposed Dummyi + β3(Political Dummyi × Exposed 
Dummyi,t) + β4Xi + εi .  The resulting β3 coefficient is statistically insignificant for all three event 
windows (i.e., p-values of 0.833, 0.846, and 0.448 for the (0, 0), (0,+2), and (0,+5) windows, 
respectively), lending further support to our prediction that politically exposed firms are not driving 
the results.  To evaluate the impact of Citizens United on the cash holdings of politically exposed 
firms, we adopt a difference-in-difference-in-differences specification.  This specification parallels 
equation 6, with Exposed Dummy taking the place of the Governance term.  The main coefficient 
of interest, β7, is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.919), again favoring the notion that our 
findings are robust to controlling for the degree of corporate political exposure. 
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Results, provided in section IV of Table 29, support the earlier univariate results 
(Table 20 Panel B).  Notably, the negative market reaction of politically connected 
companies is in stark contrast to a positive market reaction on the part of “placebo-
neutral” companies.  For example, while the announcement-date reaction of 
politically connected companies is –0.475%, the average reaction realized by 
“placebo-neutral” firms is +0.609%, the difference of which continues to be 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.0003).  The results of this placebo study support 
our conclusion that the negative market reaction of politically connected companies 
to Citizens United is in fact driven by their political connections. 
 
6.  Market Reaction Implications of Corporate Governance Quality 
To this point, our primary interest in multivariate market reaction tests has 
been the direction and significance of the coefficient on our measure of historical 
political connectedness, the Political Dummy.  In this sensitivity test, we split the 
Political Dummy into its components, POLITICAL (Political Dummy = 1) and 
NEUTRAL (Political Dummy = 0), and subsequently interact these variables with a 
measure of weak corporate governance quality (as before, the E-Index, busy board 
members, or excessive CEO compensation).  If politically connected companies’ 
adverse reaction to Citizens United is attributable to agency problems, we expect the 
negative reaction to also hold for politically connected companies that are poorly 
governed (and inherently more susceptible to agency problems).  Results, provided 
in section IV of Table 30, provide support for this conjecture.  Specifically, 
134 
 
politically connected companies that are characterized by entrenched managers or 
excessively high CEO compensation levels realize a significant negative market 
reaction to Citizens United (p-values of 0.005 and 0.027, respectively).  This 
evidence lends support to an agency-based explanation for politically connected 
companies’ negative market reaction to Citizens United. 
 
7.  Excess Cash 
Our main test of whether politically connected firms are marred by agency 
conflicts utilized a difference-in-differences research design, where the dependent 
variable was defined as the level of corporate cash holdings (scaled by net total 
assets).  To more explicitly control for industry and time series patterns in cash 
holdings, we adjust the continuous variables in equation 12 by their annual industry 
medians.  This approach enables us to account for both cross-sectional and time-
series variation in variables of interest.  Column III of Table 31 reports the results 
from regressing this measure of excess cash on industry-adjusted traditional 
determinants and measures of political connectedness.  We continue to find a 
positive and significant effect of political connectedness on cash holdings, 
demonstrating that our empirical conclusions do not depend on variation either 
within industry or across time. 
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8.  Infrequent Contributors 
Rather than support a broad range of political candidates, a company may 
tend to contribute to just one congressional office – suppose, a candidate for state 
senator.  Our definition of political connectedness as defined over the pre-Citizens 
United period captures two congressional elections (2006 and 2008), each instance 
of which encompassed the re-election of all U.S. House seats but only one-third of 
U.S. Senate seats.  Given that approximately one-third of U.S. Senate seats were not 
subject to re-election during either the 2006 or 2008 elections, a company making 
infrequent contributions – particularly, by exclusively (though to a potentially large 
extent) supporting a candidate for the U.S. Senate – would be classified as politically 
inactive by our measure.  To address this concern, we redefine our proxy for 
historical political connectedness after omitting contributions to candidates for the 
U.S. Senate.  In unreported sensitivity analyses, we find qualitatively similar results 
with regard to the direction, magnitude, and significance of the market reaction to 
Citizens United and its implications on corporate policies, both for politically and 
non-politically connected firms.  Therefore, our results do not depend on the 
frequency of political contributions.  
 
9.  Financial Firms 
Financial firms are also known to systematically differ from other sectors of 
the economy along key corporate policy and governance dimensions. In untabulated 
sensitivity tests, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and find 
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qualitatively similar results in the context of our market reaction and difference-in-
differences analyses.
62 
 Thus, financial firms do not drive the results of the paper.  
 
VI.  Conclusion
 
Political connections may enhance or harm shareholder value. However, 
existing insights attempting to address the impact of corporate political 
connectedness on shareholder value are inconclusive.  In an effort to test for the 
existence of a causal link between political connections and changes in shareholder 
value, we pose our research questions in the context of a quasi-natural experiment.  
Specifically, we focus on an exogenous enhancement in the value implications of 
political connectedness that accompanied the landmark Supreme Court case, Citizens 
United. 
The findings in this paper support a negative relation between political 
connections and firm value.  Using an event study methodology and a seemingly 
unrelated regression design, we find that politically connected firms realized 
significant negative abnormal returns following the announcement of the Citizens 
United decision.  Specifically, historically politically connected firms realized an 
abnormal price drop of –0.475% on announcement date and a cumulative abnormal 
loss of –1.219% five days after announcement date, while historically non-politically 
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 Information regarding a decision in the Citizens United case hit the newswires at approximately 
10:00 a.m. EST on January 21, 2010 (see, for example, Tedford 2010).  At 11:34 a.m. EST, 
President Obama delivered a speech in which he publicly endorsed the Volcker Rule (The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary 2010).  Given that the financial sector reacted negatively to the 
Volcker Rule and its endorsement, it is possible that financial firms were reacting to the Volcker 
Rule endorsement rather than to the Citizens United decision.  The fact that our results are robust to 
the exclusion of financial firms provides assurance that this overlap in events does not materially 
affect the findings of this paper. 
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connected firms enjoyed positive returns on announcement date in the order of 
0.240%.  Furthermore, the negative effect of political connectedness is significant for 
the subsample of firms with weak corporate governance.  Collectively, these findings 
are consistent with a positive association between agency costs and political 
connectedness.  
Given the negative implications of political connectedness on firm value, we 
investigate whether the corporate policy decisions of politically connected firms are 
suggestive of agency conflicts.  Building upon previous studies that document a 
positive association between agency problems and cash holdings (e.g., Jensen 1986; 
Stulz 1990; Harford 1999), we evaluate whether the corporate cash holdings of 
connected firms significantly differ from those associated with their less-connected 
counterparts.
 
 
The findings in this paper reveal a connection between political activism and 
corporate policies.  Using a difference-in-differences research design that controls 
for relevant firm characteristics, we find that politically connected firms increased 
their cash holdings following passage of Citizens United relative to before its 
passage.  Poor corporate governance quality, captured by managerial entrenchment, 
busy board members, excessive remuneration to the CEO, and investor inactivism in 
the context of politically-oriented shareholder proposals also aggravates the existing 
agency conflicts within politically connected firms, as evidenced by an incrementally 
and significantly greater level of cash holdings.  Finally, political tension within a 
firm, defined as divergence in the party affiliation of political contributions of 
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executive employees relative to that of non-executive employees, is associated with 
incrementally greater cash holdings.  Collectively, our findings are consistent with 
the existence of agency problems in politically connected firms.  
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Appendix A:  Chapter 1 Variable Definitions 
This table provides definitions of all variables in Chapter 1 and Tables 1 through 11.  See Panel 1 for 
definitions of the main variables, Panel 2 for definitions of governance index variables, and Panel 3 
for details on the construction of instrumental variables.  Numbers in brackets denote the 
corresponding Revised Form 990 section, line, and column numbers. 
Panel 1:  Main variables. 
Age The Age of the firm, calculated relative to the Year of Formation [Page 1, L] 
Asset Tangibility The ratio of Land, Buildings, and Equipment, Net [X.10c.B] to Total Assets 
[X.16.B] 
Board Size The number of voting members of the governing body [VI.A.1a] 
CEO Tenure The number of years the CEO has held the title of CEO excluding the year of 
his or her appointment 
CEO Turnover 
Dummy 
Set equal to 1 when the CEO in year t–1 is not the CEO in year t, and 0 
otherwise 
Commercial 
Dummy 
Set equal to 1 when the ratio of Program Services Revenue to (Program 
Services Revenue + Donations Revenue) is at least 90%, and 0 otherwise 
([VIII.2g.A] / [VIII.2g.A] + [VIII.1h.A]) 
Donations Growth The change in the ratio of Net Contributions to Total Revenue [VIII.12.A] in 
year t–1 relative to year t–2 , where Net Contributions = Total Contributions 
[VIII.1h] – Government Revenue [VIII.1e] 
First-class Flights 
Indicator 
Set to 1 if the organization indicates that first-class or charter travel was 
provided to an executive during year t [Schedule J, I.1a]   
Fundraising 
Dummy 
Set equal to 1 when Total Fundraising Expenses [IX.25.D] are zero, and is 0 
otherwise 
Fundraising Ratio The ratio of (Net Contributions – Net Fundraising Expenses) to Net 
Contributions, where Net Fundraising Expenses = Total Fundraising Expenses 
–  Compensation allocated to Fundraising Expenses ([IX.25.D] – [IX.5.D] – 
[IX.6.D] – [IX.7.D]) and Net Contributions = Total Contributions – 
Government Revenue ([VIII.1h] – [VIII.1e]) 
Gender Dummy Set equal to 1 if the CEO is a female, and is 0 otherwise 
Governance Index See “Governance Index” in Appendix A, Panel 2; defined as the average of 
four governance sub-indices (Governing Body, Governing Policies, 
Compensation Policies, Accountability & Transparency), where each sub-
index is defined as the ratio of the sum of the indicator variables as a 
proportion of the total number of possible responses for each firm-year 
observation where each response is weighted by its annual cross-sectional 
standard deviation   
Government 
Revenue 
The ratio of Government Grants [VII.1e] to Total Revenue [VIII.12.A] 
High Program 
Spending Dummy 
Set equal to 1 when the Program Spending Ratio exceeds the annual industry 
median value, and is 0 otherwise 
Household Income Median household income (as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau’s American 
Community Survey); computed for each state and fiscal year pair 
Liquid Assets/Total 
Expenses 
The ratio of Liquid Assets to Net Total Expenses, where Liquid Assets = Cash 
+ Savings and Temporary Cash Investments + Pledges and Grants Receivable, 
Net + Accounts Receivable, Net, and Net Total Expenses = Total Expenses – 
Compensation Expense 
([X.1.B] + [X.2.B] + [X.3.B] + [X.4.B]) / ([IX.25.A] – [IX.5.A] – [IX.6.A] – 
[IX.7.A]) 
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No. of Employees The Number of Employees [I.5], i.e. the number of compensated employees 
(full-time or part-time) listed on the entity’s W-3, “Transmittal of Wage and 
Tax Statements” 
NTEE-10 Industry 
Classifications 
A set of 10 groups defined by the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
(NTEE):  Arts, Culture, and Humanities; Education; Environment and 
Animals; Health; Human Services; International, Foreign Affairs; Public, 
Societal Benefit; Religion Related; Mutual/Membership Benefit; and 
Unknown, Unclassified 
NTEE-26 Industry 
Classifications 
A set of 26 groups defined by the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
(NTEE):  Animal-Related; Arts, Culture, and Humanities; Civil Rights, 
Social Action, Advocacy; Community Improvement, Capacity Building; 
Crime, Legal Related; Diseases, Disorders, Medical Disciplines; Education; 
Employment, Job Related; Environmental Quality, Protection, and 
Beautification; Food, Agriculture, and Nutrition; Health; Housing, Shelter; 
Human Services; International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security; 
Medical Research; Mental Health; Mutual/Membership Benefit 
Organizations; Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and Grantmaking Foundations; 
Public Safety; Public, Society Benefit; Recreation, Sports, Leisure, Athletics; 
Religion Related; Science and Technology Research Institutes; Social 
Science Research Institutes; Youth Development; Unknown 
Perquisites Indicator Set to 1 if the organization indicates that at least one type of perquisite was 
provided to an executive during year t [Schedule J, I.1a]  Note:  The eight 
possibilities listed are first-class or charter travel, travel for companions, tax 
indemnification and gross-up payments, discretionary spending account, 
housing allowance or residence for personal use, payments for business use 
of personal residence, health or social club dues or initiation fees, and 
personal services (e.g., maid, chauffeur, chef). 
Program Expenses to 
Assets 
The ratio of Net Program Service Expenses to Total Assets, where Net 
Program Service Expenses = Total Program Expenses – Compensation 
allocated to Program Service Expenses  
([IX.25.B] – [IX.5.B] – [IX.6.B] – [IX.7.B]) / [X.16.B] 
Program Spending 
Ratio 
The ratio of Net Program Service Expenses to Net Total Expenses, where Net 
Program Service Expenses = Total Program Expenses – Compensation 
allocated to Program Service Expenses and Net Total Expenses = Total 
Expenses – Compensation Expense 
([IX.25.B] – [IX.5.B] – [IX.6.B] – [IX.7.B] ) / ([IX.25.A] – [IX.5.A] – 
[IX.6.A] – [IX.7.A]) 
Relative Pay Ratio The ratio of CEO Compensation to Average Non-CEO Employee Pay 
 (CEO Compensation as identified in [VII.1a.D] divided by the sum of 
([IX.5.A] + [IX.6.A] + [IX.7.A] – CEO Compensation) scaled by the number 
of employees [I.5]), where CEO Compensation is “reportable compensation 
from the organization” (essentially, that which is reported on a W-2; in 
accordance with Internal Revenue Service guidelines, businesses are required 
to generate a W-2 for all employees for which they compensate as part of an 
employment relationship) 
Revenue per 
Employee 
The ratio of Net Total Revenue to the Number of Employees [I.5], where Net 
Total Revenue = Total Revenue [VIII.12.A] – Total Contributions [VIII.1h] 
Total Assets Total Assets [X.16.B] 
Total Revenue Total Revenue [VIII.12.A] 
Total 
Liabilities/Total 
Assets 
The ratio of Total Liabilities [X.26.B] to Total Assets [X.16.B] 
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Panel 2:  Components of the governance index. 
Governing Body 
Board Independence Is at least two-thirds of the organization’s board of directors is 
independent?  [VI.A.1b / VI.A.1a]   
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Inside Business 
Relationship 
Did any person who is a current or former officer, director, 
trustee, or key employee have a direct business relationship 
with the organization [IV.28a], have a family member who 
has a direct or indirect business relationship with the 
organization [IV.28b], or serve as an officer, director, trustee, 
key employee, partner, or member of an entity doing business 
with the organization [IV.28c]?  
= 1 if No 
= 0 if Yes 
Outside Management Did the organization delegate control over management duties 
customarily performed by or under the direct supervision of 
officers, directors or trustees, or key employees to a 
management company or other person?  [VI.A.3]  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Stockholders Does the organization have members or stockholders [VI.A.6] 
who may elect one or more members of the governing body 
[VI.A.7a] and approve the decisions of the governing body 
[VI.A.7b]?  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Form 990 to Board Was a copy of the Form 990 provided to the organization’s 
governing body before it was filed?  [VI.A.10]  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Governing Policies 
Conflict  of Interest 
Policy 
Does the organization have a written conflict of interest policy 
[VI.B.12a] that is regularly and consistently monitored and 
enforced [VI.B.12c], and that requires officers, directors or 
trustees, and key employees to disclose annually interests that 
could give rise to conflicts [VI.B.12b]?  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Whistleblower Policy Does the organization have a written whistleblower policy?  
[VI.B.13]  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Document Retention 
Policy 
Does the organization have a written document retention and 
destruction policy?  [VI.B.14]  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Grant to Officer Did the organization provide a grant or other assistance to an 
officer, director, trustee, key employee, or substantial 
contributor, or to a person related to such an individual?  
[IV.27]  
= 1 if No 
= 0 if Yes 
Compensation Policies 
CEO Compensation 
Policy 
Indicate the number of ways that the organization uses to 
establish the compensation of the organization’s 
CEO/Executive Director [Schedule J, I.3].  Note:  The six 
possibilities listed are a compensation committee, 
independent compensation consultant, Form 990 of other 
organizations, written employment contract, compensation 
survey or study, and approval by the board or compensation 
committee.  
Continuous 
variable 
Non-CEO 
Compensation Policy 
Did the process for determining compensation of the non-
CEO officers or key employees of the organization include a 
review and approval by independent persons, comparability 
data, and contemporaneous substantiation of the deliberation 
and decision?  [VI.B.15b]  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
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Executive 
Reimbursement 
Policy 
If the organization provided fringe benefits to any person 
listed in the Schedule of Compensation to Officers, Directors, 
Trustees, Key Employees, and Highest Compensated 
Employees [Schedule J, I.1a], did the organization follow a 
written policy regarding payment or reimbursement or 
provision of all of the associated expenses [Schedule J, I.1b]?  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Executive 
Substantiation Policy 
If the organization provided fringe benefits to any person 
listed in the Schedule of Compensation to Officers, Directors, 
Trustees, Key Employees, and Highest Compensated 
Employees [Schedule J, I.1a], did the organization require 
substantiation prior to reimbursing or allowing the associated 
expenses [Schedule J, I.2]?  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Accountability & Transparency 
Tax Forms on 
Website 
Does the organization make its Form 1023 (or 1024 if 
applicable), 990, and 990-T available for public inspection 
on its own website?  [VI.C.18]  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Audited Financial 
Statements 
Were the organization’s financial statements compiled, 
reviewed, or audited by an independent accountant?  [XI.2a-
b]  (If audited, the audit must not be a Circular A-133 audit 
[i.e., “No” to XI.3a])  
= 1 if Audited 
= 0.50 if  
   Reviewed  
   or  
   Compiled 
= 0 if No 
Audit Committee If the organization’s financial statements are compiled, 
reviewed, or audited by an independent accountant [XI.2a-
b], does the organization have a committee that assumes 
responsibility for oversight of the audit, review, or 
compilation of its financial statements and selection of an 
independent accountant [XI.2c]?  
= 1 if Yes 
= 0 if No 
Panel 3:  Construction of instrumental variables. 
Instrumental variables estimations incorporate instruments for (1) organizational performance, and (2) 
relative pay.  For organizational performance, the instrument is defined as the mean performance of 
similar-sized organizations within the same industry-region-year excluding nonprofit i.  For relative 
pay, the instrument is defined as the mean value of Log(Relative Pay) of similar-sized organizations 
within the same industry-region-year excluding nonprofit i.  Groups are formed according to the 
following criteria: 
 Size:  three splits (small, medium, large) based on total revenue 
 Industry:  eight splits (Arts, Education, Environment, Health, Human Services, International, 
Public and Societal Benefit, Religion)
 b
 
 Geographical region:  nine splits in accordance with the U.S. Census Bureau’s census codes 
(New England, Middle Atlantic, North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East 
South Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific) 
 Year (fiscal) 
Groups are required to entail a minimum of 5 observations to be included in instrumental variables 
estimations. 
a 
Industry classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings. 
b Industry classifications are based on the 10 NTEE major groupings, excluding the “Mutual Benefit” 
(for which there are no observations) and “Other” industries. 
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Appendix B:  Chapter 1 Governance Index Weights 
This table provides the cross-sectional standard deviations of 
each of the sixteen governance variables listed in Panel 2 of 
Appendix A.  These values are used as weights in forming the 
governance index, as described in the Governance Index 
definition in Panel 1 of Appendix A. 
Governing Body 
Board Independence 0.500 
Inside Business Relationship 0.433 
Outside Management 0.266 
Stockholders 0.378 
Form 990 to Board 0.396 
Governing Policies 
Conflict  of Interest Policy 0.404 
Whistleblower Policy 0.442 
Document Retention Policy 0.429 
Grant to Officer 0.244 
Compensation Policies 
CEO Compensation Policy 0.315 
Non-CEO Compensation Policy 0.480 
Executive Reimbursement Policy 0.346 
Executive Substantiation Policy 0.273 
Accountability & Transparency 
Tax Forms on Website 0.236 
Audited Financial Statements 0.409 
Audit Committee 0.299 
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Appendix C:  Chapter 2 Variable Definitions 
This table provides definitions of all variables in Chapter 2, Tables 12 through 18, and Figures 1 and 
2.  See Panel 1 for definitions of the expectations model variables and Panel 2 for definitions of 
partitioning variables.  Numbers in parentheses denote the corresponding OSHPD Hospital Annual 
Financial data page number, column number, and line number. 
Panel 1:  Expectations model variables. 
CORE_EXPt [Daily Hospital Services Expense (8, 1, 146) + Ambulatory Services 
Expense (8, 1, 151) + Ancillary Services Expense (8, 1, 156)] / Gross 
Patient Revenue (8, 1, 30), measured in year t 
NONCORE_EXPt [Research Costs (8, 1, 161) + Education Costs (8, 1, 166) + General 
Services (8, 1, 171) + Fiscal Services (8, 1, 176) + Administrative 
Services (8, 1, 181) + Unassigned Costs (8, 1, 186)] / Gross Patient 
Revenue (8, 1, 30),  measured in year t 
ATOt Operating Asset Turnover, defined by the OSHPD as Total Operating 
Revenue (8, 1, 140) / [Total Current Assets (5, 1, 55) + Net Property, 
Plant & Equipment (5, 1, 200)] 
ΔREVt Percentage Change in Gross Patient Revenue (8, 1, 30), calculated as 
[Gross Patient Revenuet  – Gross Patient Revenuet–1 ] / Gross Patient 
Revenuet–1 
NEG_ΔREVt Percentage Change in Gross Patient Revenue (ΔREVt) if  ΔREVt  is less 
than 0, and 0 otherwise 
CURRENT Total Current Assets (5, 1, 55) / Total Current Liabilities (5, 3, 60) 
DAYS_CASH Days Cash on Hand measured in year t, calculated as [Cash  (5, 1, 5) + 
Marketable Securities (5, 1, 10)] / [[Total Operating Expenses (8, 1, 200) 
+ Depreciation & Amortization Expense (9, 1, 15)]/ Days in Period], 
where Days in Period is the difference between the Report End Date (0, 1, 
39) and the Report Begin Date (0, 1, 38) 
TEACHING 1 if the hospital is identified as a teaching hospital in year t   based on 
OSHPD Annual Financial data pivot profiles, and 0 otherwise 
LnAGE The logarithm of the number of years since facility was originally 
licensed (based on OSHPD Utilization Data File, 1.21.3) as of year t 
LnASSETS The logarithm of Total Assets (5, 1, 270) measured in year t 
CMI Case Mix Index in year t based on OSHPD Case Mix Index files 
(http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/PatDischargeData/CaseMixIndex/
default.asp) 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated as Total Discharges (4, 12, 150) 
as a proportion of Total Discharges in the County of hospital residence, 
measured in year t 
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Panel 2:  Partitioning variables. 
RURAL
A(B)
 1 if the hospital was a rural hospital in year t  based on OSHPD Annual 
Financial data pivot profiles and reports earnings well above (below) the 
zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise 
CHURCH
 A(B)
 1 if the hospital was a church hospital in year t (1, 2, 5) and reports 
earnings well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark, and 0 otherwise 
SYSTEM
 A(B)
 1 if the hospital was a system hospital in year t  based on OSHPD Annual 
Financial data pivot profiles and reports earnings well above (below) the 
zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise 
HIGH_CHARITY
 A(B)
 1 if the hospital provided Charity Care above the annual sample median 
and reports earnings well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark, 0 
otherwise, where Charity Care is defined as [Charity Discounts-Hill 
Burton (8, 1, 350) + Charity Discounts-Other (8, 1, 355) + Contractual 
Adjustments-County Indigent Programs-Traditional (8, 1, 330) + 
Contractual Adjustments-County Indigent Programs-Managed Care (8, 1, 
335) + Provision for Bad Debts (8, 1, 300)] / Gross Patient Revenue (8, 1, 
30), measured in year t 
LOW_MEDICARE
 A(B)
 1 if the hospital’s reported proportion of inpatient Medicare days to total 
inpatient days is above the annual sample median and reports earnings 
well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise, where the 
proportion is defined as [Patient Days-Medicare-Traditional-Total (4.1, 1, 
35) + Patient Days-Medicare-Managed Care-Total (4.1, 2, 35)] / Total 
Patient Days (4.1, 11, 35) as measured in year t 
LOW_MEDICAID
 A(B)
 1 if the hospital’s reported proportion of inpatient Medicaid days to total 
inpatient days is above the annual sample median and reports earnings 
well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise, where the 
proportion is defined as [Patient Days-Medicaid-Traditional-Total (4.1, 1, 
35) + Patient Days-Medicaid-Managed Care-Total (4.1, 2, 35)] / Total 
Patient Days (4.1, 11, 35) as measured in year t 
HIGH_DONATIONS
 A(B)
 1 if Donations Revenue is above the annual sample median and reports 
earnings well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise, 
where Donations are defined as Unrestricted Contributions (8, 1, 510) / 
Gross Patient Revenue (8, 1, 30) measured in year t 
NO_AUDIT
 A(B)
 1 if the hospital’s OSHPD Annual Financial data report did not undergo 
an independent financial audit prior to submission (0, 1, 40) and reports 
earnings well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise 
LOW_FISCAL_FEES
 A(B)
 1 if the hospital’s spending on Professional Fees for Total Fiscal Services 
(18, 4, 200) as a proportion of Gross Patient Revenue (8, 1, 30) is below 
the annual sample median and reports earnings well above (below) the 
zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise 
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Appendix D:  Chapter 3 Variable Definitions 
This table provides definitions of all variables in Chapter 3 and Tables 19 through 31.  See Panel 1 for 
definitions of political connectedness variables, Panel 2 for traditional determinants for corporate cash 
holdings, and Panel 3 for corporate governance variables.  Numbers in parentheses denote Compustat 
Fundamentals Annual variable names. 
Panel 1:  Political connectedness variables. 
Contributions/NTA Annual Political Contributions / [Total Assets (AT) – Cash & Cash 
Equivalents (CHE)] computed at the parent-level and measured in year t, 
where political contributions include donations made by PACs and 
employees associated with parent and wholly-owned subsidiary 
companies, unless indicated otherwise 
Post-Citizens United 
Dummy 
An indicator variable equal to 1 for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, 0 
otherwise 
Political Dummy An indicator variable to capture the degree of historical political 
connectedness as determined by median firm-level pre-Citizens United 
contributions (scaled by Net Total Assets), set equal to 1 for firms in the 
fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and for 
historically non-politically active firms  
Political Deviation A ranked variable to capture the degree of historical within-firm 
divergence in political beliefs among historically politically active firms 
(i.e., where Political Dummy = 1), determined by the median firm-level 
absolute difference in the proportion of executive employee contributions 
to Republicans and the proportion of non-executive employee 
contributions to Republicans as observed during the pre-Citizens United 
period; ranging from 0.10 (bottom decile) to 1.00 (top decile)  
Panel 2:  Traditional determinants of corporate cash holdings. 
Log(Cash/NTA) The logarithm of Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE) / [Total Assets (AT) – 
Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE)], measured in year t 
Log(Net Total Assets) The logarithm of [Total Assets (AT) – Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE)], 
measured in year t 
Debt/NTA [Long-term Debt (DLTT) + Debt in Current Liabilities (DLC)] / [Total 
Assets (AT) – Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE)], measured in year t 
Market-to-Book [Market Value of Equity (CSHO × PRCC_F) + Total Liabilities (LT)] / 
[Total Assets (AT) – Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE)], measured in  
year t 
Cash Flow/NTA [Operating Income before Depreciation (OIBDP) – Interest Expense (DP) 
– Taxes (TXT) – Common Dividends (DVC)] / [Total Assets (AT) – 
Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE)], measured in year t 
Std(Cash Flow/NTA) The trailing volatility of cash flow (OIBDP), computed over a minimum 
(maximum) of 5 (10) years ending in year t–1 
Net Working 
Capital/NTA 
[Working Capital (WCAP) – Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE)] / [Total 
Assets (AT) – Cash & Cash Equivalents (CHE)], measured in year t 
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R&D/Sales Research and Development Expenditures (XRD) / Sales (SALE), 
measured in year t (and set to 0 if missing) 
R&D Missing Dummy An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm does not report Research & 
Development Expenditures (XRD) in year t, 0 otherwise 
Capital 
Expenditures/NTA 
Capital Expenditures (CAPX) / [Total Assets (AT) – Cash & Cash 
Equivalents (CHE)], measured in year t 
Dividend Dummy An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm paid common dividends 
(DVC) in year t, 0 otherwise 
Panel 3:  Corporate governance variables. 
Busy Directors The proportion of independent directors who serve on three or more 
boards in year t 
CEO Compensation 
Dummy 
An indicator variable equal to 1 when a CEO’s excess compensation in 
year t (defined as the residual from a regression of the logarithm of total 
CEO compensation on lagged Log(Total Assets), the lagged Market-to-
Book ratio, industry effects based on two-digit SIC code classifications, 
and year fixed effects (Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman 2010), where total 
compensation is set equal to TDC1 in the Execucomp database) is 
positive; 0 otherwise 
E-Index An index of managerial entrenchment, ranging from 0 to 6, where higher 
values indicate a greater degree of managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk et 
al. 2009) 
Shareholder Inactivism 
Dummy 
An indicator variable equal to 1 when a firm does not entertain a 
shareholder proposal pertaining to political contributions in year t,  
0 otherwise 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics, Chapter 1. 
Panel A:  Compensation variables. 
Variable N     Mean    Std. Dev. 
Lower    
 Quartile  Median  
Upper    
 Quartile 
CEO Compensation 10,186 327,212 428,679 135,620 222,326 367,746 
Relative Pay 10,186 11.356 10.591 4.644 8.062 14.425 
Log(Relative Pay) 10,186 2.086 0.856 1.536 2.087 2.669 
Panel B:  Organizational performance variables. 
Program Spending Ratio 10,186 0.843 0.114 0.795 0.867 0.919 
Program Expenses to Assets 10,186 0.401 0.499 0.119 0.257 0.475 
Fundraising Ratio 9,315 0.904 0.178 0.886 0.963 1.000 
Log(Revenue per Employee) 9,711 10.704 1.473 10.067 10.803 11.541 
Panel C:  Determinants of relative pay and organizational performance. 
Governance Index 10,186 0.363 0.096 0.295 0.356 0.443 
Board Size 10,186 21 13 12 17 26 
No. of Employees 10,186 879 1,542 62 308 1,017 
Total Assets 10,186 198,405,661 821,149,254 15,476,609 59,423,104 145,761,043 
Total Revenue 10,186 92,971,905 254,105,250 7,329,995 23,448,859 77,139,389 
Age 10,186 60 43 28 46 86 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses 10,186 0.814 1.132 0.270 0.468 0.875 
Government Revenue 10,186 0.105 0.231 0.000 0.001 0.050 
Donations Growth 10,168 –0.001 0.196 -0.018 0.000 0.012 
Asset Tangibility 10,186 0.363 0.263 0.105 0.375 0.560 
Household Income 10,186 52,828 7,073 47,847 51,351 57,934 
CEO Tenure 10,186 8.770 3.847 6.000 8.000 12.000 
Gender Dummy 10,134 0.274 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Commercial Dummy 10,186 0.367 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Fundraising Dummy 10,185 0.358 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets 10,186 0.397 0.370 0.127 0.333 0.578 
Panel D:  Number of organizations by NTEE major industry classification. 
 Arts Education Health 
Human 
Services 
Other  
No. of Observations 639 1,945 3,186 2,579 1,837  
Descriptive statistics are computed for a maximum of 10,186 nonprofit-year observations spanning tax years 2008-2010.  
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.  Correlations between the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio, organizational performance, governance variables, and other determinants.   
  2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 
                     
1. Log(Relative Pay) −0.03 −0.08 −0.09 −0.08 −0.02 0.26 0.68 0.42 0.35 −0.17 −0.16 0.01 0.23 −0.02 0.02 −0.17 0.23 −0.05 0.12 
2. Program Spending Ratio  0.28 0.13 0.07 0.05 −0.01 0.04 0.06 −0.02 −0.15 0.07 −0.01 −0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.07 
3. Program Expenses to Assets   0.05 −0.10 0.04 −0.13 0.11 −0.24 −0.10 −0.25 0.24 0.00 −0.09 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.18 0.25 
4. Fundraising Ratio    0.01 0.03 −0.02 −0.08 −0.01 −0.09 0.02 0.00 0.04 −0.08 −0.05 0.02 0.01 −0.14 0.36 −0.02 
5. Log(Revenue per Employee)     0.05 −0.14 −0.06 0.39 −0.05 −0.02 −0.52 −0.06 −0.17 0.01 0.00 −0.10 0.36 0.25 0.11 
6. Governance Index      0.02 0.01 0.06 −0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.10 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.00 −0.01 0.04 
7. Board Size       0.17 0.21 0.33 0.02 −0.03 0.00 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.26 −0.36 −0.14 
8. Log(No. of Employees)        0.53 0.42 −0.33 −0.08 −0.01 0.32 0.00 −0.01 −0.20 0.44 0.05 0.24 
9. Log(Total Assets)         0.28 −0.04 −0.28 0.00 −0.09 0.00 −0.02 −0.21 0.16 0.00 0.08 
10. Log(Age)          −0.16 −0.10 0.00 0.11 0.02 −0.01 −0.09 0.03 −0.22 −0.10 
11. 
Liquid Assets/Total 
Expenses 
          0.03 −0.02 −0.18 0.02 0.01 0.06 −0.21 −0.06 −0.16 
12. Government Revenue            −0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.09 −0.21 0.01 0.01 
13. Donations Growth             −0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.04 0.00 −0.01 
14. Asset Tangibility              −0.04 0.00 −0.04 0.25 0.03 0.24 
15. Log(Household Income)               0.06 0.03 0.02 −0.04 0.05 
16. Log(CEO Tenure)                0.01 0.05 0.04 0.00 
17. Gender Dummy                 −0.12 −0.08 −0.09 
18. Commercial Dummy                  0.43 0.38 
19. Fundraising Dummy                   0.27 
20. Total Liabilities/Total Assets                    
See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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Table 3.  Determinants of the log of the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio at nonprofits – Instrumental 
variables estimations. 
Performance measure: 
Program 
Spending Ratio 
Program 
Expenses to 
Assets 
Fundraising 
 Ratio 
Log(Revenue 
per Employee) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Organizational Performance it –1.9280*** –0.3674*** –2.7893 –0.3405*** 
 (endogenous) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.000) 
Governance Index it –0.1383** –0.1482** –0.1351 –0.0744 
 (0.046) (0.025) (0.128) (0.300) 
Board Size it  (÷ 10) 0.1202*** 0.1046*** 0.0560 0.0947*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) 
Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
3) –0.1008*** –0.0909*** –0.0346 –0.0898*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.526) (0.000) 
Log(No. of Employees)it   0.3138*** 0.3500*** 0.3183*** 0.1402*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total Assets)it 0.0368*** –0.0232** 0.0330*** 0.1958*** 
 (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Age)it–1  (÷ 10
2) –1.8924* –3.1272*** –3.3993 –0.1154 
 (0.059) (0.002) (0.138) (0.909) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1  (÷ 10
2) –1.6365 –1.4492* –0.9874 –3.3432*** 
 (0.121) (0.072) (0.439) (0.001) 
Government Revenue it–1   –0.2856*** –0.2199*** –0.4424*** –1.0463*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Donations Growth it–1  (÷ 10
2) 2.4153 1.2829  –7.0284* 
 (0.509) (0.712)  (0.082) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 0.0347 –0.1010** 0.0798** 0.0088 
 (0.224) (0.012) (0.026) (0.765) 
Log(Household Income) it–1 –0.0982* –0.1144** –0.3379** –0.1371*** 
 (0.051) (0.015) (0.016) (0.006) 
Log(CEO Tenure)it 0.0993*** 0.0715*** 0.0813*** 0.0816*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender Dummy it –0.0419*** –0.0588*** –0.0509*** –0.0738*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Commercial Dummy it –0.0286 –0.0291 –0.2914** 0.2714*** 
 (0.169) (0.108) (0.029) (0.000) 
Intercept 2.0860*** 1.7501*** 5.8610* 2.5685*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.065) (0.000) 
N 9,465 9,465 8,948 9,046 
Adj. R2 0.507 0.528 0.415 0.498 
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The results represent pooled regressions of Log(Relative Pay) on its traditional determinants, governance quality, and a measure 
of organizational performance:  Program Spending Ratio in column I, Program Expenses to Assets in column II, Fundraising 
Ratio in column III, and Log(Revenue per Employee) in column IV.  The regressions utilize an instrumental variables estimation 
in which nonprofit i’s performance is instrumented with the mean performance of similar-sized organizations within the same 
industry-region-year excluding nonprofit i.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is denoted in parentheses to the right of 
variable names.  Donations Growth is excluded from column III to avoid a potentially highly collinear relationship between the 
Fundraising Ratio and Donations Growth.  See Appendix A for variable definitions including a detailed explanation of how the 
instrument is constructed.  Industry classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
0.01 level for a two-tailed test.   
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Table 4.  Determinants of nonprofit performance – Instrumental variables estimations. 
Performance measure: 
Program 
Spending Ratio 
Program 
Expenses to 
Assets 
Fundraising  
Ratio 
Log(Revenue 
per Employee) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Log(Relative Pay)it  –0.2246*** –2.1722*** –0.2041*** –3.7095*** 
 (endogenous) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
Governance Index it –0.0225 –0.3928** –0.0376 –0.4428 
 (0.277) (0.014) (0.184) (0.109) 
Board Size it  (÷ 10
2) 0.2904*** 2.4496*** 0.0264 4.1576*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.797) (0.000) 
Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
4) –0.2191*** –2.1471*** 0.0517 –3.8862*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.634) (0.000) 
Log(No. of Employees)it  (÷ 10) 0.7075*** 7.7377*** 0.6518*** 6.5710*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) 
Log(Total Assets)it  (÷ 10) 0.1100*** –0.8067*** 0.0824*** 5.9726*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Log(Age)it–1  (÷ 10) –0.0445 –0.4273** –0.0995*** 0.1913 
 (0.102) (0.043) (0.003) (0.607) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1  (÷ 10) –0.1102*** –0.3603** –0.0392 –0.7825*** 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.107) (0.003) 
Government Revenue it–1 –0.0389** –0.4348*** –0.0997*** –3.3960*** 
 (0.038) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) 
Donations Growth it–1  (÷ 10) 0.0772 0.0529  –2.4413* 
 (0.438) (0.945)  (0.082) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 –0.0050 –0.3619*** 0.0135 0.1026 
 (0.535) (0.000) (0.280) (0.353) 
Fundraising Dummy it–1  (÷ 10) 0.0802* 0.8814**  1.8465*** 
 (0.078) (0.012)  (0.003) 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets it–1  (÷ 10) 0.1360** 3.8156*** 0.2331*** 1.2296 
 (0.047) (0.000) (0.009) (0.185) 
Commercial Dummy it 0.0036 –0.1162*** –0.0955*** 0.7008*** 
 (0.529) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.6990*** 1.6859*** 0.8898*** 2.9565*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 9,409 9,409 9,005 8,993 
Adj. R2 0.038 0.054 0.044 0.213 
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The results represent pooled regressions of Organizational Performance on its traditional determinants, governance quality, and 
(the log of) the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio.  Performance definitions considered include the Program Spending Ratio 
in column I, Program Expenses to Assets in column II, Fundraising Ratio in column III, and Log(Revenue per Employee) in 
column IV.  The regressions utilize an instrumental variables estimation in which nonprofit i’s relative pay ratio is instrumented 
with the mean value of the relative pay ratio of similar-sized organizations within the same industry-region-year excluding 
nonprofit i.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is denoted in parentheses to the right of variable names.  Donations 
Growth and the Fundraising Dummy are excluded from the Fundraising Ratio regression (column III) to avoid a potentially 
spurious relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  See Appendix A for variable definitions including a 
detailed explanation of how the instrument is constructed.  Industry classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed test.   
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Table 5.  The relation between changes in the log of the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio and changes in 
charitable spending for varying degrees of governance quality. 
 Dependent variable:   
Δ Log(Relative Pay)it 
 (I) (II) 
   
Δ Program Spending Ratio it   –0.0008 –0.0138*** 
 (0.349) (0.000) 
Δ Governance Index it 0.0051  
 (0.182)  
Governance Index it  (÷ 10
2)  0.0555 
  (0.304) 
Δ Program Spending Ratio it  ×  Governance Index it  0.0349*** 
  (0.000) 
Δ Board Size it  (÷ 10
2) –0.0228 –0.0216 
 (0.286) (0.314) 
Δ Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
4) 0.1729* 0.1674 
 (0.097) (0.108) 
Δ Log(No. of Employees)it   0.8949*** 0.8949*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Log(Total Assets)it  (÷ 10) –0.0615** –0.0642** 
 (0.032) (0.025) 
Δ Log(Age)it –0.0069*** –0.0069*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it  (÷ 10
3) –0.0045 –0.0041 
 (0.506) (0.549) 
Δ Government Revenue it –0.0015** –0.0016** 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
Δ Donations Growth it  (÷ 10
2) 0.0078 0.0090 
 (0.603) (0.548) 
Δ Asset Tangibility it –0.0010 –0.0010 
 (0.108) (0.102) 
Δ Log(Household Income) it 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.710) (0.731) 
Δ Log(CEO Tenure)it 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Commercial Dummy it  (÷ 10
2) –0.0180 –0.0187 
 (0.384) (0.367) 
CEO Turnover Dummy it –0.0024*** –0.0024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept –0.0001 –0.0003 
 (0.405) (0.199) 
N 6,737 6,737 
R2 0.217 0.219 
Industry Fixed Effects? No No 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes 
The results represent pooled regressions where the change in Log(Relative Pay) is modeled as a function of changes in its 
traditional determinants, governance quality, and the Program Spending Ratio, where changes are computed as the difference 
between year t and year t–1 values.  Column II includes the contemporaneous value of the Governance Index to account for the 
impact of governance quality on the relation between changes in the relative pay ratio and in charitable spending.  To offset the 
loss of observations accompanying a changes specification, CEO turnover years are included and their effect captured by a 
CEO Turnover Dummy indicator variable.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is denoted in parentheses to the right of 
variable names.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Industry classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed test.   
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Table 6.  Executive perquisites, organizational performance, and governance quality. 
 Logit Model 
Perquisites Indicatorit 
Logit Model 
First-class Flight Indicatorit 
Ordered Probit Model 
Number of Perquisitesit 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
       
High Program Spending Dummy it –0.0628 –12.3296*** –0.2595** –3.9097*** –0.0404 –4.4609*** 
 (0.373) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) 
Governance Index it –20.5963*** –29.8282*** –8.4361*** –11.3089*** –9.0526*** –12.3788*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High Program Spending Dummy it   
      × Governance Index it 
 4.4778***  1.3590***  1.6186*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Board Size it 0.0472*** 0.0390*** –0.0429*** –0.0441*** 0.0158*** 0.0139*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size Squared it –0.0005*** –0.0003** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** –0.0002*** –0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) 
Log(No. of Employees)it   0.3287*** 0.3540*** 0.3050*** 0.3157*** 0.1739*** 0.1939*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total Assets)it 0.6554*** 0.7022*** 0.5963*** 0.5807*** 0.3278*** 0.3151*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Age)it–1 0.2511*** 0.2165*** –0.2588*** –0.2770*** 0.0788*** 0.0655*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1 –0.1393*** –0.1365*** –0.1078* –0.0789 –0.0716*** –0.0626*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.090) (0.225) (0.000) (0.002) 
Government Revenue it–1 –0.9426*** –0.8648*** –0.6838* –0.6588* –0.5799*** –0.5637*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.054) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) 
Donations Growth it–1 0.0713 0.2751 –0.0670 –0.0786 0.0250 0.0707 
 (0.725) (0.219) (0.840) (0.813) (0.788) (0.462) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 –0.9624*** –1.0459*** –1.2675*** –1.2354*** –0.4363*** –0.4372*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Household Income) it–1 0.1222 0.3564 –1.1179*** –1.0496** –0.0757 –0.0292 
 (0.660) (0.257) (0.007) (0.011) (0.514) (0.807) 
Log(CEO Tenure)it –0.1616** –0.1663** 0.0156 0.0222 –0.0756*** –0.0718** 
 (0.019) (0.033) (0.875) (0.825) (0.008) (0.014) 
Gender Dummy it –0.4267*** –0.4740*** –0.0403 –0.0562 –0.2185*** –0.2311*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.777) (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) 
Commercial Dummy it –0.1934* –0.1474 –0.3620** –0.3510** –0.1226*** –0.1135*** 
 (0.051) (0.185) (0.010) (0.013) (0.002) (0.006) 
Intercept –10.2940*** –9.4701*** 2.6630 3.3176   
 (0.001) (0.008) (0.565) (0.476)   
N 8,005 8,005 7,975 7,975 8,005 8,005 
Pseudo R
2
 0.509 0.605 0.251 0.264 0.299 0.342 
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 Table 6 (Continued) 
Columns I and II model the probability of at least one perquisite being awarded to an executive; columns III and IV model the probability of first-class or charter travel being 
awarded to an executive; and columns V and VI model the probability of the variety of executive perquisite types.  Columns I, II, III, and IV represent multivariate logit models, 
while columns V and VI are multivariate ordered probit models.  Each specification is modeled as a function of traditional determinants, governance quality, and an indicator 
variable for above industry median charitable spending (High Program Spending Dummy).  Of the 8,005 observations where disclosure of executive perquisites was required, 
3,363 reported providing at least one type of perquisite and 498 provided first-class or charter travel.  Of those nonprofits that provided at least one perquisite, the mean (median) 
number of types provided was 1.93 (2.00).  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  All models include industry and year fixed effects, where industry classifications are based 
on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed test.   For specification 5, cutpoints are 3.7, 4.7, 5.4, 6.0, 6.6, 7.2, and 8.2.  For specification 6, cutpoints are 2.6, 3.8, 4.5, 5.1, 5.6, 6.2, 
and 7.3.  All are statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better. 
 175 
 
Table 7.  Determinants of the log of the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio – Quantile regressions at the 
80th percentile.   
Performance measure: 
Program 
Spending Ratio 
Program 
Expenses to 
Assets 
Fundraising 
 Ratio 
Log(Revenue 
per Employee) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Organizational Performance it –2.1223*** –0.2976*** –3.8554** –0.3062*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.037) (0.000) 
Governance Index it –0.4329*** –0.4684*** –0.4223*** –0.4319*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Board Size it  (÷ 10) 0.0630*** 0.0429** –0.0136 0.0330** 
 (0.000) (0.043) (0.766) (0.039) 
Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
3) –0.0103 0.0087 0.0715 0.0134 
 (0.640) (0.754) (0.212) (0.518) 
Log(No. of Employees)it   0.3013*** 0.3280*** 0.3118*** 0.1455*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total Assets)it 0.0529*** 0.0019 0.0486*** 0.1932*** 
 (0.000) (0.892) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Age)it–1  (÷ 10
2) –6.8165*** –7.4413*** –9.2777*** –5.0326*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1  (÷ 10
2) –1.1298 –0.2448 –1.3504 –2.4810** 
 (0.311) (0.827) (0.323) (0.010) 
Government Revenue it–1   –0.3326*** –0.3035*** –0.5248*** –1.0465*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Donations Growth it–1  (÷ 10
2) 5.6230 2.8085  –5.8620 
 (0.151) (0.565)  (0.136) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 –0.0085 –0.1173** 0.0461 –0.0408 
 (0.786) (0.034) (0.248) (0.157) 
Log(Household Income) it–1 –0.0592 –0.0832 –0.3351** –0.1070** 
 (0.267) (0.200) (0.029) (0.024) 
Log(CEO Tenure)it 0.1163*** 0.0881*** 0.0901*** 0.0938*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender Dummy it –0.0865*** –0.1049*** –0.0872*** –0.1165*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Commercial Dummy it –0.0169 –0.0325 –0.3778*** 0.2407*** 
 (0.451) (0.204) (0.007) (0.000) 
Intercept 2.4537*** 1.6523** 7.9173** 2.9818*** 
 (0.000) (0.026) (0.022) (0.000) 
N 9,465 9,465 8,948 9,046 
Pseudo R2 0.348 0.348 0.357 0.344 
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The results represent quantile regressions of Log(Relative Pay) on its traditional determinants, governance quality, and a 
measure of organizational performance:  Program Spending Ratio in column I, Program Expenses to Assets in column II, 
Fundraising Ratio in column III, and Log(Revenue per Employee) in column IV.  Each specification is estimated at the 80th 
percentile of the distribution of the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio.  All regressions utilize an instrumental variables 
estimation in which nonprofit i’s endogenous variable is instrumented with the mean analogous variable of similar-sized 
organizations within the same industry-region-year excluding nonprofit i.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is 
denoted in parentheses to the right of variable names.  Donations Growth is excluded from column III to avoid a potentially 
highly collinear relationship between the Fundraising Ratio and Donations Growth.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
Industry classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed 
test.   
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Table 8.  Determinants of nonprofit performance – Quantile regressions at the 20th percentile. 
Performance measure: 
Program 
Spending Ratio 
Program 
Expenses to 
Assets 
Fundraising 
Ratio 
Log(Revenue 
per Employee) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Log(Relative Pay) it  –0.2769*** –0.6943*** –0.2655*** –3.1873*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Governance Index it  –0.0247 –0.0716*** –0.0461** –0.4541*** 
 (0.185) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) 
Board Size it  (÷ 10
2) 0.4327*** 0.9379*** 0.0893 3.1554*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.233) (0.000) 
Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
4) –0.3562*** –0.8507*** –0.0249 –2.9360*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.769) (0.000) 
Log(No. of Employees)it  (÷ 10) 0.9201*** 2.7867*** 0.8471*** 6.0137*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total Assets)it  (÷ 10) 0.1194*** –0.5097*** 0.1125*** 5.0121*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Age)it–1  (÷ 10) –0.0194 –0.0528*** –0.1035*** 0.0927 
 (0.448) (0.005) (0.000) (0.457) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1  (÷ 10) –0.1724*** –0.1001*** –0.0006 –0.7575*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.978) (0.000) 
Government Revenue it–1 –0.0431** –0.1992*** –0.1065*** –3.7103*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Donations Growth it–1  (÷ 10) –0.0179 0.0071  –3.9409*** 
 (0.855) (0.919)  (0.000) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 0.0114 –0.0070 0.0175* 0.2046*** 
 (0.113) (0.216) (0.051) (0.000) 
Fundraising Dummy it–1  (÷ 10) 0.0888** 0.1821***  1.2674*** 
 (0.030) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets it–1  (÷ 10) 0.0080 0.6235*** 0.2817*** 1.3704*** 
 (0.899) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Commercial Dummy it 0.0099* –0.0120*** –0.1046*** 0.6722*** 
 (0.063) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.4992*** 0.7149*** 0.7776*** 2.7713*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 9,409 9,409 9,005 8,993 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.239 0.080 0.469 
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The results represent quantile regressions of Organizational Performance on the governance index and traditional 
determinants of organizational performance.  Performance definitions considered include the Program Spending Ratio in 
column I, Program Expenses to Assets in column II, Fundraising Ratio in column III, and Log(Revenue per Employee) in 
column IV.  Each specification is estimated at the 20th percentile of the distribution of the respective measure of 
performance.  All regressions utilize an instrumental variables estimation in which nonprofit i’s endogenous variable is 
instrumented with the mean analogous variable of similar-sized organizations within the same industry-region-year 
excluding nonprofit i.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is denoted in parentheses to the right of variable names.  
Donations Growth and the Fundraising Dummy are excluded from the Fundraising Ratio regression (column III) to avoid a 
potentially spurious relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.  Industry classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level 
for a two-tailed test.   
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Table 9.  Determinants of the log of the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio – Quantile regressions at the 
80th percentile, modeled as a function of governance sub-indices. 
Performance measure: 
Program 
Spending Ratio 
Program 
Expenses to 
Assets 
Fundraising 
 Ratio 
Log(Revenue 
per Employee) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Organizational Performance it –0.1387* –0.1362*** –0.1481*** –0.0979*** 
  (0.061) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Governing Board Index it –0.3212*** –0.3574*** –0.3965*** –0.3644*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) 
Governing Policies Index it  –0.1284 –0.1246 –0.0710 0.0078 
 (0.201) (0.206) (0.521) (0.932) 
Compensation Policies Index it  –0.0646* –0.0527 –0.0815** –0.0504 
 (0.074) (0.138) (0.037) (0.127) 
Accountability & Transparency Index it  –0.1461** –0.1766** –0.1395* –0.1362** 
 (0.040) (0.012) (0.070) (0.035) 
Board Size it  (÷ 10) 0.0648*** 0.0519*** 0.0590*** 0.0463*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
3) –0.0198 –0.0047 –0.0157 –0.0044 
 (0.424) (0.848) (0.547) (0.845) 
Log(No. of Employees)it   0.2940*** 0.3044*** 0.2972*** 0.2537*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total Assets)it 0.0433*** 0.0255*** 0.0393*** 0.0846*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Age)it–1  (÷ 10
2) –5.6633*** –5.8516*** –4.2217*** –4.7326*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1  (÷ 10
2) 1.7298** 0.9448 1.0278 1.2375 
 (0.040) (0.258) (0.260) (0.107) 
Government Revenue it–1   –0.4304*** –0.3967*** –0.4707*** –0.6135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Donations Growth it–1  (÷ 10
2) 2.6875 2.4415  –1.3719 
 (0.541) (0.572)  (0.739) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 0.0309 –0.0285 0.0778** 0.0118 
 (0.354) (0.405) (0.034) (0.696) 
Log(Household Income) it–1 –0.0868 –0.0842 –0.0773 –0.1146** 
 (0.137) (0.142) (0.222) (0.031) 
Log(CEO Tenure)it 0.0933*** 0.0893*** 0.0819*** 0.0752*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Gender Dummy it –0.1060*** –0.1106*** –0.0847*** –0.1107*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Commercial Dummy it –0.0542*** –0.0442** –0.0937*** 0.0165 
 (0.010) (0.033) (0.000) (0.428) 
Intercept 1.3476** 1.5613** 1.3274* 2.0899*** 
 (0.043) (0.017) (0.066) (0.001) 
N 9,465 9,465 8,948 9,046 
Pseudo R2 0.347 0.350 0.357 0.348 
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The results represent quantile regressions of Log(Relative Pay) on its traditional determinants, sub-indices of the governance 
index, and a measure of organizational performance:  Program Spending Ratio in column I, Program Expenses to Assets in 
column II, Fundraising Ratio in column III, and Log(Revenue per Employee) in column IV.  Each specification is estimated at 
the 80th percentile of the distribution of the CEO-to-employee relative pay ratio.  All regressions utilize an instrumental 
variables estimation in which nonprofit i’s endogenous variable is instrumented with the mean analogous variable of similar-
sized organizations within the same industry-region-year excluding nonprofit i.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is 
denoted in parentheses to the right of variable names.  Donations Growth is excluded from column III to avoid a potentially 
highly collinear relationship between the Fundraising Ratio and Donations Growth.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
Industry classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed 
test.   
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Table 10.  Determinants of nonprofit performance – Quantile regressions at the 20th percentile, modeled 
as a function of governance sub-indices. 
Performance measure: 
Program 
Spending Ratio 
Program 
Expenses to 
Assets 
Fundraising  
Ratio 
Log(Revenue 
per Employee) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
Log(Relative Pay) it –0.2588*** –0.6646*** –0.2540*** –3.0941*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Governing Board Index it –0.0617** –0.0843*** –0.0608* –0.5090*** 
 (0.035) (0.001) (0.070) (0.000) 
Governing Policies Index it  0.0230 0.0203 –0.0075 0.2518** 
 (0.303) (0.295) (0.772) (0.015) 
Compensation Policies Index it  0.0136 0.0378*** 0.0132 0.1643*** 
 (0.102) (0.000) (0.161) (0.000) 
Accountability & Transparency Index it  0.0066 –0.0926*** –0.0326* –0.7219*** 
 (0.694) (0.000) (0.083) (0.000) 
Board Size it  (÷ 10
2) 0.4212*** 0.8920*** 0.0738 3.0151*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.345) (0.000) 
Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
4) –0.3488*** –0.8136*** –0.0140 –2.8607*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.875) (0.000) 
Log(No. of Employees)it  (÷ 10) 0.8620*** 2.6703*** 0.7989*** 5.5862*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Total Assets)it  (÷ 10) 0.1093*** –0.5274*** 0.1052*** 4.8783*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Age)it–1  (÷ 10) –0.0132 –0.0401* –0.0981*** 0.0883 
 (0.631) (0.082) (0.001) (0.486) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1  (÷ 10) –0.1704*** –0.1015*** –0.0012 –0.6454*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.958) (0.000) 
Government Revenue it–1 –0.0357* –0.1979*** –0.1058*** –3.7618*** 
 (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Donations Growth it–1  (÷ 10) –0.0237 –0.0053  –3.6769*** 
 (0.824) (0.950)  (0.000) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 0.0111 –0.0094 0.0177* 0.2294*** 
 (0.156) (0.192) (0.064) (0.000) 
Fundraising Dummy it–1  (÷ 10) 0.0816* 0.1934***  1.2966*** 
 (0.064) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets it–1  (÷ 10) 0.0113 0.5899*** 0.2858*** 0.9948*** 
 (0.868) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Commercial Dummy it 0.0106* –0.0110** –0.1044*** 0.6791*** 
 (0.063) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept 0.6469*** 1.0686*** 0.8900*** 5.5138*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 9,409 9,409 9,005 8,993 
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.239 0.080 0.471 
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The results represent quantile regressions of Organizational Performance on sub-indices of the governance index and 
traditional determinants of organizational performance.  Performance definitions considered include the Program Spending 
Ratio in column I, Program Expenses to Assets in column II, Fundraising Ratio in column III, and Log(Revenue per 
Employee) in column IV.  Each specification is estimated at the 20th percentile of the distribution of the respective measure of 
performance.  All regressions utilize an instrumental variables estimation in which nonprofit i’s endogenous variable is 
instrumented with the mean analogous variable of similar-sized organizations within the same industry-region-year excluding 
nonprofit i.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is denoted in parentheses to the right of variable names.  Donations 
Growth and the Fundraising Dummy are excluded from the Fundraising Ratio regression (column III) to avoid a potentially 
spurious relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Industry 
classifications are based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed 
test.   
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Table 11.  The relation between CEO-to-employee relative pay and nonprofit performance – Commercial 
versus traditional nonprofits.  
 
Dependent variable:   
Log(Relative Pay)it 
 Dependent variable:   
 Program Spending Ratio it 
Commercial    vs.     Traditional  Commercial    vs.     Traditional 
(I) (II)  (III) (IV) 
      
Program Spending Ratio it –3.2048*** –0.9116    
 (endogenous) (0.001) (0.164)    
Log(Relative Pay)it    –0.1102*** –0.4835*** 
 (endogenous)    (0.000) (0.007) 
Governance Index it 0.1082 –0.2559***  0.0288 –0.1217* 
 (0.316) (0.006)  (0.131) (0.078) 
Board Size it  (÷ 10) 0.1003*** 0.0984***  0.6649 5.9584*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.292) (0.006) 
Board Size Squared it  (÷ 10
3
) –0.0615 –0.0750***  0.4239 –4.5853** 
 (0.201) (0.004)  (0.627) (0.024) 
Log(No. of Employees)it   0.3430*** 0.3065***  0.4163*** 1.4753*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.008) 
Log(Total Assets)it 0.0553*** 0.0116  0.0657*** 0.0948** 
 (0.000) (0.199)  (0.002) (0.012) 
Log(Age)it–1  (÷ 10
2
) –0.3904 –1.9280  0.0263 –0.1109 
 (0.791) (0.181)  (0.340) (0.116) 
Liquid Assets/Total Expenses it–1  (÷ 10
2
) 1.2020 –2.1033  –0.0403 –0.1941*** 
 (0.485) (0.115)  (0.162) (0.000) 
Government Revenue it–1   –0.1890*** –0.3993***  –0.0065 –0.1640* 
 (0.003) (0.000)  (0.614) (0.057) 
Donations Growth it–1  (÷ 10
2
) –20.5074 2.7035  –0.0186 0.1258 
 (0.195) (0.447)  (0.950) (0.490) 
Asset Tangibility it–1 –0.1207** 0.1374***  –0.0368*** 0.0679* 
 (0.016) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.052) 
Log(Household Income) it–1 0.0242 –0.1917***    
 (0.761) (0.005)    
Log(CEO Tenure)it 0.1570*** 0.0431**    
 (0.000) (0.014)    
Gender Dummy it –0.0500** –0.0458**    
 (0.034) (0.027)    
Fundraising Dummy it–1 (÷ 10)    0.0516 0.3374** 
    (0.212) (0.046) 
Total Liabilities/Total Assets it–1     0.2173*** –0.1467 
    (0.001) (0.493) 
Intercept 1.4015 2.6754***  0.7386*** 0.7284*** 
 (0.127) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) 
N 4,943 4,522  4,931 4,478 
Adj. R
2
 0.429 0.546  0.029 0.016 
Industry Fixed Effects? Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Columns I and II present pooled regressions of Log(Relative Pay) on its traditional determinants, governance quality, and the 
Program Spending Ratio for sub-samples of commercial and traditional nonprofits, where commercial nonprofits are defined 
as those with at least 90% of revenues drawn from program services.  Columns III and IV present pooled regressions of the 
Program Spending Ratio on its traditional determinants, governance quality, and (the log of) the CEO-to-employee relative 
pay ratio for sub-samples of commercial and traditional nonprofits.   All regressions utilize an instrumental variables 
estimation in which nonprofit i’s endogenous variable is instrumented with the mean analogous variable of similar-sized 
organizations within the same industry-region-year excluding nonprofit i.  Scaling of coefficients (where applicable) is 
denoted in parentheses to the right of variable names.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  Industry classifications are 
based on the 26 NTEE major groupings.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are 
shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed test.   
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Figure 1.  Income Statement based on OSHPD Hospital Annual Financial data. 
Income Statement (worksheet 8, section 1) 
 
 
OSHPD Data Item (line no.) 
 
Operating Revenues: 
    Daily Hospital Services (5) 
    Ambulatory Services (10) 
    Ancillary Services (15) 
 Gross Patient Revenue (30) 
   Deductions from Revenue (105) 
   Capitation Premium Revenue (107) 
 Net Patient Revenue  
    Total Other Operating Revenue (135) 
 Total Operating Revenue (140) 
Operating Expenses: 
    Daily Hospital Services* (146) 
    Ambulatory Services* (151) 
    Ancillary Services* (156) 
    Research Costs
#
 (161) 
    Education Costs
#
 (166) 
    General Services
#
 (171) 
    Fiscal Services
#
 (176) 
    Administrative Services
#
 (181) 
    Unassigned Costs
#
 (186) 
    Purchased Inpatient Services (190) 
    Purchased Outpatient Services (195) 
 Total Operating Expenses (200) 
        Net from Operations (205) 
    Net Non-Operating Revenue and Expense (210) 
Net Income before Taxes and Extraordinary Items (215) 
    Provision for Current Income Taxes (220) 
    Provision for Deferred Income Taxes (225) 
 Net Income before Extraordinary Items (230) 
    Extraordinary Items (235) 
        Net Income (245) 
 
* Core (revenue-generating) expenses 
#
 Non-core (non-revenue-generating) expenses 
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The horizontal axis has been truncated to [−0.20, 0.20], which encompasses approximately 90% of all 
observations. BELOW_ZERO hospitals are defined as those with net incomet / total assetst−1 less than 
0.00. ABOVE_ZERO hospitals have net incomet / total assetst−1 greater than 0.10. Hospitals with net 
incomet / total assetst−1 greater than or equal to 0.00 and less than 0.04 are defined as BENCHMARK 
hospitals. No hypothesis was made on observations falling in the range [0.04, 0.10]. 
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Figure 2: Frequency Plot of Net Income / Lagged Total Assets 
Fiscal years 2002-2010; 1,282 hospital-year observations 
Bin widths of 0.01 
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Table 12.  Sample selection procedures, Chapter 2. 
 
All church and nonprofit hospital-year observations during FY 2002-2010 1,868 
Less: Specialty, psychiatric, and substance abuse hospital-year observations (195) 
Less: Non-comparable report
a
 hospital-year observations (223) 
Less: Hospital-year observations with fewer than 50 licensed beds
b
 (146) 
Less: Hospital-year observations with insufficient data      (22) 
         Total hospital-year observations 1,282 
 
a
 Non-comparable reports result in data that are not comparable to that filed by other hospitals.  Each 
fiscal year, the OSHPD identifies a list of non-comparable reports which generally includes, for 
example, Kaiser hospitals, long-term care emphasis hospitals, Shriner’s hospitals, and state 
hospitals. 
b
 The number of licensed beds was identified using OSHPD Annual Financial data files (1, 1, 5). 
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Table 13.  Descriptive statistics, Chapter 2.  (N = 1,282) 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
CORE_EXPt 0.183 0.053 0.147 0.169 0.206 
NONCORE_EXPt 0.111 0.045 0.084 0.101 0.123 
CORE_EXPt−1 0.190 0.055 0.151 0.175 0.217 
NONCORE_EXPt−1 0.117 0.047 0.088 0.106 0.134 
ATOt 1.599 0.564 1.200 1.543 1.939 
ΔREVt 0.152 0.206 0.081 0.124 0.184 
NEG_ΔREVt −0.006 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CURRENT 1.990 1.526 1.030 1.621 2.470 
DAYS_CASH 29.372 44.755 1.324 12.716 38.512 
TEACHING 0.095 0.294 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LnAGE 3.779 0.451 3.659 3.900 4.078 
LnASSETS 18.783 1.110 18.004 18.786 19.577 
CMI 1.161 0.230 1.000 1.130 1.290 
HHI 0.233 0.474 0.023 0.075 0.251 
U_CORE_EXP 0.000 0.017 −0.007 0.000 0.006 
U_NONCORE_EXP 0.000 0.017 −0.005 −0.001 0.005 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles.  
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Table 14.  Estimation of expected core expenses and expected non-core 
expenses. 
       CORE_EXPt              NONCORE_EXPt        
Variable Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value 
Intercept 0.014 0.244  0.021* 0.065 
CORE_EXPt−1 0.899** <.0001    
NONCORE_EXPt−1    0.861** <.0001 
ATOt 0.003** 0.006  0.000 0.923 
ΔREVt −0.018** <.0001  −0.034** <.0001 
NEG_ΔREVt −0.069** <.0001  −0.121** <.0001 
CURRENT 0.001* 0.032  0.000 0.356 
DAYS_CASH 0.000 0.105  0.000** 0.001 
TEACHING 0.001 0.469  0.001 0.645 
LnAGE −0.001 0.372  −0.001 0.217 
LnASSETS 0.000 0.722  0.000 0.643 
CMI 0.001 0.712  0.001 0.633 
HHI 0.002* 0.061  −0.001 0.296 
Adj. R
2
 0.907   0.874  
N 1,282   1,282  
The results represent a pooled regression of all 1,282 hospital-year observations in the sample. 
However, when estimating expected expenses of hospital i in year t, we estimate a model that includes 
only hospitals other than hospital i in the same fiscal year. Coefficient estimates from these models 
times actual amounts for hospital i in year t are used to calculate expected expenses for hospital i in 
year t. See Appendix C for variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentiles. *, ** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 15.  Correlations between hospital characteristic partitioning variables.  
 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. U_CORE_EXP 0.38 0.00 −0.06 −0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 −0.04 −0.05 −0.01 
2. U_NONCORE_EXP  0.00 0.02 −0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.04 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03 
3. RURAL   0.04 0.02 0.21 −0.03 −0.06 0.15 0.05 0.02 
4. CHURCH    0.28 0.09 −0.01 −0.12 0.00 0.13 0.13 
5. SYSTEM     0.16 −0.10 0.01 −0.05 0.18 −0.03 
6. HIGH_CHARITY      0.04 −0.19 −0.02 0.04 0.01 
7. LOW_MEDICARE       −0.48 0.00 −0.07 0.04 
8. LOW_MEDICAID        0.03 0.04 −0.07 
9. NO_AUDIT         −0.01 −0.07 
10. LOW_ FISC_FEES          0.00 
11. HIGH_DONATIONS 
          
U_CORE_EXP (U_NONCORE_EXP) is calculated as actual core (non-core) expenses less expected core (non-
core) expenses, where expectations are based on estimation in Table 14. See Appendix C for other variable 
definitions. 
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Table 16.  The relation between unexpected core expenses and unexpected non-
core expenses for suspect versus non-suspect hospitals based on an aggregate 
measure of cost shifting tendency. 
Panel A:  Hospitals reporting net income within or well above the zero-profit 
benchmark. 
Variable Coef. p-value 
Intercept −0.001 0.179 
SUSPECT
A
 0.005* 0.097 
U_NONCORE_EXP 0.465** <.0001 
U_NONCORE_EXP × SUSPECT
A
 −1.308** <.0001 
Adj. R
2
 0.075  
N 601  
Panel B:  Hospitals reporting net income within or below the zero-profit benchmark. 
Variable Coef. p-value 
Intercept −0.001 0.194 
SUSPECT
B
 0.004 0.230 
U_NONCORE_EXP 0.500** <.0001 
U_NONCORE_EXP × SUSPECT
B
 −0.172 0.236 
Adj. R
2
 0.230  
N 648  
The results represent a regression of U_CORE_EXP on U_NONCORE_EXP, after partitioning on an 
aggregate measure of cost shifting tendency, SUSPECT
A(B)
. SUSPECT
A(B)
 is the sum of the nine 
partitioning indicator variables (scaled by 9) when earnings are well above (below) the zero-profit 
benchmark. U_CORE_EXP (U_NONCORE_EXP) is calculated as actual core (non-core) expenses 
less expected core (non-core) expenses, where expectations are based on estimation in Table 14. 
Hospitals well above (below) [within] the zero-profit benchmark include those reporting bottom-line 
net income scaled by lagged total assets greater than 0.10 (less than 0.00) [greater than or equal to 
0.00 and less than 0.04]. See Figure 2 for benchmark classifications and Appendix C for other 
variable definitions. *, ** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 17.  The relation between unexpected core expenses and positive or negative unexpected non-core 
expenses for suspect versus non-suspect hospitals based on an aggregate measure of cost shifting tendency. 
Panel A:  Hospitals reporting net income within or well above the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
Negative 
U_NONCORE_EXP  
Positive 
U_NONCORE_EXP 
F-Test:
posneg
33    
Variable Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value p-value 
Intercept 0.002 0.260  −0.001 0.433  
SUSPECTA −0.019** 0.001  0.002 0.560  
U_NONCORE_EXP 0.799** <.0001  0.355** 0.000  
U_NONCORE_EXP × SUSPECTA −3.541** <.0001  −0.045 0.910 <.0001 
Adj. R2 0.146   0.091   
N 335   266   
Panel B:  Hospitals reporting net income within or below the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
Negative 
U_NONCORE_EXP  
Positive 
U_NONCORE_EXP 
F-Test:
posneg
33    
Variable Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value p-value 
Intercept 0.002 0.293  −0.002 0.245  
SUSPECTB 0.002 0.737  0.004 0.367  
U_NONCORE_EXP 0.768** <.0001  0.463** <.0001  
U_NONCORE_EXP × SUSPECTB −0.488 0.149  −0.119 0.547 0.341 
Adj. R2 0.186   0.284   
N 339   309   
The results represent a regression of U_CORE_EXP on positive and negative values of U_NONCORE_EXP, after partitioning 
on an aggregate measure of cost shifting tendency, SUSPECTA(B). SUSPECTA(B) is the sum of the nine partitioning indicator 
variables (scaled by 9) when earnings are well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark. U_CORE_EXP (U_NONCORE_EXP) 
is calculated as actual core (non-core) expenses less expected core (non-core) expenses, where expectations are based on 
estimation in Table 14. Hospitals well above (below) [within] the zero-profit benchmark include those reporting bottom-line net 
income scaled by lagged total assets greater than 0.10 (less than 0.00) [greater than or equal to 0.00 and less than 0.04]. See 
Figure 2 for benchmark classifications and Appendix C for other variable definitions. The final column provides p-values of an 
F-test of whether the coefficients for the interactions of U_NONCORE_EXP and SUSPECTA(B) differ for negative versus 
positive values of U_NONCORE_EXP. *, ** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 18.  The relation between unexpected core expenses and positive or negative unexpected non-core expenses 
for suspect versus non-suspect hospitals based on individual measures of cost shifting tendency. 
Panel A:  Hospitals reporting net income within or well above the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
 
Negative 
U_NONCORE_EXP  
Positive 
U_NONCORE_EXP 
F-Test:
posneg
33    
Variable Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value p-value 
Intercept 0.002 0.128  −0.001 0.391  
RURAL
A
 −0.004 0.591  0.008 0.197  
CHURCH
A
 0.001 0.797  −0.002 0.603  
SYSTEM
A
 0.004 0.307  −0.001 0.713  
HIGH_CHARITY
A
 −0.008* 0.022  0.001 0.645  
LOW_MEDICARE
A
 0.001 0.732  0.002 0.450  
LOW_MEDICAID
A
 −0.004 0.159  0.003 0.396  
NO_AUDIT
A
 0.000 0.972  0.002 0.595  
LOW_FISC_FEES
A
 0.003 0.390  −0.002 0.462  
HIGH_DONATIONS
A
 −0.008* 0.026  −0.001 0.795  
U_NONCORE_EXP 0.876** <.0001  0.352** 0.000  
U_NONCORE_EXP × RURAL
A
 −1.947** 0.001  −0.761 0.136 0.140 
U_NONCORE_EXP × CHURCH
A
 0.803 0.180  −0.121 0.822 0.273 
U_NONCORE_EXP × SYSTEM
A
 0.071 0.868  0.374 0.274 0.587 
U_NONCORE_EXP × HIGH_CHARITY
A
 −0.774* 0.031  −0.014 0.966 0.132 
U_NONCORE_EXP × LOW_MEDICARE
A
 −0.355 0.202  0.049 0.873 0.366 
U_NONCORE_EXP × LOW_MEDICAID
A
 −0.674* 0.035  −0.653* 0.041 0.965 
U_NONCORE_EXP × NO_AUDIT
A
 0.132 0.657  0.036 0.923 0.856 
U_NONCORE_EXP × LOW_FISC_FEES
A
 0.270 0.509  0.167 0.631 0.853 
U_NONCORE_EXP × HIGH_DONATIONS
A
 −1.068** 0.007  0.033 0.910 0.028 
Adj. R
2
 0.335   0.086   
N 335   266   
Panel B:  Hospitals reporting net income within or below the zero-profit benchmark. 
 
 
Negative 
U_NONCORE_EXP  
Positive 
U_NONCORE_EXP 
F-Test:
posneg
33    
Variable Coef. p-value  Coef. p-value p-value 
Intercept 0.003* 0.077  −0.001 0.649  
RURAL
B
 0.006 0.496  0.002 0.821  
CHURCH
B
 −0.002 0.740  −0.001 0.737  
SYSTEM
B
 0.003 0.384  −0.006* 0.100  
HIGH_CHARITY
B
 −0.001 0.725  0.012** 0.001  
LOW_MEDICARE
B
 −0.005 0.140  −0.005 0.110  
LOW_MEDICAID
B
 −0.003 0.500  0.001 0.703  
NO_AUDIT
B
 0.007 0.139  −0.005 0.185  
LOW_FISC_FEES
B
 −0.001 0.847  0.003 0.285  
HIGH_DONATIONS
B
 −0.003 0.356  −0.001 0.813  
U_NONCORE_EXP 0.993** <.0001  0.360** 0.002  
U_NONCORE_EXP × RURAL
B
 0.779 0.130  0.553 0.227 0.743 
U_NONCORE_EXP × CHURCH
B
 0.248 0.483  −0.084 0.646 0.398 
U_NONCORE_EXP × SYSTEM
B
 0.377 0.248  0.360* 0.054 0.963 
U_NONCORE_EXP × HIGH_CHARITY
B
 −0.378 0.169  −0.467** 0.008 0.783 
U_NONCORE_EXP × LOW_MEDICARE
B
 −0.711* 0.018  0.166 0.204 0.007 
U_NONCORE_EXP × LOW_MEDICAID
B
 −1.198** 0.002  −0.394 0.092 0.072 
U_NONCORE_EXP × NO_AUDIT
B
 0.583* 0.034  0.274* 0.068 0.317 
U_NONCORE_EXP × LOW_FISC_FEES
B
 0.048 0.900  −0.344* 0.069 0.351 
U_NONCORE_EXP × HIGH_DONATIONS
B
 −0.627* 0.013  0.340* 0.075 0.002 
Adj. R
2
 0.259   0.342   
N 339   309   
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Table 18 (Continued) 
      
The results represent a regression of U_CORE_EXP on positive and negative values of U_NONCORE_EXP, after partitioning 
on nine hospital characteristics. For Panel A (B), each indicator is coded as 1 when the hospital has that characteristic and 
reports earnings well above (below) the zero-profit benchmark, 0 otherwise. U_CORE_EXP (U_NONCORE_EXP) is calculated 
as actual core (non-core) expenses less expected core (non-core) expenses, where expectations are based on estimation in Table 
14. Hospitals well above (below) [within] the zero-profit benchmark include those reporting bottom-line net income scaled by 
lagged total assets greater than 0.10 (less than 0.00) [greater than or equal to 0.00 and less than 0.04]. See Figure 2 for 
benchmark classifications and Appendix C for other variable definitions. The final column provides p-values of an F-test of 
whether the coefficients for the interactions of U_NONCORE_EXP and the partitioning variables differ for negative versus 
positive values of U_NONCORE_EXP. *, ** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 19.  Aggregate and firm-level statistics of political contributions. 
Panel A:  Aggregate statistics. 
 Total Executives Non-Executives PACs 
No. of contributions 373,393 45,315 130,587 197,491 
Percent of total sample 100% 12.14% 34.97% 52.89% 
Aggregate dollar amount $441,090,114 $41,411,371 $102,535,972 $297,142,771 
Percent of total sample 100% 9.39% 23.25% 67.36% 
Panel B:  Firm-level statistics. 
 Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
Political Contributions (unscaled) 142,448 215,406 11,950 57,225 182,214 
Aggregate statistics are computed on the full data set of political contributions made by the employees and PACs of parent and 
subsidiary companies belonging to the S&P 500 for which sufficient data are available during fiscal years 2005-2011.  A firm 
that entered and/or departed the S&P 500 during the sample period is included in the analysis during the years in which they 
belonged to the index.  We restrict the upper bound of the sample to fiscal year 2011.  Consistent with recommendations 
offered in the Center for Responsive Politics’ OpenSecrets user’s guide, we impose several exclusions. In the employee 
subsample, the following contribution-level observations are excluded: noncontributions (RealCode beginning with “Z9”), 
contributions to committees (RecipID beginning with “N”), and contributions to PACs (RecipID beginning with “P”).  In the 
PAC subsample, the following contribution-level observations are excluded: noncontributions (RealCode beginning with “Z9”) 
and transfers between committees as well as contributions to joint fundraising committees (RealCode beginning with “Z4”).  
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Table 20.  The market reaction to Citizens United: Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses. 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics (N = 133). Mean Std Dev 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile  
 
CAR(0, 0), in % –0.082 1.591 –1.051 –0.116 0.846  
CAR(0,+2), in % –0.123 2.039 –1.279 –0.334 1.142  
CAR(0,+5), in % –0.482 3.648 –2.142 –0.612 0.995  
Net Total Assets, in $ millions 18,215 25,816 4,571 9,844 23,056  
Market-to-Book 2.254 1.281 1.440 1.868 2.666  
Debt/NTA 0.266 0.153 0.170 0.261 0.340  
Panel B:  Univariate results for subsamples of political connectedness. 
 
                     POLITICAL (N = 60)                     
 
                   NEUTRAL (N = 73)                    
 
           POLITICAL – NEUTRAL            
 Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic % Positive t-statistic  Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic % Positive t-statistic  Diff. in ?̂? t-statistic Diff. in % Pos. χ2 stat 
CAR(0, 0) –0.475** –2.256 28.33%*** –3.690  0.240 1.377 56.16% 1.050  –0.715** –2.616 –27.83%*** 10.373 
CAR(0,+2) –0.633*** –2.902 23.33%*** –4.840  0.300 1.146 50.69% 0.120  –0.929*** –2.746 –27.36%*** 10.421 
CAR(0,+5) –1.219** –2.248 31.67%*** –3.030  0.123 0.349 43.84% –1.050  –1.343** –2.074 –12.17% 2.063 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for a combined sample of POLITICAL and NEUTRAL firms.  “POLITICAL” refers to our sample of historically politically connected 
firms, defined as firms in the fourth quartile of median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by NTA).  “NEUTRAL” refers to our sample of historically non-
politically connected firms, defined as firms in the first quartile of median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by NTA), as well as firms that did not 
contribute to political campaigns prior to Citizens United.  CARs are estimated surrounding the date of the Citizens United decision, January 21, 2010, and represent average ?̂? 
estimates, where the parameter ?̂? is derived from the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), Ri = αi + βiRm + δiEvent + εi.  In this specification, Ri is the return series for 
individual firm i, Rm is the return series for CRSP value-weighted index (including dividends), and Event is a dummy variable that equals 1 on days included in the event 
window (0 otherwise).  Daily returns are measured between April 1, 2008, and March 31, 2010, and are retrieved from the CRSP daily returns file.  The event parameter 
estimate ?̂? corresponds to the average abnormal return for firm i in a given event window, and is multiplied by increments of 100% for each day in the event window to obtain 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  Control variables are measured as of fiscal year-end 2009 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  //  Panel B presents 
summary statistics and univariate tests of average ?̂? estimates for the subsamples of POLITICAL and NEUTRAL firms, in addition to a nonparametric test based on the 
proportion of positive CARs. t-statistics reflecting the statistical significance of differences in mean ?̂? values assume unequal variances between the two groups.  Statistical 
tests of the difference in proportions of positive CARs between the two sub-groups utilize the Chi-squared distribution. 
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Table 21.  The market reaction to Citizens United: Cross-sectional analysis. 
 CAR(0, 0) CAR(0,+2) CAR(0,+5) 
Variable I II III 
Political Dummy –0.750*** –0.915** –1.327** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.042) 
Log(Net Total Assets) –0.042 –0.046 –0.022 
 (0.747) (0.788) (0.944) 
Market-to-Book 0.268** 0.047 0.085 
 (0.020) (0.756) (0.753) 
Debt/NTA 0.112 0.378 1.095 
 (0.898) (0.742) (0.598) 
R
2
 0.103 0.055 0.037 
N 133 133 133 
The results represent estimates from a multivariate ordinary least squares regression where average ?̂? estimates are regressed on 
a measure of historical political connectedness (Political Dummy) and control variables.  The parameter ?̂? is derived from the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), Ri = αi + βiRm + δiEvent + εi where Ri is the return series for individual firm i, Rm is the 
return series for CRSP value-weighted index (including dividends), and Event is a dummy variable that equals 1 on days 
included in the event window (0 otherwise).  Daily returns are measured between April 1, 2008, and March 31, 2010, and are 
retrieved from the CRSP daily returns file.  The event parameter estimate ?̂? corresponds to the average abnormal return for firm 
i in a given event window, and is multiplied by increments of 100% for each day in the event window to obtain the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR).  Control variables are measured as of fiscal year-end 2009 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  Standard errors are corrected 
for contemporaneous cross-correlation in the residuals through use of the SUR methodology.  p-values are shown in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 22.  Univariate analysis. 
  
               All firms      
Political Contribution Quartiles   
           1                   2                      3                   4                  Difference         
  N  Mean   N Mean N  Mean   N  Mean   N Mean  (1) – (4) t-statistic 
Panel A:  Cash holdings and its traditional determinants. 
Log(Cash/NTA) 
Pre-Citizens United 871 –2.652 217 –2.818 224 –2.718 220 –2.761 210 –2.295 –0.523*** –4.127 
Post-Citizens United 454 –2.423 111 –2.619 115 –2.414 112 –2.650 116 –2.025 –0.594*** –3.462 
 Pre – Post  –0.229***  –0.199  –0.304**  –0.111  –0.269*   
 t-statistic  –2.980  –1.389  –2.068  –0.710  –1.691   
Log(Total Assets) 
Pre-Citizens United 871 9.371 217 9.146 224 9.338 220 9.732 210 9.260 –0.114 –1.063 
Post-Citizens United 454 9.566 111 9.392 115 9.414 112 9.949 116 9.512 –0.120 –0.812 
 Pre – Post  –0.195***  –0.246*  –0.075  –0.217**  –0.252*   
 t-statistic  –2.980  –1.892  –0.519  –2.061  –1.961   
Log(Sales) 
Pre-Citizens United 871 9.319 217 9.140 224 9.271 220 9.568 210 9.295 –0.154 –1.473 
Post-Citizens United 454 9.436 111 9.296 115 9.308 112 9.671 116 9.469 –0.173 –1.183 
 Pre – Post  –0.116*  –0.155  –0.037  –0.102  –0.174   
 t-statistic  –1.840  –1.264  –0.249  –1.129  –1.335   
Debt/NTA 
Pre-Citizens United 870 0.255 217 0.242 224 0.272 220 0.273 209 0.230 0.012 0.858 
Post-Citizens United 454 0.284 111 0.250 115 0.312 112 0.306 116 0.268 –0.017 –0.923 
 Pre – Post  –0.030***  –0.008  –0.041**  –0.033*  –0.038**   
 t-statistic  –3.330  –0.481  –2.104  –1.941  –2.187   
Market-to-Book 
Pre-Citizens United 871 2.380 217 2.128 224 2.220 220 2.374 210 2.815 –0.687*** –4.680 
Post-Citizens United 454 2.163 111 1.963 115 2.146 112 2.114 116 2.418 –0.454*** –2.889 
 Pre – Post  0.217**  0.165  0.075  0.259  0.398**   
 t-statistic  2.480  1.303  0.496  1.239  2.051   
Cash Flow/NTA 
Pre-Citizens United 866 0.113 216 0.109 223 0.111 220 0.103 207 0.130 –0.021*** –3.200 
Post-Citizens United 450 0.112 111 0.109 113 0.115 112 0.106 114 0.119 –0.010 –1.056 
 Pre – Post  0.001  0.000  –0.004  –0.003  0.011   
 t-statistic  0.160  0.018  –0.624  –0.345  1.265   
Std(Cash Flow/NTA) 
Pre-Citizens United 871 0.036 217 0.032 224 0.034 220 0.034 210 0.043 –0.011*** –2.761 
Post-Citizens United 454 0.035 111 0.027 115 0.036 112 0.035 116 0.041 –0.014*** –3.521 
 Pre – Post  0.001  0.005  –0.002  –0.001  0.002   
 t-statistic  0.480  1.439  –0.586  –0.113  0.481   
Net Working 
Capital/NTA 
Pre-Citizens United 871 0.001 217 0.039 224 –0.002 220 –0.001 210 –0.032 0.071*** 5.368 
Post-Citizens United 454 0.008 111 0.040 115 0.006 112 –0.001 116 –0.010 0.050*** 3.042 
 Pre – Post  –0.007  –0.001  –0.009  0.000  –0.022   
 t-statistic  –0.970  –0.054  –0.513  –0.023  –1.291   
R&D/Sales 
Pre-Citizens United 871 0.038 217 0.026 224 0.036 220 0.034 210 0.056 –0.030*** –4.563 
Post-Citizens United 454 0.035 111 0.024 115 0.029 112 0.034 116 0.051 –0.027*** –3.187 
 Pre – Post  0.003  0.001  0.006  0.000  0.005   
 t-statistic  0.780  0.216  0.892  0.039  0.553   
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Table 22 (Continued) 
R&D Missing Dummy 
Pre-Citizens United 871 0.369 217 0.327 224 0.362 220 0.432 210 0.352 –0.025 –0.548 
Post-Citizens United 454 0.368 111 0.306 115 0.365 112 0.438 116 0.362 –0.056 –0.888 
 Pre – Post  0.001  0.021  –0.004  –0.006  –0.010   
 t-statistic  0.030  0.383  –0.065  –0.098  –0.174   
Capital 
Expenditures/NTA 
Pre-Citizens United 871 0.060 217 0.066 224 0.060 220 0.057 210 0.054 0.012*** 2.764 
Post-Citizens United 454 0.051 111 0.059 115 0.053 112 0.054 116 0.040 0.018*** 3.507 
 Pre – Post  0.008***  0.007  0.007  0.003  0.014***   
 t-statistic  3.390  1.224  1.316  0.956  3.881   
Dividend Dummy 
Pre-Citizens United 871 0.836 217 0.848 224 0.813 220 0.841 210 0.843 0.005 0.145 
Post-Citizens United 454 0.855 111 0.856 115 0.817 112 0.857 116 0.888 –0.032 –0.721 
 Pre – Post  –0.019  –0.008  –0.005  –0.016  –0.045   
 t-statistic  –0.890  –0.190  –0.109  –0.387  –1.118   
Panel B:  Governance variables. 
E-Index 
Pre-Citizens United 213 4.132 51 3.863 61 4.393 43 3.930 58 4.241 –0.379* –1.799 
Post-Citizens United 357 1.742 87 1.690 93 1.882 85 1.506 92 1.870 –0.018 –1.164 
 Pre – Post  2.389***  2.173***  2.512***  2.424***  2.372***   
 t-statistic  26.190  11.555  13.555  14.396  13.477   
Proportion of Busy 
Directors 
Pre-Citizens United 327 0.176 74 0.173 86 0.167 79 0.162 88 0.201 –0.028 –1.224 
Post-Citizens United 380 0.132 88 0.114 97 0.137 95 0.142 100 0.134 –0.020 –1.259 
 Pre – Post  0.044***  0.059***  0.031  0.019  0.067***   
 t-statistic  4.330  3.005  1.526  0.846  3.591   
Excess CEO 
Compensation 
Pre-Citizens United 868 –0.047 216 –0.175 222 –0.085 220 0.035 210 0.039 –0.214** –2.066 
Post-Citizens United 453 0.099 111 0.067 115 0.053 112 0.248 115 0.030 0.037 0.315 
 Pre – Post  –0.146**  –0.242**  –0.139  –0.213*  0.009   
 t-statistic  –2.510  –2.078  –1.396  –1.655  0.077   
Shareholder Inactivism 
Dummy 
Pre-Citizens United 251 0.570 51 0.667 63 0.746 74 0.378 63 0.540 0.127 1.373 
Post-Citizens United 237 0.578 45 0.600 56 0.750 71 0.451 65 0.554 0.046 0.477 
 Pre – Post  –0.008  0.067  –0.004  –0.072  –0.014   
 t-statistic  –0.190  0.672  –0.049  –0.880  –0.160   
Univariate analyses are computed on the full sample of S&P 500 firms for which sufficient data are available during fiscal years 2005-2011.  Quartiles of political connectedness are 
based on the Political Dummy, defined as median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by NTA).  To provide a cleaner test, fiscal year 2009 observations (i.e., those 
immediately preceding passage of Citizens United) are excluded.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  See Appendix D for other 
variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 23.  The differential relation in political contributions for historically 
politically connected firms relative to historically non-politically connected firms in 
the post-Citizens United period. 
Variable 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
  
Political Dummy 1.556* 
 (0.075) 
  Contributions/NTA 0.808*** 
 (0.000) 
  Log(Net Total Assets) –0.234 
 (0.536) 
  Debt/NTA –2.148 
 (0.392) 
  Market-to-Book 0.035 
 (0.930) 
  Cash Flow/NTA –2.603 
 (0.719) 
  Std(Cash Flow/NTA) 3.465 
 (0.789) 
  Net Working Capital/NTA –0.870 
 (0.770) 
  R&D/Sales –3.649 
 (0.622) 
  R&D Missing Dummy 0.399 
 (0.659) 
  Capital Expenditures/NTA –12.201 
 (0.299) 
  Dividend Dummy –0.756 
 (0.487) 
Adj. R
2
 0.776 
N 259 
The results represent pooled regressions of Political Contributions/NTA on traditional determinants of cash 
holdings and a measure of historical political connectedness (Political Dummy), and are estimated for the 
period 2010-2011 for which sufficient data are available. All traditional determinants of cash holdings are 
lagged in an effort to alleviate endogeneity.  To provide a cleaner test, fiscal year 2009 observations (i.e., those 
immediately preceding passage of Citizens United) are excluded.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is computed as 
Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents. Political Dummy is a measure of historical political connectedness 
and is based on median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by NTA), set equal to 1 for firms 
in the fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and for historically non-politically active 
firms.  See Appendix D for other variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 24.  The change in cash holdings modeled as a function of the change in 
political contributions as computed in year 2010 (post-Citizens United) relative to 
year 2008 (pre-Citizens United). 
Variable 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
  
ΔContributions/NTA 0.017** 
 (0.043) 
  ΔLog(Net Total Assets) –0.820*** 
 0.000  
  ΔDebt/NTA 1.745*** 
 (0.004) 
  ΔMarket-to-Book 0.172** 
 (0.020) 
  ΔCash Flow/NTA 1.401  
 (0.102) 
  ΔStd(Cash Flow/NTA) 1.914  
 (0.454) 
  ΔNet Working Capital/NTA –0.339 
 (0.583) 
  ΔR&D/Sales 1.759  
 (0.593) 
  ΔR&D Missing Dummy –0.502 
 (0.162) 
  ΔCapital Expenditures/NTA –4.885** 
 (0.015) 
  ΔDividend Dummy 0.191  
 (0.640) 
  Adj. R
2
 0.186 
N 236 
The results represent pooled regressions of 236 firm-level differences computed as observed values in 2010 
(post-Citizens United) less observed values in 2008 (pre-Citizens United).  The dependent variable is 
∆Log(Cash/NTA).  To provide a cleaner test, fiscal year 2009 observations (i.e., those immediately preceding 
passage of Citizens United) are excluded.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is computed as Total Assets less Cash & 
Cash Equivalents.  See Appendix D for other variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 
0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 25.  The differential relation in cash holdings for historically politically 
connected firms relative to historically non-politically connected firms in the post-
Citizens United relative to pre-Citizens United periods. 
Variable 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
  
Political Dummy –0.018 
 (0.764) 
Post-Citizens United Dummy –0.072 
 (0.416) 
Political Dummy × Post-Citizens United Dummy 0.181** 
 (0.026) 
  
Log(Cash/NTA) 0.770*** 
 0.000  
Log(Net Total Assets) –0.011 
 (0.676) 
Debt/NTA –0.314* 
 (0.076) 
Market-to-Book 0.020  
 (0.304) 
Cash Flow/NTA  0.783  
 (0.102) 
Std(Cash Flow/NTA) 1.354** 
 (0.026) 
Net Working Capital/NTA –0.089 
 (0.682) 
R&D/Sales 0.709* 
 (0.062) 
R&D Missing Dummy –0.086 
 (0.160) 
Capital Expenditures/NTA –2.149*** 
 0.000  
Dividend Dummy –0.149** 
 (0.027) 
Adj. R
2
 0.798 
N 707 
The results represent a regression of Log(Cash/NTA) on traditional determinants of cash holdings, a measure 
of historical political connectedness (Political Dummy), and year fixed effects, and are estimated for the 
period 2005-2011 for which sufficient data are available.  All traditional determinants of cash holdings are 
lagged in an effort to alleviate endogeneity.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  To provide a cleaner test, 
fiscal year 2009 observations (i.e., those immediately preceding passage of Citizens United) are excluded.  Net 
Total Assets (NTA) is computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  Political Dummy is a measure 
of historical political connectedness and is based on median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions 
(scaled by NTA), set equal to 1 for firms in the fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and 
for historically non-politically active firms.  See Appendix D for other variable definitions.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 26.  The differential relation in corporate cash holdings with respect to political connectedness and governance quality in the post-Citizens United relative to pre-
Citizens United periods. 
 
High 
Compensation Busy Boards E-Index 
Proposal 
Entertained 
during  
2007-2008 or 
2010-2011 
Proposal 
Entertained 
during 2007-
2008 
Proposal 
Entertained 
during  
2010-2011 
Variable  I II III IV V VI 
Political Dummy 0.030 0.157 0.523 0.119 –0.116 0.053 
 (0.695) (0.358) (0.151) (0.525) (0.610) (0.749) 
Post-Citizens United Dummy 0.218* 0.230** 0.055 0.194 –0.086 0.214 
 (0.080) (0.044) (0.827) (0.414) (0.784) (0.362) 
Political Dummy × Post-Citizens United Dummy –0.063 –0.161 –0.556 –0.057 –0.135 –0.059 
 (0.601) (0.416) (0.179) (0.740) (0.549) (0.682) 
Weak Governance 0.011 0.758** –0.039 –0.311 0.101 –0.277 
 (0.888) (0.035) (0.420) (0.249) (0.764) (0.296) 
Political Dummy × Weak Governance –0.092 –0.878 –0.150 –0.243 0.116 –0.148 
 (0.398) (0.173) (0.102) (0.258) (0.648) (0.476) 
Post-Citizens United Dummy × Weak Governance –0.311** –0.742 –0.085 –0.266 0.127 –0.266 
 (0.034) (0.176) (0.470) (0.325) (0.711) (0.314) 
Political Dummy × Post-Citizens United Dummy × Weak Governance 0.403** 1.586* 0.244 0.670** –0.000 0.583* 
 (0.028) (0.065) (0.114) (0.035) (0.999) (0.062) 
       
Control variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Adj. R2 0.800 0.837 0.818 0.866 0.861 0.865 
N 705 380 316 238 238 238 
The results represent a regression of Log(Cash/NTA) on traditional determinants of cash holdings, a measure of historical political connectedness (Political Dummy), a measure of 
weak corporate governance (the Compensation Dummy in column I, Busy Directors in column II, E-Index Dummy in column III, or Shareholder Inactivism Dummy in columns IV, 
V, and VI), and year fixed effects, and are estimated for the period 2005-2011 for which sufficient data are available.  Data used to estimate the E-Index and Busy Directors measures 
are derived from RiskMetrics and available for the period 2007-2011.  Data used to estimate the Compensation Dummy are derived from Execucomp and available for the period 
2005-2011.  All traditional determinants of cash holdings are lagged in an effort to alleviate endogeneity.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  To provide a cleaner test, fiscal year 
2009 observations (i.e., those immediately preceding passage of Citizens United) are excluded.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  
Political Dummy is a measure of historical political connectedness and is based on median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by NTA), set equal to 1 for firms in the 
fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and for historically non-politically active firms.  Control variables include the lagged values of Log(Cash/NTA), Log(Net 
Total Assets), Debt/NTA, the Market-to-Book ratio, Cash Flow/NTA, Std(Cash Flow/NTA), Net Working Capital/NTA, R&D/Sales, R&D Missing Dummy, Capital 
Expenditures/NTA, and the Dividend Dummy.  See Appendix D for other variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are 
shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 27.  The differential relation in cash holdings as a function of within-firm 
deviation of political beliefs in the post-Citizens United relative to pre-Citizens 
United periods. 
Variable 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
  
Political Deviation –0.274*** 
 (0.010) 
Post-Citizens United Dummy –0.323** 
 (0.011) 
Political Deviation × Post-Citizens United Dummy 0.537** 
 (0.011) 
  
Log(Cash/NTA) 0.845*** 
 0.000  
Log(Net Total Assets) 0.008  
 (0.813) 
Debt/NTA –0.437 
 (0.136) 
Market-to-Book –0.016 
 (0.398) 
Cash Flow/NTA  0.548  
 (0.400) 
Std(Cash Flow/NTA) 0.529  
 (0.374) 
Net Working Capital/NTA 0.177  
 (0.400) 
R&D/Sales 0.465  
 (0.272) 
R&D Missing Dummy –0.062 
 (0.470) 
Capital Expenditures/NTA –2.999** 
 (0.015) 
Dividend Dummy –0.198** 
 (0.018) 
Adj. R
2
 0.848 
N 281 
The results represent a regression of Log(Cash/NTA) on traditional determinants of cash holdings, a measure 
of historical within-firm diversion in political beliefs (Political Deviation), and year fixed effects, and are 
estimated for the period 2005-2011 for which sufficient data are available.  To be included in the test, the firm-
year observation must report positive executive contributions and positive non-executive contributions, and be 
drawn from our sample of historically politically active firms (i.e., the upper quartile of pre-Citizens United 
political contributions).  All traditional determinants of cash holdings are lagged in an effort to alleviate 
endogeneity.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  To provide a cleaner test, fiscal year 2009 observations 
(i.e., those immediately preceding passage of Citizens United) are excluded.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is 
computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  Political Deviation is a ranked variable to capture 
the degree of historical, within-firm divergence in political beliefs, ranging from 0.10 (bottom decile) to 1.00 
(top decile).  Deciles are formed based on the median firm-level absolute difference in the proportion of PAC 
contributions to Republicans and the proportion of executive contributions to Republicans as observed during 
the pre-Citizens United period.  See Appendix D for other variable definitions.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 28.  Validity of the natural experiment: Placebo regressions. 
Event shifted backwards by: I. One year II. Two years III. Three years 
Variable 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
Coef. 
(p-value) 
    
Political Dummy 0.001 –0.012 –0.009 
 (0.993) (0.864) (0.916) 
Post-Citizens United Dummy –0.009 –0.076 0.052 
 (0.914) (0.361) (0.557) 
Political Dummy × Post-Citizens United Dummy 0.061 0.036 –0.002 
 (0.378) (0.578) (0.984) 
    
Log(Cash/NTA) 0.774*** 0.773*** 0.802*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Net Total Assets) –0.015 –0.019 –0.027 
 (0.541) (0.422) (0.214) 
Debt/NTA –0.385** –0.399*** –0.371*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) 
Market-to-Book 0.024 0.027* 0.027 
 (0.161) (0.088) (0.110) 
Cash Flow/NTA  0.638 0.606 0.285 
 (0.128) (0.134) (0.460) 
Std(Cash Flow/NTA) 1.185* 1.602** 1.495 
 (0.072) (0.023) (0.110) 
Net Working Capital/NTA 0.030 0.033 0.004 
 (0.879) (0.845) (0.977) 
R&D/Sales 0.432 0.715** 0.481 
 (0.207) (0.039) (0.125) 
R&D Missing Dummy –0.067 –0.063 –0.066 
 (0.199) (0.204) (0.181) 
Capital Expenditures/NTA –1.689*** –1.599*** –1.187** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) 
Dividend Dummy –0.183*** –0.201*** –0.145** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.030) 
    
Adj. R
2
 841 878 890 
N 0.793 0.805 0.808 
The results represent a regression of Log(Cash/NTA) on traditional determinants of cash holdings, a measure of historical 
political connectedness (Political Dummy), and year fixed effects.  In column I (II) [III], the post-Citizens United event window 
is shifted by one (two) [three] year(s) into the past; that is, Post-Citizens United Dummy is set to 1 for fiscal years 2009-2011 
(2008-2011) [2007-2011], and 0 for fiscal years 2005 through the year before the post-event window.  Standard errors are 
clustered by firm.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  Political Dummy is a 
measure of historical political connectedness and is based on median firm-level pre-event contributions (scaled by NTA), set 
equal to 1 for firms in the fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and for historically non-politically active 
firms.  Political Dummy is redefined for each of the three possible pre-event windows presented in the table.  See Appendix D 
for other variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in 
parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 29.  Robustness checks on the market reaction to Citizens United: Univariate analyses. 
I.  After accounting for confounding events. 
                      POLITICAL                                                   NEUTRAL                              POLITICAL – NEUTRAL         
 N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic Difference t-statistic 
CAR(0, 0) 55 –0.592*** –3.240 70 0.227 1.260 –0.820*** –3.190 
CAR(0,+2) 50 –0.737*** –3.480 67 0.253 1.050 –0.989*** –3.090 
CAR(0,+5) 34 –0.785* –1.750 56 –0.010 –0.030 –0.775 –1.330 
II.  After excluding the defense, energy, and utilities industries. 
                      POLITICAL                                                  NEUTRAL                              POLITICAL – NEUTRAL         
 N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic Difference t-statistic 
CAR(0, 0) 50 –0.548** –2.474 64 0.211 1.092 –0.759** –2.582 
CAR(0,+2) 50 –0.631** –2.581 64 0.336 1.203 –0.967** –2.604 
CAR(0,+5) 50 –1.413** –2.231 64 0.237 0.609 –1.650** –2.220 
III.  After redefining POLITICAL on the basis of within-industry pre-Citizens United contributions. 
                      POLITICAL                                                  NEUTRAL                              POLITICAL – NEUTRAL         
 
N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic Difference t-statistic 
CAR(0, 0) 58 –0.272 –1.391 67 0.229 1.294 –0.500* –1.899 
CAR(0,+2) 58 –0.459** –2.113 67 0.275 1.015 –0.734** –2.113 
CAR(0,+5) 58 –0.766* –1.784 67 0.080 0.210 –0.845 –1.476 
IV.  Placebo analysis. 
                      POLITICAL                                            NEUTRAL (placebo)                   POLITICAL – NEUTRAL         
 N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic N Mean ?̂? (%) t-statistic Difference t-statistic 
CAR(0, 0) 60 –0.475** –2.256 60 0.609*** 2.970 0.011*** 3.691 
CAR(0,+2) 60 –0.633*** –2.902 60 0.504 1.565 0.004*** 2.927 
CAR(0,+5) 60 –1.219** –2.248 60 0.085 0.189 0.002* 1.855 
This table presents sensitivity analyses on the results provided in Table 20 Panel B.  In analysis I, we exclude firms that are associated with a confounding event, defined as a firm 
filing a form 8-K with the SEC during the event window or the day preceding the Citizens United decision.  In analysis II, we exclude politically exposed firms, i.e., those 
belonging to the defense, energy, or utilities industries, where Fama-French 48-industry classifications are used to identify firms belonging to the defense (industry code 26), 
energy (industry codes 29 and 30), and utilities (industry code 31) industries.  In analysis III, Political Dummy is redefined in terms of median firm-level pre-Citizens United 
contributions (scaled by Net Total Assets) within each 1-digit SIC industry, set equal to 1 for firms in the fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and for 
historically non-politically active firms.  In analysis IV, politically “neutral” firms are replaced with “placebo-neutral” firms, defined as companies that match to POLITICAL 
firms on industry (two-digit SIC) and size (Log of Total Assets) within the same fiscal year, and where Political Dummy is set to 0 for these “placebo-neutral” companies.  
Summary statistics and univariate tests are based on average ?̂? estimates, where the parameter ?̂? is derived from the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), Ri = αi + βiRm + 
δiEvent + εi where Ri is the return series for individual firm i, Rm is the return series for CRSP value-weighted index (including dividends), and Event is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 on days included in the event window (0 otherwise).  Daily returns are measured between April 1, 2008, and March 31, 2010, and are retrieved from the CRSP daily 
returns file.  The event parameter estimate ?̂? corresponds to the average abnormal return for firm i in a given event window, and is multiplied by increments of 100% for each day 
in the event window to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  “POLITICAL” refers to our sample of historically politically connected firms, defined as firms in the fourth 
quartile of median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by NTA).  “NEUTRAL” refers to our sample of historically non-politically connected firms, defined as 
firms in the first quartile of median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by NTA), as well as firms that did not contribute to political campaigns prior to Citizens 
United.  t-statistics reflecting the statistical significance of differences in means assume unequal variances between the two groups.   
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Table 30.  Robustness checks on the market reaction to Citizens United: Multivariate analyses. 
       I. Confounding events            II. Politically exposed firms          III. Redefining POLITICAL    
Variable CAR(0, 0) CAR(0,+2) CAR(0,+5) CAR(0, 0) CAR(0,+2) CAR(0,+5) CAR(0, 0) CAR(0,+2) CAR(0,+5) 
Political Dummy –0.841*** –0.975*** –0.653 –0.804*** –0.985** –1.735** –0.549** –0.752** –0.807 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.298) (0.008) (0.016) (0.022) (0.041) (0.043) (0.176) 
Log(Net Total Assets) –0.092 –0.047 –0.259 –0.074 0.065 0.182 –0.034 –0.006 –0.004 
 (0.481) (0.788) (0.475) (0.603) (0.739) (0.614) (0.789) (0.971) (0.989) 
Market-to-Book 0.297*** 0.096 –0.270 0.294** 0.056 0.165 0.258** 0.104 0.052 
 (0.008) (0.509) (0.413) (0.015) (0.728) (0.582) (0.023) (0.503) (0.835) 
Debt/NTA –0.002 0.443 –0.339 0.216 0.759 1.091 0.085 0.118 1.227 
 (0.998) (0.676) (0.849) (0.814) (0.542) (0.636) (0.922) (0.922) (0.526) 
R2 0.159 0.080 0.028 0.128 0.059 0.051 0.084 0.038 0.021 
N 125 117 90 114 114 114 125 125 125 
IV. The impact of corporate governance quality on the announcement date. 
Variable E-Index Busy Directors High Compensation 
Political Dummy × Weak Governance –0.449*** –1.222 –0.791** 
 (0.005) (0.454) (0.027) 
(1 – Political Dummy) × Weak Governance –0.186 2.210 –0.141 
 (0.297) (0.210) (0.651) 
Log(Net Total Assets) –0.139 –0.041 –0.072 
 (0.351) (0.790) (0.587) 
Market-to-Book 0.034 0.151 0.250** 
 (0.838) (0.357) (0.031) 
Debt/NTA 0.638 0.150 0.093 
 (0.509) (0.888) (0.917) 
R2 0.115 0.042 0.087 
N 85 110 133 
This table presents sensitivity analyses on the results provided in Table 21.  In analysis I, we exclude firms that are associated with a confounding event, defined as a firm filing a 
form 8-K with the SEC during the event window or the day preceding the Citizens United decision.  In analysis II, we exclude politically exposed firms, i.e., those belonging to 
the defense, energy, or utilities industries, where Fama-French 48-industry classifications are used to identify firms belonging to the defense (industry code 26), energy (industry 
codes 29 and 30), and utilities (industry code 31) industries.  In analysis III, Political Dummy is redefined in terms of median firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled 
by Net Total Assets) within each 1-digit SIC industry, set equal to 1 for firms in the fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and for historically non-politically 
active firms.  In analysis IV, the market reaction to Citizens United is modeled as a function of corporate governance quality.  The results represent estimates from a multivariate 
ordinary least squares regression where average ?̂? estimates are regressed on a measure of historical political connectedness (Political Dummy) and control variables.  The 
parameter ?̂? is derived from the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), Ri = αi + βiRm + δiEvent + εi where Ri is the return series for individual firm i, Rm is the return series for 
CRSP value-weighted index (including dividends), and Event is a dummy variable that equals 1 on days included in the event window (0 otherwise).  Daily returns are measured 
between April 1, 2008, and March 31, 2010, and are retrieved from the CRSP daily returns file.  The event parameter estimate ?̂? corresponds to the average abnormal return for 
firm i in a given event window, and is multiplied by increments of 100% for each day in the event window to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  Control variables are 
measured as of fiscal year-end 2009 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  
Standard errors are corrected for contemporaneous cross-correlation in the residuals through use of the SUR methodology.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 31.  Robustness checks on the differential relation in cash holdings for historically 
politically connected firms relative to historically non-politically connected firms in the post-
Citizens United relative to pre-Citizens United periods. 
 
Accounting for politically  
     exposed industries      
Industry-adjusted 
values 
Variable I II III 
Political Dummy –0.028 –0.023 –0.062 
 (0.646) (0.692) (0.322) 
Post-Citizens United Dummy –0.124 –0.036 –0.252** 
 (0.189) (0.696) (0.019) 
Political Dummy × Post-Citizens United Dummy 0.175** 0.153* 0.250*** 
 (0.026) (0.058) (0.005) 
Control variables? Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.793 0.803 0.672 
N 596 669 559 
This table represent a regression of Log(Cash/NTA) on traditional determinants of cash holdings, a measure of historical 
political connectedness (Political Dummy), and year fixed effects, and are estimated for the period 2005-2011 for which 
sufficient data are available.  //  The results in columns I and II parallel those provided in Table 25 after controlling for 
politically exposed firms.  In column I, firms belonging to the defense, energy, and utilities industries are excluded, where 
Fama-French 48-industry classifications are used to identify firms belonging to the defense (industry code 26), energy (industry 
codes 29 and 30), and utilities (industry code 31) industries.  In column II, Political Dummy is redefined in terms of median 
firm-level pre-Citizens United contributions (scaled by Net Total Assets) within each 1-digit SIC industry, set equal to 1 for 
firms in the fourth quartile and equal to 0 for firms in the first quartile and for historically non-politically active firms.  //  The 
results in column III parallel those provided in Table 25 after industry-adjusting both the dependent and independent variables.  
Industry-adjusted forms of all continuous variables are defined relative to the annual industry median.  Fama-French 48-
industry classifications are used for the industry adjustment.  To be included in the test, the industry corresponding to each 
firm-year observation must include a minimum of five observations for that year.  //  All traditional determinants of cash 
holdings are lagged in an effort to alleviate endogeneity.  Standard errors are clustered by firm.  To provide a cleaner test, fiscal 
year 2009 observations (i.e., those immediately preceding passage of Citizens United) are excluded.  Net Total Assets (NTA) is 
computed as Total Assets less Cash & Cash Equivalents.  See Appendix D for other variable definitions.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  p-values are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicates significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test. 
 
 
